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Note on pronunciation 
 
Serbian/Croatian words and names will be used in this research and commonly should be 
pronounced as follows: 
 
a - a as in father (long), above (short) 
c - ts as in rats 
ć - ' soft' ch, as in Pacino, chilli 
č - ' hard' ch, as in chalk 
đ - g as in gender, or j as in juice 
dž - ' dzh ' as in jam, edge 
e - as in pet (short), or grey (long) 
g - as in go (never as g in ' large' !) 
h - ' kh ' (gutteral) as in loch 
i - as in pin (short) or machine (long) 
j - y as in yet or yes 
lj - Ii as in million, halyard 
nj - ni as in dominion, canyon 
o - 0 as in upon 
s - as in hiss 
š - sh as in shawl, sugar 
u - u as in rule 
ž - zh, as in French jour 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Identities in general, and especially national identity, have been in the last years a very popular 
topic of research in the field of social studies. Scientific interest in the topic was enhanced after the 
World War I, following creation of numerous nation-states in Europe (Wehler, 2001). Since then, 
there have been numerous increasingly differentiated studies, offering diverse approaches and 
theoretical frameworks. The issue has gained even more importance with the enlargement of the 
European Union and the creation of a disputed common ―European identity‖.  
So far, empirical studies of nation, nationalism and national identity in the ex-Yugoslavian states 
have predominately dealt with analyses of intensity, distribution and the effect on the day-to-day 
politics. Only recently, there have been studies comparing European and national identity. It has 
been shown that the second half of the 20th century was marked by dominant attachment to 
Yugoslav nation. Attachment to Serbian and Croatian nation emerged during 80‘s and early 90‘s. Its 
intensity strengthened during multiethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, and it remains dominant 
today. (Milošević ĐorĊević, 2007) 
It seems that notions of nation, nationalism and national identity, regardless of what exactly is 
defined by them, will accompany us well into 21st century. Recent worldwide political 
developments indicate that simultaneous and contrary to leveling of nations through globalization, 
there is a process of further differentiation among the nations, characterized by an ever increasing 
number of ethnic groups looking for their political and territorial independence and by 
progressively stronger statements of obvious national interests of world‘s most powerful nations. 
While most democratic western nations have adopted a civic nationalism as the basis for their state-
building, the new nation states that emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia were 
characterized by an extremely ethnic nationalism, based rather on blood and common roots then on 
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a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens. According to Bazić (2009:38), the intensity of 
national identity is stronger among the ethnic than in the civic model of the nation.  
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the common Yugoslav identity created the emergence of a 
series of new national minorities in all its ex republics, and the beginning of their struggle in order 
to determine and preserve their national identities.  
The case of the Serb minority in Croatia is particual, because we have a situation where a relatively 
large minority and historically so important that it had the status of constitutive people
1
, entered in 
an armed conflict with the dominant population, the Croats, with the military support of the 
minority‘s country of origin. The result of this conflict for the Serbs in Croatia was, among others, 
the loss of their previous legal status, which saw them becoming a national minority overnight. Not 
only the Serbs have lost their centuries-long privileged status in Croatia, but they lost as well the 
protection offered them previously by the Yugoslav Constitution (1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974). 
They not only became an unwanted and hated minority, but they also became the main public 
enemy, the ―aggressors‖, and very soon experienced the legal discrimination of their new status as a 
national minority.  
This new situation produced uncertainty and an identity crisis among the Serb community in 
Croatia, who had no other choice but to ―rediscover‖ or ―reinvent‖ its own national identity in a 
changed society of a new formed nation-state.   
Aware of the loss of their historical position, which, as a constituent people Serbs have built for 
centuries, and are again on the path from an unrecognized community to a community which is 
organizing itself through the mechanisms of personal autonomy and restoring the memory of its 
historical role, and are already building, in new historical circumstances, a new community of post-
Yugoslav and future European society. 
                                                 
1
 According to the 1971 Yugoslav Constitution, Croats, Serbs, Slovenians, Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians 
were considered as constitutive people or ―nations‖(narodi) regardless of their Republic of residence, while the other 18 
ethnic groups and/or minorities present in Yugoslavia were considered as ―nationalities‖ (narodnosti).  It is interesting 
to point out that none of these nations represented the ―majority‖ since the most numerous nation, the Serbs, were only 
the 36.3% of the entire Yugoslavian population in 1981.  
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The Civil (or Homeland) war in Croatia ended sixteen years ago, and in the meanwhile the country 
managed to gain its access into the European Union, which will soon follow (very possibly in the 
year 2013). But what happened in the meanwhile to Croatia‘s most numerous and most 
controversial national minority, the Serbs? Who are these Serbs today, are any of them left? Or did 
they ―disappear‖ in order to be able to remain?     
This research will try to answer to some of these questions, through the study of the predominant 
elements of Serb national identity in contemporary Croatia. 
 
 
 1.1. The structure of the thesis 
 
 
The thesis is structured into five chapters, starting from a general framework that analyses the 
historical aspects, continuing with a more specific approach towards the main concepts of the thesis 
and ending with a methodological framework that describes the techniques used and further 
elaborates and interprets the data gathered. 
The first chapter includes some general aspects of methodological approach and makes a brief 
introduction of the main thesis‘ topics by presenting the objectives of the research and its 
hypotheses. It also contains the reasons why the present work represents an interesting topic for the 
researched area and for future research.    
The second chapter presents a historical overview of the Serbs in general, starting from their 
settlement in the Balkans, describing the creation of the first Serb and Croatian states, the Serb 
migrations in the Croatian territories
2
 and the realization of their special status, the formation of the 
first and second Yugoslavia, and finally the events that brought to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and 
to the new Serb status in Croatia.  
                                                 
2
 During most of its Middle Eve and Modern history, most Croatian territories were incorporated into Hungarian and 
successively into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while the rest were occupied by Venetian and Ottoman rule.     
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The third chapter explores the Legislation framework of independent Croatian state after 1992 
concerning minority rights in general, with a special reference to the Serb status as a new minority 
and its respective rights.  
The fourth chapter introduces the key concept of the research: national identity according to various 
theories, as well as the introduction of correlated concepts such as nation, nationalism, nationality. 
Since the Serbs of Croatia are at the same time a national, ethnic, cultural and religious minority, 
also these types of identity have been introduced.  
The last chapter deals with the methodological aspects of the research. The questionnaire was used 
as a methodological tool, in order to verify the hypothesis and the objectives of the research. The 
obtained answers were quantified into variables, and their correlation was analyzed in order to 
detect the factors that influence the attitudes of the respondents. A focus group was also used as a 
qualitative methodological tool, which enabled a further analysis and offered a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
The final part of the thesis represents the conclusive part, the bibliography and the appendixes.  
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH THEME 
 
 
1.1. Choosing the research theme 
 
The first question that comes into mind when reading the title of the thesis is ―why this theme?‖. 
Aware of the uncertainty and broadness of the central concept, national identity, it has been decided 
to analyze it from the perspective of a ―new‖ national minority, the Serbs in Croatia. The main 
reason is that the Serbs living in Croatia are at the same time a national, ethnic, religious and 
cultural minority in a country where they used to be a constitutive people. The dissolution of 
Yugoslavia produced the disintegration of the common civic ―Yugoslav‖ identity and the creation 
of new identities, thus creating an ―identity crisis‖ among different groups of population. For most 
Serbs in Croatia, identification with the Yugoslav nation was one among many social identities that 
were lost and have not been adequately replaced so far. During the last decades names of states and 
national symbols changed frequently. Not well defined and not deeply rooted national symbols lead 
to confusion about national identity by making it harder to identify with the state, favoring a 
primordial concept of national identity. The new minorities, such as the Serbs in Croatia, were 
forced to ―rediscover‖ or sometimes even ―invent‖ their national identity in order to find their place 
in the society of a new established nation state. 
This research will study the concept of national identity among the Serb minority in Croatia through 
the analysis of some elements of their contemporary national identity. Starting from the premise 
that Serb national identity is a result of the interaction between the Serb ethnic, cultural and 
religious identity and it has evolved during the formation of the first nation-states under the 
expansion of nationalism, this research will try to measure the level of importance of each of these 
identities among the chosen sample, in order to identify the most predominant aspect(s) of Serb 
national identity. Another premise is that Serb national identity is based on a predominantly 
Research theme 
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primordialistic concept of identity
3
, which limits the importance of the state, culture
4
 and politics. 
Under such circumstances, national identity is primarily tied to ethnic and personal characteristics 
(such as birth, history, tradition, territory, language, alphabet, religion and ancestry).  
The objectives of the research are the following: 
 
 Investigate the predominant aspects of national identity among the Serb 
minority in contemporary Croatia; 
 Compare the differences and find similarities in the attitudes toward elements of 
national identity on a territorial division of the sample; 
 Determine the basic concepts of national identity in theoretical approaches and 
among the respondents; 
 Examine the presence of different understandings of the aspects of national 
identity , as well as experiences, emotions and individual constructs of national 
identity; 
 
 
1.2 The research questions and the hypotheses 
 
 
Aside from the given objectives, the research will also try to answer the following questions by 
using various techniques of measurement: 
 
 How do the Serbs in Croatia identify themselves today (nationally and religiously)? 
 
 Does a common Serb identity in Croatia exist today? If not, how does it differ from 
region to region? What are the factors that influence this differentiation? 
 
 Will most of the respondents, regardless of the territorial distribution, highly rate 
(―very important‖ or ―moderately important‖) all the questions about the importance 
                                                 
3
 See Milošević-ĐorĊević J. (2007), ―Primordialistic concept of national identity in Serbia‖, Psihologija, Vol. 40 (3), 
385-397     
4
 Intended here as common mass and civil culture.  
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of the ethnic aspects (religion, tradition, costumes, language, alphabet, history, 
myths) of their national group for the preservation of their identity in Croatia?  
 
 What will prevail among the Serb minority in Croatia: a modern/civic or rather a 
traditional/ethnic model of national identity? 
 
 Will the chosen areas of Istria and Zagreb show more modern attitudes in despite of 
the more traditional responses offered by the War affected area and the Area of 
peaceful integration?  
 
 Do the Serbs feel discriminated with their new status (from constitutional people to 
minority)? Do they wish to change their status and regain the previous one? 
 
 Is there a sense of belonging to the state of origin (Serbia), and what is it influenced 
from?  
 
 What is stronger: the attachment to the state symbols of the country of origin 
(Serbia), or to the symbols of the country of residence (Croatia)? 
 
 How do the Serbs feel about the dominant population, the Croats? What trend is 
predominant: a high degree of ethnic tolerance or rather a discriminatory feeling with 
elements of ethno nationalism? 
 
 
The above listed research questions simply introduce some of the aspects of Serb national identity 
in Croatia and their potential relationships, while the chosen hypotheses will test a novel 
relationship with the use of several statistical techniques. There are four main hypotheses
5
 that have 
been chosen which express the probable relationship between variables: 
 
First hypothesis (H1): Serbian national identity in general is defined by a strong religious 
(Christian Orthodox) connotation. Therefore, a high percentage of respondents who will identify as 
Serbs or Croatian Serbs will mostly indicate Christian Orthodoxy as their religious confession. A 
correlation between national self-identification and religious confession will show a strong 
association between the two categories. Additionally, all the questions related to the role of religion 
                                                 
5
 The techniques that will be used in this research to measure correlations and strength of association between variables 
(Chi-square test, T-test, etc.) imply the existence of a null hypothesis (no relation) and of an alternate hypothesis (the 
variables are related) which are then whether accepted or rejected depending on the obtained result. They will be 
mentioned in the sections regarding data analysis in chapter 5 (―Fieldwork‖).  
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in preserving the Serb national identity in Croatia will be highly rated (“very important) by most of 
the respondents.  
 
Second hypothesis (H2): Assuming that national self-identification is a dependent variable, it will 
be influenced by elements (independent variables) such as age, level of education, negative war 
experiences, active membership in Serb organization, country of birth and longer period of stay in 
Serbia. The correlation between these variables will show that there is a relationship between them, 
expressed in a high strength of association.  
 
Third hypothesis (H3): Since Serb national identity in general, as most of the eastern nations, can 
be considered mostly ethnic rather than civic, it is expected that the respondents will give higher 
importance to the ethnic/primordial elements rather than to the civic/modern ones. Moreover, the 
respondents will show a higher degree of traditionalism than modernity (expressed in indexes that 
will be subsequently calculated). 
 
Fourth hypothesis (H4):  The respondents will show a high degree of ethnic tolerance toward the 
Croats, regardless of the territorial distribution, which will show that the Serbs of Croatia are 
mostly a high tolerant population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research theme 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9 
 
1.3 Methodological approach  
 
This research studies the concept of national identity among a minority group using techniques 
which allow a possible generalization (Quantitative research on a representative sample of Serb 
ethnic citizens in Croatia) but also other techniques that examine the deep personal interpretations 
that can‘t be measured by  quantitative tools (qualitative techniques like focus groups). 
The obtained answers will be quantified and transformed into variables by using the SPSS. The 
most relevant ones will be correlated and expressed into crosstabs and illustrated into bar charts.  
 
1.4 Fieldwork  
 
 
The quantitative investigation technique utilized to measure the elements of national identity among 
the Serbs in Croatia is a closed ended questionnaire, combined with dichotomous yes/no questions, 
as well as multiple choice and categorical questions, open ended questions and importance 
questions that rate the importance of a particular issue. The obtained answers were finally 
elaborated by SPSS, to better quantify the results. A further qualitative research method, the focus 
group, was used in order to get a deeper insight of the studied phenomenon.  
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1.5 Advantages and limitations  
 
 
The present thesis offers a real and current situation in the republic of Croatia, among a limited 
group of its citizens. Although the chosen sample is statistically representative, it can never be fully 
representative of the whole reality, but it can be a good indicator of the new tendencies.  
One of the most important limitations is the fact that there are not many researches about the Serb 
national identity in general, and practically none about the Serb identity in Croatia. Aside from few 
studies about the possibility of cohabitation between Serb returnees and Croats, the theme has been 
practically neglected. This unconcern about the Serbs in Croatia heavily influenced the lack of 
sources relevant to the theme of this research.  
Since the Serbs from Croatia were one of the constitutive people in former Yugoslavia, they were 
not included in the studies about minorities and ethnic distance that were previously conducted. 
They became a theme of interest only in the numerous reports dealing with human rights, where 
they represented the most numerous refugees in the region and the most subjected group to 
discriminatory laws.  
This lack of information and general disinterest about the Serbs of Croatia outside the conflict 
context can also be interpreted as an advantage of this research, because it gathers new useful 
information about social attitudes that have never been studied before. However, the lack of 
previous studies regarding the subject of the research increases the possibilities of erroneous 
assumptions and deductions about the phenomenon, as well as the impossibility to compare the 
obtained results with previous ones questions their frequency and significance.  
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1.6 The relevance of the research 
 
 
 
The ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia and its consequences has been for quite a time at the 
center of various studies and researches, but none of these ever dealt with the topic of national 
identity among the ―new‖ minorities that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Most of the 
studies were based on some aspects of national minority among the dominant population (whether 
Serb or Croat), on a comparison between two or more nations, on ethnic distance between minority 
and majority, and more recently, on the attitudes toward a new European identity.  
This research offers a close insight in a group that hasn‘t been appropriately studied, and can been 
seen as the first attempt in studying the Serb minority of Croatia from a social point of view, where 
their attitudes are the main subjects of interest. It also offers a comprehensive analysis of all their 
social and collective identities that differs them from the ―Others‖, and make them unique. 
The questions formulated in the given questionnaires
6
 are a fruitful source of information that 
represent a precious database and can be used for future studies. The theme of the research and the 
obtained result leave room for further comparison in the future.  
Thus this research presents a challenge and a helpful resource for future studies and researches 
which will deal with minority national identity, and especially among the new minorities that have 
appeared after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.  
 
                                                 
6
 See appendix number 1 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 THE SERBS OF CROATIA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
During the process of definition of the research question, it is essential to define the subject of the 
research. As a consequence, the first research question is quiet concrete: who are the western Serbs 
residing in today‘s Croatia? The answer is far from being simple. It is not enough to define the 
Serbs as South Slavs of Christian Orthodox faith, whose mother country is today‘s Serbia and who 
settled early in today‘s Croatia, where they became through the centuries a significant national 
minority
7
.  
Although the temporal and geographic context of research focuses on the contemporary status of the 
Serbs in today‘s Republic of Croatia, it is impossible to understand the peculiarity of the subject of 
the research, and the research itself, without a deeper explanation of its historical and socio-cultural 
background. Since the case of the Serb minority in Croatia is a particular one, with a very 
tumultuous history that marked their status in today‘s Croatia, it would be impossible to define 
them without understanding their history in the Croatian territories.  
The Slav phenomenon in general is very complex and most historians have concerns about the 
prehistory and the origin of the Serbs and Slavs in general. A further difficulty is represented by the 
attempts of various historians to give a modern national character (whether Serb or Croat) to these 
early Slav tribes who settled in the Balkan Peninsula. Up to the 7
th
 century, Serbs as well as Croats 
weren‘t a defined nation, but rather tribes or social classes of the South Slavs. The name of Serbs 
and Croats became a nation and received its actual ethnonimyc designation only during the creation 
of the first South Slavic states in the Balkans. (Nikolić; 1935:36) But even this period is full of 
uncertainties because it is still too early to distinguish a national identity in the modern sense of its 
                                                 
7
 The legal status of national minority was given to the Serbs for the first time in 1991, when Croatia declared 
independence from Yugoslavia. They held through their history in Croatian territories a special status, but they were not 
referred to as a minority. 
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meaning, which is a phenomenon that will rise only in the 19th century, for both the Serbs and the 
Croats. 
As a consequence, it is very difficult to make a clear distinction between Serbs and Croats until the 
Middle Ages, and especially between the territories they inhabited. Upon their arrival in the 
Balkans, they both interacted and mixed between each other, as well with other Slavs and the 
indigenous population of the Balkans (Illyrians, Thracians and others).  
Still today various historians and social scientists argue about the national identity of the Serbs 
living outside Serbia, especially in today‘s Bosnia and Herzegovina and in today‘s Croatia. The 
reason for such a practice is to be found in the past attempts of various national political options to 
neglect whether the Serbian or Croatian national being in order to gain political points or to achieve 
higher goals or interests. This is why Serbs in Croatian territories are known under different names, 
such as Vlachs, Rascians, Uskoks, Greeks, Schismatics and others (Ivić; 1922:7), although many 
historians for various political purposes, especially Croats, try to neglect their common (Serb) 
identity. 
National identity and national consciousness is deeply rooted in the history of each nation, so it is 
essential to present and analyze the most significant historical stages of the Serbs in the territories of 
contemporary Croatia, as well as the creation of the Serbian nation state. In order to put some 
clarity and define as good as possible the subject of the research and its ethno genesis, it is 
necessary to begin from the first mention and appearance of Serb tribes in the Balkan Peninsula, 
with emphasis on the territories of today‘s Croatia. Since the Serbs and Croats share a very similar 
language and have lived for centuries adjacent to each other, their history is interconnected. It is 
impossible to trace a Serb history in the territories of today‘s Croatia and ignore the history of 
Croatia and its people. Therefore, a comparative history of both their people and their nations is 
necessary in order to understand their ethno genesis, their relations and their diversities and/or 
similarities, all of which contributed to create an individual national identity. Since this is not a 
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historical research, the synthesized and selected historical overview that follows shouldn‘t be 
criticized, but rather considered as an introduction that will help to understand better the subject of 
the research. 
 
7.1. Serb prehistory and early settlements in the Balkans 
 
As it has been mentioned in the introduction, Serbs belong to the group of South Slavic peoples, 
who are an ethnic and linguistic branch of Indo-European peoples, living mainly in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and in the Balkans. Slavs are classified geographically and linguistically into West 
Slavic (including Czechs, Kashubs, Poles, Slovaks, Sorbs, Silesians), East Slavic (including 
Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians), and South Slavic (including Bosniaks, Bulgarians, Croats, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes)
8
.  
The circumstances surrounding the formation and expansion of Slav identity remain a topic of 
intense academic debate. The question of Slavic origins has generated many theories, none of which 
have been universally accepted. It is no intention of this research to take part in the debate over the 
origin of the Slavic tribes, but rather present only generally accepted facts and theories concerning 
the Slav early history.   
Little is known about the Serbs and the South Slavs in general before the 5
th
 century. Their history 
prior to this can only be tentatively hypothesized via archeological and linguistic studies. According 
to Porphyrogenitos both Serbs and Croats came to the Balkans from an original homeland called, 
consecutively, White Croatia and White Serbia. In this context, the term ―white‖ designates ―west‖ 
as well as ―unbaptized‖ and ―pagan‖. (Mandić; 1990:18) According to the Byzantine emperor 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus, whose work ―De Administrando Imperio‖ is the main source of 
information on Slavic arrival in the Balkans, White Croatia was located somewhere between 
Bavaria, Hungary and White Serbia (Barada 1934:3-4). In more specific terms, Porphyrogenitus‘ 
                                                 
8
 Encyclopædia Britannica. "Slav (people) - Britannica Online Encyclopedia". Britannica.com. Retrieved 28-01-2011 
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Great or White Croatia, extended north of Hungary and east of Germany, in today‘s Czech and 
Slovakia, and south of Poland. (Mandić; 1990:18-19) 
On the other side, White Serbia (also known as Bojka,), the original homeland of today‘s Serbs, was 
situated along the Elbe river, in today‘s northern Czech Republic. (Mandić; 1990:24) According to 
Porphyrogenitus, White Croatia and White Serbia were adjacent. (Barada; 1934:5). Although the 
names Serbs and Croats appear in their original homelands, these Slavs at the time didn‘t have a 
clear national identity, these were rather names for dominant tribes in a general Slav mass united by 
a common language. (Mandić; 1990:30) Prior to their settlement in the Byzantine Empire, these 
early Slav tribes were known by the Byzantines as Veneti/Wends, Antes and Sclaveni (Ćirković; 
2008:47). All of these terms referred to ―barbarian‖ tribes living in proximity of the Byzantine 
Empire, whether along the lower Danube (Antes), the middle Danube (Sclaveni) or between the 
rivers Elbe and Oder (Wends). However, by the year 800, the term Sclaveni also referred 
specifically to Slavic mobile military colonists who settled as allies within the territories of the 
Byzantine Empire
9
. Eventually, the name Slav (deriving from the Sclaveni) prevailed  and under the 
general name of Sclaveni/Slavs, these early Slav tribes occupied territories of central Europe from 
the Danube till the Alps and the whole Balkans, while the names of Serbs and Croats on the south 
will appear in the sources only in the 9
th
 century. (Mandić; 1990: 29)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 "Slavs." Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium. Volume 3, pp. 1916-1919. 
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Figure 1: Slavic people in the 6
th
 century 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Slavic_peoples_6th_century_historical_map.jpg 
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Figure 2: Early Serb migrations 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/?title=File:Migration_of_Serbs.png 
 
The first arrival of Slav tribes to the south, in the Byzantine territory, is a result of the Great 
Migration Period at the beginning of the 6
th
 century. The territories of White Croatia and White 
Serbia were conquered by the nomadic tribe of Avars in the 5
th
 century and the Slav tribes were 
subdued to the new strong ruler. The big Avar state lied between the Alps, the Sava and Danube 
rivers, the Black and the Baltic Sea, as well as the rivers Don, Donets and Elbe, across the Slav 
territories. This state was constituted by various subjugated Slavic tribes, while the central state on 
the banks of the Danube was purely Avarian. (Barada; 1934:9) The Avars, who arrived at the banks 
of the Danube in 558, established themselves as rulers of the Slavs who inhabited the borders 
around their centers, and often galvanized Slav groups and led them into the Byzantine territory. 
(Ćirković; 2004:8) This was the first encounter between Slav tribes and the Byzantine Empire 
(which ruled at the time over the whole Balkan Peninsula and beyond), characterized by incursions 
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and raids. As a result of internal disorders and weakening of the Byzantine Empire during the 5
th
 
century, the borders of the empire became unprotected and the early Slav tribes started to cross the 
border not only for looting, but also for permanent settlement. (Ćorović; 2010:33) 
It is important to note that the Slavs didn‘t settle in the Balkans at one time, but during two main 
migration flows: the first one, between the end of the 4
th
 and the beginning of the 7
th
 century, when 
a generally Slavic population with the Avars and the Goths came to the right bank of the Danube; 
the second one, during the 7
th
 century, when specific Slav tribes as the Croats (who came first), then 
the Serbs and the Bulgarians, inhabited the southern territories. The second migration flow is quiet 
important because the Serbs and the Croats, as well as the Bulgarians, came as  built nations
10
 and 
during time they melted with the Slavs of the first migration flow and thus created their first 
national states. (Mandić; 1990: 30)  
The second migration flow during the 7
th
 century is better documented than the first one, and it 
provides important information about the settlement for both the Serb and the Croat tribes in the 
territories of the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, the  weakening of the Avar state in the 7
th
 century 
encouraged several revolts among the Slav tribes in order to free themselves from the Avarian rule. 
The Byzantine Empire supported these revolts, and as a consequence, the emperor Heraclius (c. 575 
– 641) offered free lands to these Slav tribes in exchange for their fight against the Avars. (Ćorović; 
2010:37).  The early Croat tribes arrived in the Avar territories of Pannonia and Dalmatia, between 
the years 625 and 630. (Mandić; 1990:39) They came as warriors to these territories upon a request 
of help by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius in order to defeat the Avars. When they accomplished 
their mission, they were free to settle in the liberated territories. They inhabited the roman provinces 
of Dalmatia, Illyria and Pannonia. (Mandić; 1990: 43) 
                                                 
10
 They were not nations in the modern connotation, but rather tribes who bore a name that characterized them, which 
later became synonym of their nation.  
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According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the early Serbs came some time later in the Byzantine 
Empire, probably in the year 635 or 636. (Mandić; 1990:55) An Unknown Archont11 led half of the 
Serbian folk in the Balkans and claimed protection of the emperor Heraclius, who gave them land in 
the province of Thessaloniki at a place called Serblia. After some time they decided to depart home, 
but having crossed the Danube, they sought permission to return. They were than given land to 
settle on in what is now Serbia (i.e. the region of the Lim and Piva rivers), Pagania
12
 (the lower 
Neretva), Zahumlje, Trebinje and Konavli, regions which have been made desolate by the Avars. 
(Fine; 1983:52)  
By the end of 7th century, the Slavs occupied most parts of the Balkans, and the territores they 
inhabited in the Byzantine Empire were called "Sclaviniae", based on their general name Sclaveni 
(Slavs). (Ćirković; 2008: 47) Both the Serbs and the Croats organized their territories upon their 
settlement, but they weren't actual states, rather tribal organizations of various sizes. These groups 
were led by native chiefs, called ţupans (―heads of tribal states‖), because they were organized into 
ţupas, a form of territorial organization, being roughly equivalent to a county. (Stanojević; 1923:7-
8) Each ţupa consisted of several villages, linked by clan (i.e. extended family, the so-called 
zadruga) relationships. (Ćorović; 2010:71) The ţupas became part of Serbian principalities led first 
by a knez ("duke, prince, archont") and then subsequently by ţupans, while the Croat tribes were 
ruled by bans
13
 
                                                 
11
 The Unknown Archont is a conventional name given by historians to the Serbian leader who led the White Serbs 
from their homeland to settle in the Balkans after 610, during the reign of Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (610-641). The 
main record of this person is in the ―De Administrando Imperio‖, a book written in the 950s by Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitos. 
12
 According to Byzantine emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in his‖ De Administrando Imperio‖( Chapter 36), 
"Pagani are descended from the unbaptized Serbs", while according to the Chronicle of the Priest of Duklja written 
1298-1300, the region has also been referred to as being part of Red Croatia. As a consequence, both Serbs and the 
Croats historians appropriated this land. However, Pagania kept its own identity and independence for a long time, until 
it was incorporated in the Kingdom of Croatia during the 11
th
 century. 
13
 Ban was the Croatian name for a ruler of a tribe, which was made by several ţupas (villages with brotherhoods). The 
ban was both referee and duke, and had the authority to convoke the council of elders. It was considered as the most 
dignitaries among all the rulers. (Horvat; 1924:24) In historiography it is referred to ―duke‖ or ―prince‖.  
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During the course of the 8th and 9th century these tribal organizations would become embryonic 
Medieval states: the Kingdom of Croatia (Dalmatia) and the Principality of Serbia, known later as 
Raška/Rascia, as well as the powerful Bulgarian Empire.  
 
7.2. The Serbian and Croatian Medieval states  
 
The peoples, who inhabited the lands of today‘s Istria, Medjugorje, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia 
with Syrmia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Monte Negro, a part of northern Albania and Serbia, were the 
same from an ethnical point of view. On the contrary, the lands they inhabited didn‘t form a unitary 
state until the year 1918, so the expansion of the name Serb and/or Croat in the past depended on 
the political power of whether one or the other part. (Šišić; 1920:9-10) 
The history of the Croatian people and of their state can be divided and summarized into four 
periods: the first one includes the period from their settlement in the Balkans and the period of 
Croatian Princes and Kings of native birth up to the crowning of the Hungarian king Coloman as 
Croatian-Hungarian king, i.e. from the mid-6
th
 century to the year 1102; the second period goes 
from 1102 to 1526, i.e. from the crowning of the Croatian-Hungarian king Coloman to the battle on 
Mohacs Field; the third period, dating from 1526 to 1790, when Croatia was ruled by the royal 
house of Habsburgs; the fourth period goes from the year 1790 to 1918, and it is characterized by 
the Habsburg rule over Croatian territories. (Šišić; 1920:48-50) Although Ferdo Šišić,  a renowned 
Croatian historian, makes a distinction of the Croatian history in four periods, it is necessary to 
include as well the more recent history: Croatia in the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941), The 
Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), Croatia as a republic in Tito's (or second) Yugoslavia 
(1945-1991), and finally, the internationally recognized Republic of Croatia (January 1992). This 
paragraph will deal with the first and second period, while the other periods will be covered by the 
following sections.   
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When the early Croat tribes settled in Pannonia and in Dalmatia, they didn‘t form a unitary state. 
Partly it was because of their geographic position which was divided by the rivers Kupa and Sava, 
being Dalmatia
14
 south of these rivers, and Pannonia on the north.  As a consequence, individual 
Croat tribes lived separately; each tribe was ruled by a “ban” (sometimes referred to as prince) and 
spread in different districts called “banovine”15. (Horvat; 1924:27) It is natural that some of these 
bans tended to subject the other tribes, which led to several internal wars. Eventually, both the 
Pannonian and the Dalmatian Croatia had their own ban, which ruled separately and independently.  
A further obstacle to a unitary Croatian state was the separate development of Pannonia, which fell 
under Avar rule during the first half of the 8
th
 century. (Horvat; 1924:28) The arrival of the Franks 
at the doors of Croatian lands at the end of the 8
th
 century marked a new stage in Croatian history. 
The Franks first defeated the Avars in Pannonia with the help of the Pannonian Croats, and then 
tried to conquer the Croatian lands. The Franks didn‘t succeed in their attempt, but when their king 
Charlemagne was crowned by the Roman pope Leo III in the year 800, the Croats recognized him 
as their supreme ruler. With the new crown, Charlemagne became the protector of all Christian 
lands on the west, and since the Croat lands used to belong to the West Roman Empire, it was 
natural that the Croats would accept Charlemagne as their ruler. Croats were still able to choose 
their own bans and rule in their traditional way, but they had to recognize the new Christian king 
and ask approval for their election. (Horvat; 1924:29) At that time (probably under the Frankish 
influence) two Croatian principalities were formed: one in the former Roman Pannonia between the 
Sava and Drava rivers, and the other was formed in the hinterland of the Dalmatian coast and the 
coast of Dalmatia. The first known rulers of these principalities (the early 9
th
 century) were the 
princes (bans) Ljudevit in Pannonia and Borna in Dalmatia. Very soon the Croats rebelled to the 
                                                 
14
 With the exception of the cities on the coast and the islands which remained under Byzantine rule, in the so called 
Byzantine Thema of Dalmatia. The Byzantium will renounce its rule over Dalmatia in the 10
th
 century, during king 
Tomislav‘s rule. 
15
 The first known banovinas are ―White Croatia‖, which included Istria and Dalmatia till the river Cetina, while ―Red 
Croatia‖ was formed by the southern regions of Duklja, Zahumlje and Travunja. (Horvat; 1924: 28) The latter will be 
inhabited and conquered by the Serbs, becoming Serbian principalities and eventually part of the medieval Serbian 
kingdom. 
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Frankish rule, especially in Pannonian Croatia. The resistance was led by the Pannonian ban 
Ljudevit Posavski, and it spread to the neighboring counties, but it didn‘t succeed for several 
reasons. However, this event is interesting and therefore mentioned here, because it was the first 
time (recorded in historiography) that Croats, Serbs and Slovenes collaborated to achieve a common 
goal. The Serbs of the river Timok are explicitly mentioned in having participated to the rebellion 
raised by the Pannonian ban (Horvat; 1924:30). After the demise of the rebellion, Ljudevit Posavski 
had to escape from Frankish retaliation, and according to Porphyrogenitus he sought refuge in 
Serbian lands. For unknown reasons, during his stay among the Serbs, prince Ljudevit killed the 
Serb ţupan who offered his shelter and thus appropriated all of his lands. (Horvat; 1924:74) After 
Ljudevit‘s escape in 822, Pannonian Croatia came again under Frankish rule.  
Prince Trpimir, who ruled from 845 to 864 in Dalmatian Croatia, issued in 852 the oldest known 
governmental document in the Latin script, where the Croatian name was explicitly mentioned for 
the first time (dux Chroatorum and regnum Chroatorum). This is important, because it means that 
at the time Croatia, although not yet a kingdom, ruled as an independent state, free from Frankish 
and Byzantine rule. Prince Trpimir is also the founder of the royal house of Trpmirović, which will 
govern Croatia until the end of the 11
th
 century (with interruptions). Probably during Trpimir‘s rule 
the diocese of Nin was established, which was responsible for the entire area under the rule of 
Croatian rulers. He also founded the first Benedictine monastery in Croatia. (Horvat; 1924:34) 
In the meanwhile, Dalmatian Croatia was threatened by a new force at the Adriatic coast, the 
Venetians. In the 9
th
 century begins the period of conflict between Croats and Venetians that will 
last for centuries. Moreover, in the first half of the 9
th
 century began a process of gradual 
independence of Croatian principalities in Dalmatia from the Frankish supreme rule, which ended in 
the era of prince Branimir whom the Pope recognized as independent ruler. At the end of 9
th
 century 
another important factor in Croatian history took place: the appearance of Hungarians in the 
Pannonian Plain.  
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Figure 3: The Balkans in the late 9
th
 century 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Balkans850.png 
 
Croatia was ruled by bans (princes) up to the year 925, when Pope John X crowned Tomislav, 
making him rex Croatorum, King of Croatia and Dalmatia. (Horvat; 1924:7) From Tomislav‘s rule 
on, Croatian rulers constantly wore the title of king, a sign that marked the strengthening of the 
Croatian medieval state. Tomislav (910 - 928) fought successfully against the Bulgarians and 
Hungarians, thus extending his authority in the area between the rivers Sava and Drava and uniting 
all Croatian lands. (Horvat; 1924:42)The Croats interfered also in the opportunity of neighboring 
Serbia. The Croatian court has become the refuge of exiled Serbian contenders, as well as a base for 
their military campaigns. Among the first to seek refuge toward the Croats was Peter Gojniković, 
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who undertook a successful action in 891, chasing away from Serbia Prvoslav, Bran and Stephen, 
sons of Serbian Prince Mutimir. (Budak; 1994:20) 
Helping Byzantium in their conflict with the Bulgarians, Croatia became a Byzantine ally, together 
with Serbia. As a consequence, Byzantine entrusted Croatia with the administration of their 
territories in Dalmatia. Another important event occurred during Tomislav‘s rule, which is worth 
mentioning. Since the Serbian ţupan Zaharije betrayed the Bulgarians and joined the Byzantines 
together with the Croats, the Bulgarians wanted to get revenge for the suffered grievance. As a 
result, in 924, a mighty Bulgarian army was sent to Serbian lands in order to punish Zaharije and 
the Serb people for the betrayal. Being aware of the fact that he was not able to face such a power, 
Zaharije sought help and protection to the Croatian King Tomislav. Many Serbs, as well as 
Zaharije, were granted shelter in Croatian lands and thus saved their lives, while the remaining 
Serbs were taken into slavery by the Bulgarians. (Horvat; 1924:43)  
The first successors of king Tomislav maintained the territory and power of the Croatian state, but it 
later deteriorated because of dynastic struggles. (Horvatić; 1991:61) Among his successors was 
Petar Krešimir IV (1058-74), who bore the title of king of Croatia and Dalmatia, meaning that he 
ruled over former Byzantine territories. He is worth mentioning because he reestablished the 
bishporic of Nin (after it had been abolished and not recognized as a metropolitanate having 
jurisdiction over the entire territory of Croatia), and because during his reign the Croats chose 
western Christianity (as consequence of the Great Shism in 1054), i.e. Roman Catholicy. (Horvatić; 
1991:61) As a Pope‘s ally, Croatia fought against Byzantium and lost, while at the same time both 
the Venetians and the Byzantines continued menacing Dalmatian Croatia. 
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Figure 4: Croatian kingdom under Tomislav (year 928 ca.) 
 
Source: www.crohis.com 
 
Following the disappearance of the major native dynasty by the end of the 11
th
 century in the battle 
of Gvozd Mountain, and in attempt to reestablish the unity of Croatian territory, representative of 
Croatian tribes agreed in the Pacta Convecta
16
 on a personal union with king Coloman of Hungary 
in 1102. From then until 1918, the Croatian state was, regardless of the size of its territory, tied by 
personal union to Hungary - that is, Croatia shared a ruler with Hungary but had separate statal and 
legal attributes. (Horvatić; 1991:62) The trouble was the relocation of most of the central (royal) 
power outside the state. Croatia has lost the political center around which it could gather, left to 
                                                 
16
 Pacta conventa (Lat. ―agreed accords‖) was an alleged agreement concluded between King Coloman of Hungary and 
the Croatian nobility. While some claim it was a voluntary union of the two crowns, leaving Croatia as a sovereign 
state, others argue that Hungary simply annexed Croatia outright and forced an agreement. 
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accelerated feudalization and atomization of its societies. Thus, in some way, at the end of its 
independence, Croatia found itself where it started three centuries earlier: shattered into regions 
(ţupanije). (Budak 1994:40) Croatia continued to exist as a dual monarchy ruled by a Hungarian 
king, first by the Arpads dynasty until the year 1290 and then by the House of Anjous until 1526 
(with several interruptions)
17
.  
The arrival of the Ottomans during the 14
th
 century and their conquest of most of the Balkan 
Peninsula in the following years had a very strong impact on all the political matters of the 
neighboring countries and beyond. Especially Croatia found itself in a very difficult position: 
surrounded by the Ottomans on one side and the Venetians on the other.  
The 1526 Battle of Mohacs and the death of Hungarian King Louis II marked the end of the 
Hungarian authority over Croatia. The Croatian parliament, sitting at Cetin on January 1, 1527, 
unanimously elected Ferdinand Habsburg of Austria as King of Croatia. The parts of Croatia that 
were not occupied by the Ottomans received Austrian rule and protection. Croatia thus became a 
frontier of Christendom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Croatia was ruled by the House of Luxembourg (1387-1437), the House of Habsburg (1438 -1439, 1440-1457), the 
Jagiellon dynasty (1440-1444, 1490-1526), the House of Hunyadi (1458-1490), and the House of Zapolya (1526-1540). 
The latter was due to Kingship disputed between Ferdinand of Austria and John Zápolya during the Ottoman invasion. 
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Figure 5: Croatian territory under Venetian rule 
 
 
It is important to note that the Croats were the first among the other South Slavs to convert to 
Christianity, during the first half of the 7
th
 century. (Horvat; 1924:26) This is understandable, due to 
the fact that they inhabited the lands that were most closely situated to Rome and the pope, i.e. the 
center of Christian life. The lands they inhabited were purely Christian, with several dioceses in 
Dalmatia, as well as in Pannonia. As a consequence, their conversion to Christianity happened more 
naturally than in any other South Slav tribe. Nevertheless, Christianity among the Croats 
strengthened at the beginning of 9
th
 century under Frankish rule, and probably through the action of 
the clergy from the Patriarchate of Aquileia. At the beginning of the 9
th
 century Dalmatian Croats 
were baptized from the Frankish missionaries and soon after a separate Croatian diocese was 
established in Nin which was directly subjected to the Pope. (Horvat; 1924:72) The first known by 
name Christian Dalmatian-Croatian Prince was Višeslav (about 800), who left behind a baptistery 
which remains an important symbol of early Croatian history and the people's conversion to 
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Christianity.  However, Croatia was torn between two religious spheres of influence: the 
Roman/Latin and the Byzantine Christianity. Since the islands on the Adriatic and most of the 
towns on the coast remained under Byzantine rule during the first centuries, until the Venetians 
conquered them, the Byzantine church had  major influence on the Croats living in that area, i.e. 
Dalmatia. On the other side, the geographic proximity to Rome and the West Christian world in 
general, as well as the missionary work done by Frankish priests, brought the Roman influence in 
Pannonian Croatia. The connection between Dalmatian cities and Croatian hinterland during king 
Tomislav‘s rule encouraged the connection of the two ecclesiastical areas, especially since the 
Dalmatian towns came again under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Pope.  
Over time the differences between the two rites became more emphasized until the great schism 
finally occurred in 1054, creating two distinct churches. Of all the South Slavs, only Croats and 
Slovenes became followers of the West Christianity, which created a socio-cultural gap between 
them and the other south Slavs who accepted Greek Orthodoxy (Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians 
and Bulgarians).  
************************************ 
The Serbs are first mentioned in the west part of the Balkan Peninsula in 822. They populated the 
regions east of the river Cetina, mountain Plješevica and the area between the rivers Una and Kupa. 
It means that the significant part of the present Republic of Croatia had been populated by the Serbs 
since the settlement of the Slavs. The main regions mostly populated by the Serbs were north-west 
Dalmatia, the larger part of Lika and Kordun, Banija, west Slavonia and smaller sections in east 
Slavonia, west Srem and Baranya. (Ilić; 2006: 270) 
The earliest Serbian state
18
 (referred to as Sclavinia) called ―Baptized‖ by Porphynogenitus, 
consisted in the principalities of Neretva/Pagania (from the river Cetina to the river Neretva), 
Zahumlje/Zachlumia (from the river Neretva to the hinterland of Dubrovnik, in today‘s 
                                                 
18
 The earliest rudimentary Serb state arose in the mid-11th century, although it was mostly a vassal principality to the 
Byzantine Empire and Bulgarian Empires alternatively. 
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Herzegovina) and Travunija (from Dubrovnik‘s hinterland to Boka Kotorska, in today's eastern 
Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia, now part of Croatia). In the immediate vicinity was located the 
principality of Duklja
19
 (―Dioclea‖), which encompassed the territories of present-day southeastern 
Montenegro. On the west, the ―Baptized‖ Serbia bordered with Croatia, (Ćirković; 2008:50) and on 
the east with the Bulgarian khanat, whose border was marked by the fort of Ras. However, this 
early princedom was far from a consolidated, centralized state, and the various ţupans retained 
considerable independence. The Sclaviniae were endangered from three sides: the Byzantine 
Empire, the early Bulgarians and the powerful Franks (who demolished the Avar state). 
Progressively the Sclaviniae were conquered and ceased to exist in their original form in the year 
806 (Mandić; 1990: 34) and developed into rudimental state forms such as kneţevine and/or 
ţupanije. The Serbs became federates to the Byzantines and held the frontiers as vassalage (initially 
Sclaviniae, later Ţupas), subsequently receiving greater autonomy with Višeslav, the ruler of the 
ţupanijas of Neretva, Tara, Piva and Lim, who united various Serbian provinces (kneţevine) and 
tribes of the Byzantine Sclaviniae in the 8
th
 century into the Principality of Serbia (known 
anachronistically in western sources as Raška/Rascia20).  
Serbia was collocated in the pathway of the Bulgarian expansion in the Balkan Peninsula, and found 
itself between two strong empires: the Bulgarian Khanate and the Byzantine Empire both of which 
tried to subjugate Serbia and regularly interfered in its internal affairs. Bulgaria already managed in 
installing Bulgarian despots
21
 over the Slavic tribes which inhabited what is present-day northern 
Serbia - the Srem region and eastern Slavonia. The Serb tribes were encircled by the Bulgarians and 
                                                 
19
 In 1148 Duklja was reinstated as a Ţupanate of Rascia and is since referred to as ―Zeta‖, and remained so until the fall 
of the Serbian Empire, when it subsequently becomes semi-independent in 1362. 
20
 The name is derived from the name of the region's most important fort near its border with the First Bulgarian 
Empire, Ras, which eventually became the capital district and seat of the first bishopric of Serbia (Bishopric of Ras, 
Raška episkopija). The name of the bishopric eventually started to denote the entire area under jurisdiction and later, 
under Stefan Nemanja, Ras was re-generated as state capital and the name spread to the entire land. Soon after Raška 
became one of the common names for Serbia in western sources, but Raška appears scarcely in Serbian and never in 
Byzantine works to denote the state. Constantine's Serbia is often identified as Raška by modern historiography to 
differentiate it from the other provinces ruled by the Serbs: Zahumlje, Travunia, Duklja, Bosnia and Pagania. 
21
 Despot was a title in Byzantine aristocracy and bureaucracy that was originally used as an honorific address for the 
sons of reigning emperors and later came to denote the rulers of the medieval despotates of Epirus, the Morea and 
Serbia. By the end of the nineteenth century, the term "despot" was a nobility title in the Balkans. Today it is used 
mainly in reference to despotism, a form of government in which a single entity rules with absolute power. 
The Serbs of Croatia: a historical overview 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
30 
 
as a response to this, with Byzantine support, a few Serbian ţupas united defensively under the lead 
of Knez (‗Prince‘) Vlastimir, the founder of the Vlastimirović dynasty which ruled directly until 
960, through its cadet branches up to 1371. The extent of Vlastimir‘s realm encompassed Raška, 
Travunija and Konavli, which corresponds to modern southern Serbia, southeastern Bosnia, eastern 
Herzegovina and present day Konavli n Croatia. Vlastimir‘s eldest son Mutimir succeeds him as the 
Knez while his brothers Strojimir and Gojnik became Ţupans with own domains directly under their 
brother's rule. Under the rule of Vlastimir‘s son Mutimir (851-892.), started the Christianization of 
the Serbs by the missionaries Cyril and Methodius, sent by the Byzantine Emperor Basil I (867–
886).  
Figure 6: Serb lands in the 9
th
 century 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Serb_lands04.png?uselang=de 
 
For much of the second half of the 9th century and first half of the 10th century, Serbia oscillated 
between Byzantine and Bulgarian control. This period was marked by continual internal rivalries 
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between the male members of the Serbian ruling family who, sometimes with Bulgarian and 
sometimes with Byzantine support, ousted each other and assumed control of Serbia in turn. With 
the death of the powerful Bulgarian emperor Simeon I in 927, Byzantine was finally able to regain 
power in its territories. In this period (931), Byzantine aided Prince (knez) Ĉaslav to restore self-rule 
and to unify all the Serb populated lands, centered between contemporary South Serbia and 
Montenegro and the coastal south of Croatia. He liberated the central Serbian tribes from Bulgarian 
empire, concluded a voluntary confederation with the chiefs of Bosnia that brought them out of 
Croatia's control and together with Zahumlje, Pagania, Neretva, Travunia, Duklja and Raška 
established a unified Serb state that encompassed the shores of the Adriatic sea, the Sava river and 
the Morava river valley as well as Northern Albania. The written information about the first Serbian 
house of Vlastimirović ends with the death of Ĉaslav, thus creating a gap in the history of Raška as 
it is annexed by the Byzantine Empire and the Bulgarian Empire and it dissolved back into many 
small ţupanijas. The Vlastimir dynasty continued to rule their lands in Duklja (based in what is 
today Montenegro), which now became the main Principality of the Serbs. The kingdom of Duklja 
became the seat of the Serbian state in the 11
th
 century, ruled by the House of Vojislavljević (cadet 
branch of the Vlastimirović) between the 1050s up to 1186. The founder of the House of 
Vojislavljević, Knez Dobroslav I (or Stefan) Vojislav (1018–1043), raised a rebellion against the 
Byzantines in 1038, overthrowing their supremacy over Serbs in Duklja (Ćirković; 2008:59). He 
managed to conquer the neighbouring Travunija, Konavli and Zahumlje
22
, thus expanding his realm 
(Ferjanĉić; 2009:71). Vojislav was succeeded by his son Mihailo (1050–1082), who managed to 
expand further his father's real to Raška as well. Among his most significant deeds was the 
establishment of the independent Serbian Catholic Archbishopric in the town of Bar (Stanojević; 
1923:10), thus exiting from Croatian's religious sphere
23
 and establishing the basis for the future 
                                                 
22
 This maritime region of Medieval Serbia is often referred to as ―Srpsko Pomorje‖ (Serbian Maritime), which 
encompassed present-day parts of Montenegro, Croatia and Herzegovina. 
23
 Prior to the establishment of the Archdiocese in Bar (in present day Montenegro), the dioceses in the south coastal 
towns was subordinated first to the Archdiocese of Split and then (in 1022) to the one in Dubrovnik, i.e. Croatia. There 
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independent metropolis of the Serbian Orthodox church. Mihailo was the first Serbian ruler to be 
crowned as king by the Roman Pope Gregory VII in 1077, which put him out of the Byzantine 
hierarchical system where he was given the inital title of  protospatar
24
 around the year 1052 
(Ferjanĉić; 2009:72). In the aftertmath of the great Church schism of 1054, Pope Gregory VII had 
an interest in bestowing royal titles on rulers in the rift area. This practice was a result of the 
competition between the pope and the emperor, who mutually granted royal titles in order to bind 
the rulers to themselves (Ćirković; 2008:61). As a consequence, Mihailo was given the title of "king 
of Slavs" by the pope and Duklja (Zeta) was referred to as a kingdom, until its reduction in the 
following century. 
King Mihailo was succeeded by his son Constantine Bodin (1081 - 1101) who was, among the title 
of king, recognized the title of emperor
25
 (car) of Bulgaria as well. Among his accomplishments 
was the annexation of Raška (where he installed his nephews Marko and Vukan as ţupans) and 
Bosnia to his realm in Zeta, previously retrieved by the Byzantines from his father king Mihailo, as 
well as the jurisdiction
26
 of the Archdiocese in Bar over the dioceses on the south coastal towns and 
over Serbia (at least what was left of it at the time), Bosnia and Travunija, that were previously 
subordinated to the Archdiocese in Dubrovnik (Ćirković; 2008:62). 
After Bodin's death (in 1011) came to big discords in the royal family. As a consequence, Duklja 
was largerly weakened and soon fell apart into several independent regions who became 
                                                                                                                                                                  
has been a long controversy between the Churches of Split and Dubrovnik, where even king Mihailo was involved. The 
cause of the controversy was Dubrovnik‘s desire for secession from Split‘s Archdiocese and the establishment of its 
own. Serbian king Mihailo advocated the separation of Dubrovnik‘s Church from Split‘s Metropolis. The exact 
outcome of the Split-Dubrovnik controversy is not known. However, the Diocese of Dubrovnik was no longer returned 
to Split and at the end of the 11th century its ruler was recognized as Archbishop. 
24
 Protospatar was one of the highest court dignities of the middle Byzantine period (8th to 12th centuries), awarded to 
senior generals and provincial governors, as well as to foreign princes. 
25
 Bodin was crowned as emperor of the Bulgarians under the name of Peter III in 1072. This was the result of his 
military intervention in Bulgaria, with the aim to help the restoration of the Bulgarian Empire during an uprising that 
started in Skoplje. 
26
 From the antipope Clement III he was given a papal bull in 1089 which approved the use of Archdiocesan symbols 
and honors to the Bishop of Bar, as well as the jurisdiction over the aforementioned territories. This act led to a long 
struggle between Dubrovnik and Bar regarding the jurisdiction over the southern coastal towns and their hinterland. 
Since the antipope's bull didn't have actual power, the dispute ended in favour of Dubrovnik, which regained its dioces 
in Zahumlje, Travunija, Bosnia and Serbia. The jurisdiction of Bar's Archdiocese didn't exceed Pilot, a plain north of 
the Skadar Lake. (Ćirković 2008:63) 
The Serbs of Croatia: a historical overview 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33 
 
competitive. The mot important of these regions were Raška, Bosnia and Zeta/Duklja (Stanojević; 
1923:11) Vukan (1083–1115) was the first Grand Ţupan of Raška27, appointed by king Bodin. 
During this period, the state center of the Serbian realm started to move to Raška, especially since 
Duklja and the region succumbed to Raška's reign between 1183 and 1186. After a series of 
rebellions raised by Vukan and his successor Uroš II (1140–1155) against the Byzantine Empire 
with the assistance of the newest actor on the political scene in the Balkans, the Hungarians, several 
dynastic struggles arose in the Serbian territories. After the Byzantine Empire managed to suppress 
the rebellions and re-instate its power on these territories, in order to avoid future political 
complications in Raška, the emperor decided to divide the authority over the land between four 
brothers: Tihomir, Nemanja, Miroslav and Stracimir (Ferjanĉić; 2009:82). The oldest one, Tihomir, 
was given the title of Grand Ţupan in 1166 ca. but was very soon overthrown by his brother 
Nemanja, whom was previously given the authority over the most eastern part of the state (Toplica, 
Ibar, Rasina and Reke). After a battle against his brothers, Nemanja declared himself as the Grand 
Ţupan of Raška (1166-1196). Taking advantage of Byzantine‘s difficulties, Nemanja started to 
conquer some of its territories, thus initiating Serbian expansion with the aim of gathering all Serb 
provinces around one state (Stanojević; 1923:12). He managed to expand the borders of his state on 
areas of Duklja, Travunija and Hum on Adriatic coast.  
Nemanja‘s appearance on the historic and political stage is of great importance for Serbian history, 
because with Nemanja the Serbian history actually begins. Since their arrival in the Balkan 
Peninsula, the Serbs were subjugated by the neighboring powers and were not able to form an 
independent state until the 12
th
 century, when Nemanja‘s Raška rose to become the paramount Serb 
state
28
. Henceforth, the name Serbia became synonymous with the state of Raška from the 12th 
century onwards. Not only Nemanja created the first independent Serbian state and is thus 
                                                 
27
 At that time Raška encompassed the territories of Kosovo and the Ibar's plain (Ćirković 2008:63). 
28
 Nemanja conquered different territories that were under Byzantine rule, but the Byzantines always succeedeed in 
retrieving them back. Although Nemanja put a lot of effort in expanding his realm, it actually embodied only Raška, 
Duklja/Zeta, Zahumlje, Travunija, as well as some towns on the coast and their hinterland.   
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considered the founder of the Serbian state, but he is also the founder of the Nemanjić dynasty29, 
which ruled Serbia up to the 14th century. Another of Nemanja‘s accomplishments was the raising 
of monasteries and churches, which would become a tradition for all the Serbian rulers of the 
Nemanjić dynasty. After Nemanja resigned from the throne (1196) in favour of his son Stefan, he 
took monastic vows and retired to the Mont Athos. After his death in 1199, he was proclaimed saint 
(St. Simeon) by the Serbian Church. As a result, the House of Nemanjići is often referred to as the 
―holy root dynasty‖, with Nemanja as its initiator, which will produce other saints as well. The veil 
of holiness that surrounded the dynasty in general, as well as some of its members, made it possible 
to develop a specific Serbian tradition within the general Christian tradition. (Ćirković; 2009:72) 
Nemanja‘s youngest son, Sava30, secured the autocephaly (independence) for the Serbian Church as 
a national church of Serbia in 1217, and became the first Serbian Archbishop in 1219. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church assumed the role of the national spiritual guardian and it profoundly shaped the 
Serbian identity. 
The Serbian Kingdom was proclaimed in 1217, after the coronation
31
 of Stefan Nemanjić 
Prvovenĉani ("the first crowned"). As King of Serbia, he inherited all the territories32 unified by his 
father, Stefan Nemanja.  The recognition of Serbia as a kingdom and the establishment of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church marked for the Serbs the acquisition of both forms of independence: 
political and religious.  
In 1166-1168 Stefan Nemanja, took control of the coastline from northern Dalmatia to today‘s 
Albania. His younger son Sava, subsequently canonized as the founder of the autocephalous 
                                                 
29
 The House of Nemanjić, descendants of the kings of Duklja (the House of Vlastimirović), moved in the late 12th 
century the state center from Duklja to Raška, i.e. towards continental Serbia. The Nemanjićs ushered a golden period 
in Serbian history, whereby it became a dominant Balkan power.  
30
 His secular name was Rastko Nemanjić, but was given the monastic name of Sava after he joined the Orthodox 
monastic colony on Mount Athos. Due to his accomplishments for the Serbian Orthodox Church, and for the Serbian 
people in general, he was proclaimed saint shortly after his death, in 1237. Hence, he is referred to as ―Saint Sava‖ and 
is venerated by the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as by the Serbian people all over the world. 
31
 Stefan was proclaimed King of Serbia, Dalmatia and Bosnia by Pope Honorius III in 1217. 
32
 These territories included Raška, while Duklja, Travunija, Hvosno and Toplica were appointed to Stefan's brother 
Vukan, who governed these territories under the title of veliki knez (great prince) and consequently as king of Zeta.  
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Serbian Orthodox Church, established the diocese of Hum in this region in 1219. Its seat was in the 
city of Ston, linking the Sabioncello (Pelješac) peninsula with the Hum mainland. By the late 
medieval times, compact settlements of Serbs were established further north, in central and northern 
Dalmatia, along the Krka and Cetina rivers. The oldest major Orthodox monastery in the region, 
Krupa (r.), dedicated to the Ascension of the Mother of God, was founded in 1317. Its building was 
paid for in part by two prominent Serbian kings, Dragutin and Milutin, and it was later endowed by 
the most powerful medieval Serbian king (later Tsar, ‗Emperor‘) Stefan Dušan.(Trifkovic, 2010:14) 
Although thanks to the House of Nemanjići, medieval Serbia reached its military, economic and 
legal climax, as well as the Church autonomy, their reign was characterized by several overturns 
and internal dynastic struggles and feuds among brothers. However, the Nemanjići succeeded in 
expanding further their state to new territories that had never been under Serbian rule. Serbian king 
Stefan Dragutin (1276-1282) managed to expand his realm to the Kingdom of Syrmia
33
 in 1281, 
which was previously part of the Hungarian kingdom. Due to the fact that Dragutin was married to 
a Hungarian princess, he was given by the Hungarian king Ladislaus IV lands in northeastern 
Bosnia, the region of Maĉva, and the city of Belgrade, whilst Dragutin managed to conquer and 
annex lands in northeastern Serbia. Thus, some of these territories became part of the Serbian state 
for the first time. His new state was named Kingdom of Srem and he was its king from 1282 to 
1316. After Dragutin died (in 1316), the new ruler of the Kingdom of Srem became his son, king 
Vladislav II, who ruled this state until 1325. However, in 1324 Lower Syrmia became a subject of 
dispute between the Kingdom of Rascia and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Upper Syrmia was, after 
1311, included into the possession of the Hungarian king, while its western part was later included 
into the Banovina of Slavonia
34
 (initally part of the medieval Hungarian kingdom, but later of 
Croatia) .  
                                                 
33
 Syrmia (Srem and/or Srijem) is a fertile region of the Pannonian Plain in Europe, between the Danube and Sava 
rivers. It is divided between present day Serbia in the east and Croatia in the west. 
34
 The Banovina of Slavonia was formed in the 13th century, and existed until 1476, when it was joined with the 
Banovina of Croatia. 
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Dragutin's territory near the rivers Sava and Danube and the territorial gains in Macedonia achieved 
by his brother and successor on the Serbian throne, king Milutin
35
 (1282-1321), doubled the size of 
the first state of Nemanjići and made it possible to move the state center toward the east (Ćirković; 
2008:86). The city of Ras lost its importance and will be soon forgotten, while the rulers will get 
attached to a series of courts in Kosovo (around Uroševac and Prizren) and in Skoplje (today's 
capital of Macedonia). (Ćirković 2008:87) The most visible side of this displacement are the 
churches and monasteries left behind by the Nemanjići all around Kosovo, as well as the seat of the  
future Patriarchate, making Kosovo Serbian holy land (Metohija
36
), i.e. the center of its spiritual 
life.  
With the appearance of Stefan Uroš Dušan IV ―the mighty‖ (usually called only Dušan) on the 
Serbian throne in 1331, a new era would begin for medieval Serbia. Dušan managed to expand his 
territories by conquering all the provinces in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula which had 
been held until then by the Byzantines, so he expanded Serbian territory to the river Sava, the 
Adriatic Sea and he conquered almost the entire territory of today's Greece, except the Peloponnese 
and the islands. An interesting fact is that Dušan‘s territory embodied also the peninsula of Pelješac, 
which he sold to the Republic of Ragusa in 1333 (Fine; 1983:286). 
 Dušan was attempting to become the successor of the Byzantine Emperors, but he didn‘t succeed. 
However, during his time Serbia reached its territorial, spiritual and cultural peak, becoming the 
most powerful state in the Balkans. As a result of his territorial gains, Dušan proclaimed himself as 
"Emperor (car) and autocrat of Serbs and Romans (Greeks)" in 1345, while he was crowned the 
following year by the first Serbian Patriarch
37
 Joanikije II.  
                                                 
35
 Milutin‘s rule was characterized by the feud with his brother Dragutin, king of Syrmia, as well as by the conquest of 
northern parts of Macedonia with the city of Skoplje, which became his capital. He is the initiator of Serbia‘s expansion 
toward the south, which will be continued by his son Stefan Konstantin, but will reach its highlight with the future 
emperor Stefan Dušan. 
36
 Metohija is a large basin and the name of the region covering the southwestern part of Kosovo. The name derives 
from the Greek, meaning "monastic estates" - a reference to the large number of villages and estates in the region that 
were owned by the Orthodox monasteries of Serbia and Mount Athos during the Middle Ages. 
37
 After King Stefan Dušan assumed the imperial title of tsar, the Archbishopric of Peć (in present day Kosovo) was 
correspondingly raised to the rank of Patriarchate in 1346. 
The Serbs of Croatia: a historical overview 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37 
 
By the middle of the 14th century, Serbs were present in and around the fortified cities of Clissa 
(Klis) and Scardona (Skradin) in central and northern Dalmatia. Their settlement coincided with the 
arrival of Jelena, King Dušan‘s sister, who was married to a local prince, Mladen II Šubić of Bribir. 
A detachment of her brother‘s Serbian soldiers accompanied her to Dalmatia and remained there, 
initially as her retinue and then as her husband‘s mercenaries. By that time one‘s denominational 
allegiance had already become largely synonymous with national identity. Along the Balkan fault 
line between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism the struggle for this allegiance has only intensified 
in subsequent centuries. 
Princess Jelena, a Serb, was a patron of several Orthodox churches and monasteries in the region, 
although her husband, a Croat, was a Roman Catholic. (Trifkovic, 2010:14) 
Aware of the approaching Ottoman menace, Stefan Dušan tried to organize a Crusade with the Pope 
against the threatening Ottomans. But this attempt was stopped by his sudden death in 1355. He 
was succeeded on the throne by his son, Stefan Uroš V ―the weak‖ (1355-1371). Due to the cultural 
differences between the new conquered territories and the old Serbian lands, as well as due to the 
heterogeneous population that Dušan‘s empire embodied, the empire couldn‘t survive for long. As a 
matter of fact, Dušan‘s empire ceased to exist shortly after his death, in 1371.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Serbs of Croatia: a historical overview 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
38 
 
Figure 7: Serbian Empire under car Dušan 
 
Source: http://crohis.com/shisatlas2/dusan.htm 
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The Serbian Empire of Uroš V fragmented into a conglomeration of principalities, divided between 
the feudal lords. The most powerful among them was Vukašin Mrnjavĉević , whom Stefan Uroš V 
gave the title of despot. In 1365 Vukašin was crowned King of the Serbs and Greeks as the co-ruler 
of Emperor Uroš V, but he died in the Battle of Marica  in his campaign to drive the Ottomans out 
of Europe. The Serbian royal title thus survived in this family, but in fact the authority of these 
kings was circumscribed by the local nobility and confined to parts of central and eastern 
Macedonia (Kingdom of Prilep). 
With the death of Uroš V in the same year, the Nemanjić dynasty came to end. However, a new 
figure emerged - Lazar Hrebeljanović, ruler of Moravian Serbia, who managed to unite most of 
Serbia with war and diplomacy. He could not unite all of Serbia, because some of the regional 
feudal lords were significantly powerful, and yet he had to fight the greater threat, the Ottoman 
Empire. Lazar did not assume the imperial or royal titles (although he is referred to as car/emperor), 
but in 1377 accepted king Tvrtko I of Bosnia as titular king of Serbia. 
The influx of Serbs continued under Tvrtko I (1354-1391), who in 1377 was crowned ‗King of the 
Serbs and Bosnia.‘ By the 15th century the entire region of Knin, with the villages of Golubić, 
Padjene and Polaĉa, had an Orthodox majority.(Trifkovic, 2010:15) 
The first Ottoman raids on Lazar's territory began in 1381, but the real invasion came in 1389. On 
28 July 1389, known as Vidovdan in Serbian (St. George‘s day), the Ottoman and the Serbian 
armies met at Kosovo, in what became known as the Battle of Kosovo. The Serbs were heavily 
beaten by the Ottomans, with huge losses, including car Lazar. These events inspired the Serbs to 
write a cycle of beautiful epic poems, considered the finest work of Serbian folk poetry, where the 
battle of Kosovo came to be seen as a symbol of Serbian patriotism and desire for independence in 
the following centuries. The Battle of Kosovo defined the fate of the medieval Serbia. After the 
Battle of Kosovo there was no army among the Balkan states capable of halting the advancing 
Ottoman Empire. Kosovo was taken by the Ottomans in the following years and the Serbian realm 
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was moved northwards. Serbia however managed to recuperate under despot Stefan Lazarević, car 
Lazar‘s son, surviving for 70 more years and experiencing a cultural and political renaissance. The 
state is known as the Serbian Despotate, and its capital was the newly built fortified town of 
Smederevo in the north of the state.  
 
Figure 8: Serbian lands in the14
th
 century 
 
Source: http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datoteka:Central_balkans_1373_1395.png 
 
Serbia proper became a vassal of the Ottomans in 1390 but remained effectively ruled by the 
Lazarevićs and then by their successors, the Brankovićs, until the fall of Smederevo in 1459. After 
Stefan Lazarević's death, his successors from the House of Branković did not manage to stop the 
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Ottoman‘s advance. However, a Serbian principality was restored a few years after the fall of the 
Serbian despotate by the Brankovićs and existed as a Hungarian dependency situated in what is now 
Vojvodina and the northern Hungary/Romania. It was ruled by exiled Serbian nobles and existed 
until 1540 when it fell to the Ottomans. Serbia remained under their occupation until 1804, when it 
finally managed to regain its sovereignty from the Ottomans. 
With the arrival and conquest of the Ottomans, both the medieval Kingdoms of Croatia and Serbia 
ceased to exist in their original form, becoming integrated into the new powerful and opposite 
empires ruling the Balkan Peninsula: the Habsburg Empire on one side and the Ottoman Empire on 
the other.   
 
2.3. The Ottoman menace and the Serb migrations: the Military Frontier 
 
The arrival of the Ottomans not only changed the political balance in the Balkans, but it also caused 
a series of migrations that altered the demographic appearance of the whole region. This is 
especially true for the territories of Croatia
38
 bordering with Ottoman lands (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in particular), which found itself in the position of the last Christian stronghold before 
the approaching Ottoman menace.  
The Ottoman conquests in the Serbian lands and in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 15
th
 century, 
characterized by unseen terror and violence toward the local population, generated a series of 
migrations toward the neighboring territories.  In the first years following the Ottoman campaigns 
across the Serbian Despotate, the migration fluxes were directed to the northern Serbian lands and 
to the Hungarian lands, moving the centennial nucleus of the Serbian state (what was left of it) from 
the south to the north of the Balkan Peninsula. On the other hand, after the Ottoman conquest of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina the migrations of refugees were directed toward the northwestern and 
                                                 
38
 At that time, Croatian territory was divided into 3 distinct parts: Slavonia, Dalmatia and Croatia itself. Dalmatia was 
mostly under Venetian rule, while Slavonia and Croatia itself belonged to the Dual monarchy, with a limited self-rule.  
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western Austrian, Hungarian and Venetian lands. These territories were largely depopulated 
because of the frequent Ottoman raids that induced the autochthonous population to find shelter in 
the neighboring territories of the kingdom, on the Dalmatian islands and in Italy
39
.  
 
Figure 9: Croatian migrations from 1222 to the 17
th
 century 
 
Source: http://www.croatia-in-english.com/images/maps/emigA.jpg 
 
The Ottoman incursions in the Croatian territories started in 1463, as soon as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was conquered, and lasted for 70 years, until 1527, when in the aftermath of the Battle 
of Krbava field, the entire Croatian region of Lika fell under Ottoman hand. (Pribiĉević; 1955:10-
11) 
                                                 
39
 These migrations originated the historical Croatian Diasporas in today‘s Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Italy. (Dabić, 
1992:266) 
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As a consequence, vast territories became practically depopulated and at the same time became 
attractive destinations for the Serbs fleeing from Ottoman lands. In order to fill up the territories of 
the population that fled from the Ottomans, who forced these people to migrate, the Ottoman army 
took many of these fleeing Serbs into their army. These numerous Serb migrations, starting from 
the 16
th
 century and lasting up to the 18
th
 century, marked the massive arrival and settlement of the 
Serbs in the Croatian territories.  
According to several sources, the migration of Serbs into Croatian lands took place during the 14th 
century under the initiative of Croatian noblemen Zrinski and Frankopan. They possesed several 
properties throughout the Croatian lands, but most of them were seized or devastated by the 
incoming Ottomans. In order to preserve the left properties, Zrinski and Frankopan took advantage 
of the Serbs who started coming into the Croatian lands, and started to entice others as well. Around 
the year 1493, the first Serbs in Croatian lands are mentioned. (Pribiĉević; 1955:19) 
This was most probably connected to the fact that in the year 1434, the daughter of Serbian Despot 
ĐuraĊ Branković, Catherine Cantacuzena, married the Cont Ulrich II of Celje. Count Ulrich owned 
the croatian cities of Medvedgrad, Rakovac, Koprivnica and Kalnik. In order to defend his 
properties, he brought Serbian soldiers from the Serbian Despotate into these towns. These serbian 
troops remained in these territories even after his death in 1456, but were probably turned to 
Catholicism and progressively assimilated. (Kašić; 1967:7) 
Also all the Serbs who were settled by the noblemen Zrinski and Frankopan were gradually turned 
into serfs and Catholicized, because in Croatia until 1781, every religion aside Catholicism was 
banned. Only when the Military Frontier was instituted, the confession of the Orthodox religion was 
allowed on its territory. (Pribiĉević; 1955:20) 
The first reliable facts about the Serbian migrations in Croatia are proved in the documents about 
the arrival of Serbs in the Ţumberak40 area. This mountain range represented a weak spot in the 
                                                 
40
 Ţumberak (Croatian) or Gorjanci (Slovene) is a range of mountains and hills between present-day Croatia and 
Slovenia. 
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frontier, allowing the Ottomans to freely cross into Austrian lands. The Serbs already proved to be 
good defenders of the borders on the Ottoman side of the frontier, so the Austrian authority decided 
to extensively settle them into their frontier territories. Before the year 1531, Serbs came and settled 
into the Ţumberak area individually, while after that year, their settling began in larger masses. . 
(Pribiĉević; 1955:21) 
After the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom into the Ottoman hands in 1463, the southern and central 
parts of the Kingdom of Croatia remained unprotected, the defense of which was left to Croatian 
gentry who kept smaller troops in the fortified border areas at their own expense. But this method 
proved to be inefficient, especially since the battle of Mohacs, when the Ottomans conquered vast 
territories in Slavonia and started their offensive toward the west. So not only the Ottomans were 
closer then ever, but also vast territories around this new border became practically depopulated.  
Since the  beginning  of the Ottoman conquests  of the Serbian lands  (the  14th and the  15th 
centuries) migrations towards Dalmatia never stopped and the number of the Serbs permanently 
grew. They were most frequent during the wars between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (1537-
1540; 1570-1573; 1645-1649; 1683-1699;  1716-1718),  but  both  organized and individual 
migrations  continued in times  of peace. (Gašić; 2003:14) 
One of the largest immigrant waves came to Dalmatia during the long-lasting Candian War  (1645-
1669). The Border laid on the both sides of the frontier, so the Serbs were divided by the state 
border and thus made fight each other. Migrations were continuing all over  this  period.  Venetians  
organized  them  to  fill  up  their  Border.  Besides,  they  were  also forming the uskok homelands 
(in Ravni Kotari, the Makarska Border, and Boka Kotorska). In the first half of the war the Serbs 
populated the areas of Zadar, Šibenik and the middle-Dalmatian islands (Braĉ, Hvar, Korĉula), and 
to a lesser extent of Istria. (Gašić; 2003:15) 
The Austrian Emperor was forced to find a solution in order to keep the borders safe and to stop a 
further Ottoman expansion to the west. The idea was to create mercenary troop, especially Serbs, 
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who would be entrusted to defend the borders. In 1540 the first Serbs started to come to western 
Slavonia from Ţumberak and adjacent territories. In order to attract more Serbs, the Austrian 
commanders started to negotiate with the Serbian troops on the Ottoman side, enticing them to cross 
the border with the civilians and promising them various privileges. (Kašić; 1967:29) 
Serbs  formally obtained the promised privileges on September 5th 1538 by the emperor himself, 
Ferdinand I, and on July 16th, 1544 the privileges were expanded. According to these privileges, 
the Serbs were to receive properties as free peasants, without the duty to pay any taxes for the 
following 20 years. They were also allowed to keep the plunder during their incursions on the 
Ottoman side of the frontier. In the privileges they are reffered to as „Serviani seu Rasciani―, i.e. 
Rascians or Serbs. (Pribiĉević; 1955:21) 
Although these privileges were addressed to the Serbs of the Ţumberak area, they marked a model 
for the settlement of Serbs on the entire Croatian frontier. (Pribiĉević; 1955:22) 
The Serbs lived in Slavonia even before the 1530s,  but their  number increased there  after the 
Ottoman  conquests.  Slavonia was then divided into Lower Slavonia (under the Ottoman rule), and 
Upper Slavonia (under the Habsburg rule). The Serbs made the majority in the surroundings of 
Pakrac,  Poţega  and  Voćin,  and  this  area  was called   "small Wallachia"41. The  next  wave  of 
migrations  started  during the  Long War  between Ottoman  Empire  and  Habsburg  Monarchy 
(1593-1606).  The greater number of them were coming, led by their secular and spiritual leaders. 
(Gašić; 2003:2)  
The burning of the relics of St. Sava, the founder of Serbia's autocephalous Orthodox Church, by 
Sinan Pasha in Belgrade on 27 April 1594, marked a symbolic turning point: the end of a century-
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 The  notion  of  ―Wallach‖/‖Vlach‖  means  easily  movable  cattle breeding  population that in the  feudal  society  of 
the Mediaeval Serbia, and later in the Ottoman Empire, had privileges which differentiated them from the serfs. The 
term, therefore, denotes a social group, but most frequently coincides with the ethnic group, since the immigrated Serbs 
were movable and had privileges which differentiated them from the Croatian serfs. (Gašić; 2003:2)  Although, the term 
is still a matter of dispute between Serbian and Croatian historians, who tend to use its meaning for their own purposes. 
According to Serbian historians, the term ―Vlach‖ denotes a social group which included also Serbs, while according to 
the Croatian historians, it denotes the rests of a Romanized autochthonous population living in  the Balkans, who due to 
their Orthodox faith was soon assimilated by the Serbian Orthodox Church and turned into Serbs. 
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long period when many Serbs served as auxilliaries in the Sultan's army and were used as settlers 
along the western borders of the Ottoman Empire. From the 1590's century onward the Ottomans 
could no longer rely on local Serbs along the Austrian border. The allegiance of the latter became 
strictly confessional. The Emperor in Vienna was not always reliable as a defender of their 
privileges, but he was still a Christian and an enemy of the hated Turk.(Trifkovic, 2010:24) 
In 1630 the Habsburg government issued a charter, called the Statuta Valachorum (Vlach Statutes), 
which formally established the conditions for the area. The Military Frontier was put directly under 
the control of the emperor; the land thus remained in the possession of the state. It was granted in 
return for military service, not to individuals but to household communities, zadrugas, which were 
considered the best basic unit of organization in a difficult and dangerous time. Each zadruga was 
expected to provide one soldier, and they were collectively responsible for the obligations to the 
state. The zadrugas were joined in villages, which elected their own leaders, the vojvodas and the 
knezes; these, along with the Habsburg officials, were sponsible for local administration. The 
members of the border communities thus enjoyed much self-government. The Habsburg 
government also gave assurances to the Serbian population in regard to the Orthodox church.  
The Military Frontier was advantageous to the state in that it provided a cheap source of manpower 
to garrison the border. The frontier soldier was not paid a salary, but was supported by his family. 
For the settlers the conditions were much superior to those in the adjoining provinces, where the 
peasants also usually wanted to join the frontier. The soldier was not a serf; he was a free man 
living in a self-administering community, and he was proud of his status. (Jelavich; 1983:145)  
Although the Croatian nobility continually struggled to maintain their own control of the region, the 
Military Border was kept explicitly separate from the legal, administrative and political system of 
the Hungarian provinces of Croatia and Slavonia. In places scarcely thirty miles wide, the zone 
covered the southern flank of 'Civil Croatia' and shielded it from Ottoman territory. The Border 
divided Civil Croatia from Slavonia, reaching northwards to touch Austria. From the 1550's until 
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the late 1680's, the Habsburg defensive zone passed eastwards through the Magyar parts of Royal 
Hungary. After Ottoman Hungary was recovered following the second siege of Vienna, the Border 
achieved its final form. It now included the Velebit highlands just north of Knin and passed west of 
the border of Bosnia and north to the Kupa, and in a northward extension west of the Ilova to the 
Drava, flanking the city of Zagreb. (Trifkovic, 2010: 29)  
 
Figure 10: The Military Frontier 
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The Serbian population of the empire lived in circumstances quite different from those of the 
majority of the inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire. They controlled no definite portion of territory, 
and they were of the Orthodox religion, which was under attack in other parts of the monarchy. 
Nevertheless, they had certain privileges that set them apart and put them in a better position than 
some of the peasant populations of other ethnic origins. Having hoped to win the privileges 
promised by the Emperor, a great number of people left Serbia, guided by Patriarch Arsenije III 
Ĉarnojević. This was the so-called "Great Migration of the Serbs" - called "great" not only because 
so many people left Serbia, but also because it changed the legal position of the Serbs in Habsburg 
Monarchy, now guaranteed by Emperor's privileges. (Gašić; 2003:2) 
Their relatively favorable status rested on the special privileges
42
 granted by Leopold I in 1690 at 
the time of the migration of Arsenije III and his adherents. It will be remembered that the Serbian 
refugees were promised freedom of religion and an autonomous church administration. The Serbian 
Orthodox citizens enjoyed their privileges wherever they settled; their rights were not dependent on 
a territorial base. As in the Ottoman Empire, the church dignitaries became in practice the leaders of 
a kind of Serbian secular government, with a Serbian metropolitan, established at Sremski Karlovci, 
at its head. The regular meetings of the councils came to resemble national assemblies. They were 
held primarily to choose bishops and the heads of monasteries, but they also discussed general 
problems and matters of interest to the Serbian community. They could hear complaints and make 
protests. 
By the end of the eighteenth century Serbian colonies were present not only in the countryside, but 
also in the cities. The Serbian population of the monarchy, organized under the Orthodox Church 
and in possession of definite privileges, by the end of the century had established a strong position 
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 Appeal Manifest issued on 6 April 1690, and privilege issued on 21 August 1690, constituting the basis for the Serb 
religious–national self-government in the monarchy; Protection Certificate issued by the Hungarian Royal Office on 11 
December 1690; Protection issued on 20 August 1690, according to which the rule of the Serbian Archbishop was 
extended to secular issues; Privilege issued on 4 March 1695 by the Hungarian Royal Office granting the spiritual 
organization of the Serbian Orthodox Church and by which the appointment of bishops and previous privileges were 
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and had a community of different social levels. The merchants, the Orthodox clergy, the teachers, 
and the officers of the Military Frontier formed an upper class. The peasant-soldier of the Military 
Frontier was not only a free man, but one who had gained considerable experience in fighting. The 
Orthodox church was more than a religious institution. It formed a substitute for secular leadership, 
and it preserved the memory of Serbian statehood. (Jelavich; 1983:150) 
The political events in neighboring Serbia affected also the Border: during the First Serbian  
Uprising  (1804-1813)  the  Serbs  from  both sides of the Border were bound together in the joint 
attempt to overthrow the Ottoman rule over Serbia, so that for the first time in the history of the 
Serbs in Habsburg Monarchy the question of their loyalty to the Emperor was  set. 
Regardless of the penetration of nationalism, the Border allegiance to the dynasty was not seriously 
endangered, for as long as the serfdom existed, the status of a frontiersman was highly rated. That is 
why the frontiersmen opposed the Croatian aspirations to reincorporate the Border into the  
Kingdom  of  Croatia,  which  was later  considered to  be  one  of the  causes of  Serbo-Croatian 
conflict. (Gašić; 2003:10) 
As years passed and the frontier stabilized, it was to be expected that the Serbian population would 
press for a special territory and a recognized secular administration. The question of a national area 
was almost impossible to settle. It could only have been carved out of Hungarian or Croatian lands 
and accomplished at the expense of these people. The recognition of a civil government brought up 
similar problems. Despite these differences, in general the Serbian population preferred to cooperate 
with the central authority. Serbian privileges depended upon the protection of Vienna, and when 
this was not given, the Orthodox Serbs could not withstand Croatian and Hungarian pressure. 
When the Ottoman Empire ceased to be a menace for the Austro-Hungarian lands, the pleas of the 
Croatian Parliament to demilitarize the Frontier finally subsided. In 1787, the civil administration 
was separated from the military, but this was reversed in 1800. By the Basic Law of the Frontier 
from 1850, the administration of Military Frontier was split and the land started to look like a state. 
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The Main Command was headquartered in Zagreb, but still directly subordinate to the Ministry of 
War in Vienna. 
The demilitarization began in 1869 and on August 8, 1873, under Franz Joseph, the Banatian 
Frontier was abolished and incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary, while part of Croatian 
Frontier (Kriţevci and ĐurĊevac regiments) was incorporated into Croatia-Slavonia. The decree in 
which the rest of Croatian and Slavonian Frontiers were incorporated into Croatian-Slavonian 
crown land was proclaimed on July 15, 1881, while incorporation was performed in 1882. 
 
2.4. Serbs under Austro-Hungarian rule and World War I 
 
In the nineteenth century many European nations became politically conscious of their 
―nationhood‖, which became one of the factors in the crumbling of the two great empires in 
Central-East Europe – the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire – at the beginning of the next century. 
The peoples of future Yugoslavia, most notably Croats and Serbs, matured as nations during this 
period. They strived for greater independence not only by resisting foreign rule but also by means 
of diplomacy and cooperation with nations who shared their aspirations either out of idealism or out 
of interest.  (Trbovich, 2007:195) 
By 1882 Serbia was internationally recognized as an independent kingdom
43
, while Croatia was 
divided into four provinces (Croatia proper, Slavonia, Dalmatia and the Military Border) ruled 
either by Hungarians or Austrians
44
.  
It was not until the nineteenth century that the provinces of Croatia and Slavonia had a first 
governor of Croatian origin, Josip Jelaĉić, previously a mid-ranking Austrian military officer. 
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 The Congress of Berlin in 1878 recognized the formal independence of the Principality of Serbia, which was ruled by 
the KaraĊorĊevic dynasty from 1817 onwards(as a result of the Serbian revolution which lasted between 1804 and 
1817). The Kingdom of Serbia was created when Prince Milan Obrenović, ruler of the Principality of Serbia, was 
crowned King in 1882. 
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 Austrians ruled Dalmatia, while Hungary administered Croatia and Slavonia in the Empire. The Military Frontier was 
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Jelaĉić entertained a good relationship with the Habsburg Serbs. He referred to the ―Croat and 
Serbian People‖ in his proclamations, and declared on 7 September 1848: ―Religious differences 
make no barriers between brothers in social or public life. We proclaim full equality [between 
Croats and Serbs].‖45 
Figure 12: Croatian lands in 1868 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_the_Kingdom_of_Croatia_%281868%29.png 
 
When the Hungarians began to demand greater rights from the Austrian Habsburgs, the Croats and 
the Serbs in the Empire, led by Ban Jelaĉić, fought fervently on the Austrian side. Croats, who were 
under Hungarian rule in the Empire, resisted Magyarization and hoped to obtain greater rights from 
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the Austrian emperor. The Krajina Serbs supported the Croats not only because of Jelaĉić‘s fair 
treatment of Serbs and Croats, but also because the Hungarians had begun encroaching on the 
Austrian rule in Krajina. Finally, the Hungarians had directed their Magyarization policy not just 
against Croats but also against Serbs and other ethnic groups in the provinces under their rule. A 
key factor in forging a Croato-Serb military coalition against the Hungarians was the uprising of the 
Voivodina Serbs (then a part of Southern Hungary) against the Hungarian authorities during the 
1848–49 revolution. The Krajina Serbs demanded that Jelaĉić provide military aid for their 
brethren. The Serb Patriarch Josif Rajaĉić, who had consecrated Jelaĉić as a ban, seconded this 
demand. Although the Croat - Serb army then delivered a serious blow to the Hungarian forces, 
they lost the battle. 
The good relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the Habsburg Empire were further 
strengthened in 1867, when the Croatian Diet declared that the Serbian and Croatian nations and 
their languages were equal.
46
 However, this decision was not always respected. Notably the first 
Croat teachers‘ general assembly in 1871concluded that teaching was to be in Croatian only.47 
Perhaps this change in attitude came as a result of the 1868 Croato-Hungarian agreement 
(Nagodba).The agreement dealing with Croato-Hungarian relations was a consequence of the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which had turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a Dual 
Monarchy, now placing the province of Croatia-Slavonia completely in the sphere of Hungary. 
The Croato-Hungarian agreement delineated Croatian autonomy within Hungary with Croatian as 
the official language. Yet it stressed in the first article that Hungary and the provinces of Croatia, 
Slavonia and Dalmatia formed ―one and the same political community‖, with Budapest retaining 
control over the choice of governor, finances and the most important port, Fiume (Rijeka). While 
Croats placed their hopes in this agreement, perceiving it as a document apt to strengthen their 
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 Saborski spisi sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od godine 1865–1867 [Parliamentary Acts of the 
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rights within the Empire, Hungarians considered it a first step in Croatia‘s transformation into an 
integral part of Hungary. Hungarian and other foreign historians, including those writing in that 
period, constantly emphasized the limits to Croatia‘s autonomy within Hungary, while Croatian 
historians tended to exaggerate its scope. Notably, just as Hungarians wanted to render Croats a 
Hungarian ―political nation‖, Croats preferred to view the Serbs as ‗political Croats‘, a view that 
Serbs fiercely rejected.
48
This issue formed the core of Croato-Serb antagonism, which developed as 
Croatian nationalism ripened in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Consequently, Croatia‘s frustrations regarding its position in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were 
not soothed with the Nagodba. Thirteen years later (1881), the Habsburgs dissolved the Krajina 
province under great pressure from Hungary, incorporating it into Croatia-Slavonia. From that 
point, after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 diminished the importance of Krajina‘s 
role in the defence of the Empire‘s eastern borders, the Serbs become an important factor in the 
Croato-Hungarian conflict:  
With the new lands, Croatia added 61% more territory and 663,000 more people, of which 55 % 
were Serbs. This simple transfer of land and people from one jurisdiction to another upset the 
equilibrium of Croatian politics by inserting a non-Croatian element into what had been a largely 
Croatian land. By 1910, Orthodox Serbs made up approximately 25% of Croatia [-Slavonia-]‟s 
population.
49
 
While the majority of the Serbs living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were peasants, some were 
also bankers and wealthy landowners. In 1897, Serbian farmers‘ collectives began to be formed in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, providing small-scale aid in the form of seeds, feed, educational 
materials, and classes to Serbian peasants. Linking all the collectives was the Serbian Bank and the 
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influential Serbian Economic Society with its newspaper, Privrednik (The Tradesman), seated in 
Zagreb. Started in 1888, it was devoted to economic education and general advancement of Serbs 
who dominated Croatia‘s economy until 1914.50  
The Matica Srpska, Serbian scholarly and cultural organization, was founded in Budapest in 1826, 
but subsequently transferred to Novi Sad (Voivodina), the hub of Serb publishing activities. 
However, while promoting Serb interests, the Serb banks, cultural institutions and party organiza-
tions, according to Miller, also ―served to segregate Serbs from their neighbours and inculcate an 
insular sense of community‖. (Miller, 1997:24) 
Anxious about the termination of Krajina in 1881, the Serbs received reassurances from Emperor 
Francis Joseph that ―all measures have been taken to place [the inhabitants of Krajina] on equal 
status with all other inhabitants of [Habsburg] lands of the Hungarian crown‖. In return for the 
preservation of their previous privileges, the Serbs opted for loyalty to the Hungarian governor of 
Croatia-Slavonia, Count Charles Khuen-Hédérvary (1882–1903). Khuen-Hédérvary began a divide-
and-rule policy in the region by granting greater privileges to the Serbs. In directly placing the 
Hungarian government rather than the Croatian Diet in the service of Serbian interests, Khuen-
Hédérvary drew Serbs into the Hungarian, rather than Croatian, administrative context. In 1887 and 
1888, the Parliament passed two laws, one legalizing the use of the Serbian language and Cyrillic 
alphabet, and the other assuring the existence of Serbian Orthodox schools in the districts where 
Serbs were a majority. Many Serbs were dissatisfied with the scope of these laws, which they 
believed to be less generous than the privileges granted to Serbs in 1868, emphasizing religious and 
cultural rather than national rights. 
Count Khuen-Hédérvary‘s actions generated a strong Croatian opposition. He was portrayed as a 
tyrant in Croatian historiography. The Croatian nationalism that developed very timidly in 
resistance to Hungarian rule, aiming at the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, the Military Frontier 
(Krajina), Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single state according to a national 
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programme drafted by Janko Drašković in 1832, was rapidly enhanced by Khuen-Hedervary‘s 
actions – and directed against the Serbs who agreed to the ban‘s concessions hopeful to preserve 
their own culture represented by the Christian Orthodox faith and Cyrillic alphabet. 
According to Miller: 
Serbs‟ behaviour in Croatia was rooted in their fear of losing their collective identity. They were 
conscious of their history and proud that they had maintained their identity through centuries of 
Ottoman and Habsburg administration. ... [They] could do nothing but accept Khuen-Hedervary‟s 
patronage, given the attitude of the most popular Croatian political parties and their leaders. 
(Miller, 1997:42) 
Croatian politics became one of resisting the granting of any recognition to Serbian institutions and 
cultural peculiarity without previous acceptance by Serbs of the concept that the only ―political 
nation‖ in Croatia was the Croatian. This politics was emanated by the extreme nationalist Ante 
Starĉević (1823–96) and the Croatian Party of Rights. Starĉević launched the slogan ―The Serbs are 
a breed fit only for the slaughter house‖. He aspired towards a Greater Croatia that would 
encompass Slovenia, the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Krajina, as well as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In brief, Starĉević was ―the progenitor of extreme Croatian nationalism, which 
sought to suppress and perhaps even to exterminate all those who had a different national 
consciousness‖. 
Another ideology that emanated from Croatian resistance to Magyarization was the Croat version of 
Yugoslavism, which foresaw union of South Slavs into one, highly federalized, region based on the 
alleged historical rights. The goal was not independence but autonomy in the form of a separate 
federal unit dominated by Croats. The champion of this ideology was Bishop Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer, who had also briefly contemplated unification of the South-Slav lands of the Dual 
Monarchy with Serbia in the mid-1860s.  
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Serb politics in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was divided 
between those supporting cooperation with the Croats (the Independents), and those who supported 
some cooperation but insisted on forming an entity separate from the Croats in the future and 
joining with the Kingdom of Serbia (the Radicals). 
The Independent Serbian Party (later the Serbian National Independent Party) was founded in 
August 1881 as the first Serbian opposition party in Croatia, demanding Serbian church and school 
autonomy, budgetary support for Serbian institutions in Croatia, equality of the Cyrillic with the 
Latin alphabet, the right to fly the Serbian flag, and a revision of the agreement with 
Hungary.(Miller, 38) The party‘s leader, Svetozar Pribićević, was the most active and influential 
Serb politician in Croatia from late 1902. Born in Kostajnica in Krajina, he was brought up in such 
a way as ―to have deep devotion toward the Serbian national idea and fully uncritical love towards 
Serbia, Montenegro and Russia‖. His party advocated a broader version of Serbdom seeing Serbs as 
part of a larger, Serbo-Croatian nation. 
A more vocal party, the Serbian National Radical Party, came into force in 1887. It was not active 
in the entire province of Croatia-Slavonia, which then included Krajina, but based its political 
activity on the privileges granted to Serbs by the earlier Habsburg monarchs. The party goal was to 
extend the Serbian church and school autonomy to the political realm, building a basis for Serb 
territorial autonomy. According to the Radicals‘ Autonomy Programme of 1897, Serbs should seek 
―the right of autonomy not only in the church/school and property/financial [fields] but also in the 
political arena‖. 
The Radicals based their claims on the set of privileges granted by Habsburg Emperor Leopold I in 
1690, refusing the changes introduced by the subsequent Croato-Hungarian agreement. According 
to Miller, the Serbian Radical Party, led by Jaša Tomić, ―represented a tried and true version of 
Serbianness: that the Serbian community was [Christian] Orthodox, isolated, threatened with 
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assimilation, and needful of vigilance‖. This vigilance developed in response to Magyarization and 
the Croats‘ increasing denial of Serbian identity. 
In September 1902, Srbobran (Serb-Defender), a newspaper published by the Independent Serbian 
Party, reprinted an article titled ―Serbs and Croats‖ from Srpski knjiţevni glasnik (Serbian Literary 
Herald), the leading literary journal in the Kingdom of Serbia. This article by a young Serb student 
from Bosnia argued that the Serbs, having a stronger culture, would eventually culturally absorb the 
Croats. It caused a great uproar among the Croats, who protested in Zagreb, looting and destroying 
many Serbian banks and businesses. The extent of the violence shocked the Serbs across the 
Empire. 
Three years after this incident, however, a small group of enlightened Serbs and Croats formed an 
official political coalition, realizing that Magyarization threatened them both and that the Viennese 
authorities did not support a further federalization of the Empire. Thus, at the turn of the century, a 
policy of Croato-Serb cooperation prevailed, born out of the 1897 unification of the Croat and Serb 
youth organizations into the United Croatian and Serbian Youth. The youth leaders later formed 
parties that entered into a Serbo-Croatian government coalition, reflecting Pribićević‘s belief that 
―the Serbo-Croatian conflict cannot be considered a national question, because Serbs and Croats are 
not two different nations but parts of one and the same nation‖.51 
One of the goals of the Croato-Serb coalition was unification of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia, 
with the purpose of strengthening the struggle against the Austro-Hungarian dominance. Concerned 
about the previous nationalist Croatian policy, the Serbs joined the Coalition under one important 
condition, contained in the Zadar Resolution: 
Concerning the demands of our Croat brothers for the reincorporation of Dalmatia into Croatia 
and Slavonia … the Serbian parties are prepared to [support this] if the Croatian side … bindingly 
recognizes the equality of the Serbian nation with the Croatian. 
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On 14 November 1905, the parliamentary club of the Croatian Party and the club of the Serbian 
National Party signed a declaration in the Dalmatian parliament to that effect, stating that ―the 
Croats and Serbs are one people, equal to one another‖. The two parliamentary clubs further agreed 
to interchangeably use Serbian and Croatian language and flags, to allow for Serbian culture and 
history to be aptly represented in education and for judicial use of Cyrillic script when cases are 
filed in that script. This agreement was a cornerstone of a coalition that was announced a month 
later, becoming a significant factor in Croatia-Slavonia after the elections of May 1906.  
In 1909 Ban Rauch of Croatia-Slavonia attempted to dismantle the Croato-Serbian political 
coalition by trying fifty-three Serbs (mostly supporters of the Serbian Independent Party) for high 
treason, for encouraging Serbian nationalism aiming to destroy the Empire. It was evident that this 
trial was purely political, and Rauch failed to dismantle the Coalition. At the same time the trial 
demonstrated the existence of a strong Serbian national consciousness in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, even if it could not prove its subversive nature. 
Nevertheless, the Serbian Radicals rapidly abandoned the Coalition, claiming that Serbian interests 
could not be forwarded in conjunction with the interests of the Croats in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and that Serbs should strive for autonomy from both the Habsburgs and the Croats. 
In the decades preceding the First World War Austria-Hungary was in a state of latent crisis. Its 
mosaic of nationalities could not be held together without radical constitutional reforms, but these 
were vehemently opposed-for different reasons-by the Hungarian land-owning nobility in the east 
and by the German nationalists in the west. The Monarchy tried to overcome home tensions through 
expansion in the Balkans, by occupying Bosnia Herzegovina in 1878 and annexing it three decades 
later. In doing so, however, it turned Serbia from a client state of the Habsburgs as it was in the 
1880s under King Milan Obrenović - into an enemy under the rival KaraĊorĊević dynasty, restored 
after the coup of May 1903. 
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The immediate trigger of the European war in 1914 was the desire of Austria-Hungary to settle 
accounts with Serbia once and for all, with Germany's backing and protection vis-a-vis Russia. The 
murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo (r.) was an opportunity to be snatched while it 
was available. This was the culmination of a conflict between Austria's Balkan expansionism and 
Serbia's implicit Piedmontism. 
Serbia's unexpected achievements in 1912-1913
52
, however, inflamed the 'Yugoslav' sentiment in 
Habsburg lands. Vienna saw with consternation the triumph of Serbian arms against Turkey then 
Bulgaria, and the doubling of its territory. 
The shots fired by Gavrilo Princip were seen as an opportunity to settle the scores with a small but 
bothersome adversary. With a blank check hastily granted from Berlin, the Monarchy presented 
Serbia with an ultimatum with extravagant demands. It was not meant to be accepted: Austria-
Hungary willed the war, and rushed into it, fuelled by a heady brew of crude Serbophobia that 
blended outright racism and a peculiarly Danubian brand of Orthodoxo-phobia. The popular jingle 
of August 1914, Serbien muss sterbien ("Serbia must die!"), suggested that the Frankist bile had 
been approved by the Milteleuropa. The consequences were dire for the Serbs of Croatia. Frankist-
led rioters again took control of the streets of Zagreb, this time with the assistance of the police. 
Ivan Frank, their leader later admitted that the Zagreb Chief of Police Mraovic had urged him to 
murder several prominent local Serbs.
53
 
The atmosphere of pogrom was fuelled by the nationalist press, which, as a Croat deputy in the 
Austrian parliament recalled, published invented accounts of attempts made by Serbs to use bombs 
to wreck trains, railway lines, ships, and other means of communication, in order to justify the 
draconian measures adopted by the various authorities. All whose national sentiment was awake... 
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were arrested, interned, cast into prison, ruined, condemned, executed; all who were too young or 
too old were doomed to die of hunger; and the rest were intimidated, demoralized, and outraged. 
54
 
"I'll never forget the horrible scene at the end of the first day of mobilization", another Croatian 
political leader recalled, "when a huge bonfire was burning at Jelačić Square fuelled by furniture 
and household items looted from the shops and homes of the Serbs of Zagreb. The bonfire was 
surrounded by a screaming Frankist mob greeting with loud joy those bringing fresh items to feed 
the fire ... and chanting 'Hang the Serb on a willow tree' [Srbe na vrbe]."
55
 
The war against Serbia proved to be immensely popular among many Croats. Dr. Zivko 
Prodanovic, a Serb from Zagreb who was mobilized as a reserve medical corps lieutenant into the 
26th Regiment in Karlovac, noted that "the entire city was filled with enthusiasm and joy: now was 
the moment to exterminate the Vlachs - down with Serbia!"
56
 
Lynchings of Serbs and lootings of Serb property were common throughout the months of July and 
August 1914; they were to continue with lesser intensity, for the rest of the war. Thousands of 
prominent Serbs were arrested and summarily deported, and dozens were killed, even before the 
war against Serbia was declared. As a Serb deputy stated during a debate at the Croatian Sabor in 
the summer of 1918: "When the war broke out, the prisons were filled to overflowing with Serbs 
from Zemun to Zrmanja. The cloud of suspicion fell upon them, Serb houses were ransacked and 
demolished Serbs massacred and hanged without judge or judgment.”57 
The Serbs were saved from wholesale massacre thanks to the commendable sang-froid of the ruling 
Serb-Croat Coalition administration domestically and then to the sobering news of the Habsburg 
armies' military defeats externally. Croatian soldiers fought with dogged determination in Serbia in 
the summer and fall of 1914. Having suffered humiliating defeats in Serbia in 1914, Austria-
Hungary focused its war effort on the Russian front. But after the Allied landings at Gallipoli in 
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April 1915, Germany could no longer ignore Serbia and the Danubian link to Turkey any further' 
and after the fall of Russian Poland Germany was free to act. By October Serbia was doomed: Field 
Marshal August von Mackensen(r.) led the attack from the north while Bulgaria entered the war in 
support, and cut off Serbia's southern flank. The campaign crushed Serbia but it did not destroy the 
Serbian army, which, though cut in half, marched across Albania to the coast. 
For the remaining three years of the war Austria-Hungary deployed its South Slav conscripts mainly 
on the Italian front. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks fought hard to prevent Italy from gaining the 
borders promised by Entente powers, which included most of Dalmatia. In an ironic twist, both 
Serbs and Croats fought the Italians under the Habsburg banner, although for different ends. They 
were ably commanded by Field Marshal Svetozar Borojević von Bojna, the highest-ranking South 
Slav (Krajina Serb) in the history of the Habsburg army. 
As the war entered its decisive stage in the winter of 1917-1918, the future of the Monarchy was 
becoming uncertain. The Allies were prepared to see Serbia expand into Habsburg lands with large 
Serb populations, such as Bosnia and Vojvodina. Until the war's last year they did not envisage the 
creation of a Yugoslavia, let alone complete dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 
Serbia was concerned with mere survival during the first months of the Austrian onslaught, but 
soon she articulated war aims that envisaged the 'liberation and unification of all our brothers Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes" as was officially stated in the temporary capital Niš, in December 1914. The 
declaration was made in the heady days after Serbia's early victories, when it may have seemed that 
the downfall of the Dual Monarchy was only a matter of time. Yet from a realist perspective, 
Serbia's adoption of a radical program of South Slav unity-at such a nearly stage of the war, and 
despite the evident enthusiasm with which some of those 'South Slav brothers fought against 
Serbia-was an act of bravado, if not outright folly. 
The Serbian prime minister, Nikola Pašić (I.) acted as the Yugoslav project's strong supporter just 
before and during the war. He claimed that South Slav unity would bring peace and stability to the 
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Balkans by creating" one national state, geographically sufficiently large, ethnically compact 
politically strong, economically independent, and in harmony with European culture and progress." 
To that end in early 1915 a Yugoslav Committee' came in to being composed of Croat, Serb and 
Slovene political emigrates from Austria-Hungary who had made their way to Western Europe. 
They lobbied the Allies on the (often exaggerated) plight of the South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy 
and propagated their unification with Serbia into a single state. The creation of Yugoslavia was not 
the result of a wide Serbian grassroots movement. 
Ordinary Serbians did not feel any need for a wider South Slav context (Illyrianism, Yugoslavism) 
to protect and assert their identity. Having completed the process of emancipation from the Ottoman 
Empire (1878) and the parallel expulsion of the Turks and other Muslims, they no longer needed 
'the Other' in order to define their identity and to articulate their objectives. Millions of Serbs in the 
devastated, occupied Serbia, and further hundreds of thousands in the Serbian Army overseas or in 
captivity, were fighting and praying for a resurrected and enlarged Kingdom of Serbia. 
 
The Corfu Resolution of 1917, eventually agreed between the government of Serbia and the 
Yugoslav Committee, proposed the creation of a "constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary 
monarchy headed by the house of KaraĊorĊević, "to be called the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. Both Serbia and Montenegro were supposed to cease existing as sovereign states. This 
outcome was a major political success for the Croats on the Committee. 
Under the Treaty of London, Italy was to get Dalmatia north of Split. Such an outcome would have 
left Croatia with a mere 'four counties' of its heartland around Zagreb. It would have been squeezed 
between two enlarged, victorious neighbours, Italy and Serbia. Without much coastline, it would 
have had an uncertain future. The political class in Zagreb understood the danger and started 
looking beyond the Serb-Croat coalition. In the final year of the war, with the deteriorating internal 
situation in Austria-Hungary, the Yugoslav sentiment started gaining strength. The 1917 May 
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Declaration (Majska deklaracija) of South Slav deputies in Vienna heralded the trend, by 
demanding the union of the provinces where Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs lived in a single state. 
As the Dual Monarchy struggled to maintain the war effort, in early 1918 South Slav political 
representatives went a step further and urged the creation of a grouping of all forces aimed at the 
establishment of a 'democratically-based state Of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.' The new wave was 
driven by the fear of Italy's ambitions if the collapse of the Monarchy caught Croatia alone. The 
Yugoslav solution was seen as an obvious means of protecting Croatian interests. As the Monarchy 
crumbled in the autumn of 1918, the Croat-Serb Coalition was the driving force hind the founding 
in Zagreb of the National Council, an ad hoc body that proclaimed the 'State of Slovenes, Croats 
and Serb' in the South Slav lands of the Monarchy. The delegates from Zagreb informed Regent 
Aleksander KaraĊorĊević, on the last day of November, of the National Council's decision in favor 
of the unconditional union. On 1 December, 1918, the Regent accepted the offer of the National 
Council and proclaimed the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
Yugoslavia was born. 
 
2.5. The first Yugoslavia 
 
After the defeat of the Austro–Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the 
new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) was established on 1 December, comprised 
of Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The state was ruled 
by King Alexander KaraĊorĊević. As a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy, the 
new State was about to recognize the two alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin), the three names, the three 
national flags and the three religions (Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic), adopting universal male 
suffrage for the election of the future constituent assembly. 
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The Serbian King and the state met with resistance from Croatia and Montenegro from the 
beginning. The Croats felt that the new state was a ‗greater Serbia‘ and did not feel that Croats were 
treated as equal citizens. The seeds of mistrust were sown with the growth of Serb and Croat 
nationalism. . Even the intellectual groups which initially greeted with enthusiasm Yugoslavia‘s 
unification, were about to change their minds, embracing Croatian national cause. The Croats, 
however, politically weak, were forced to accept the Serbian conditions also in order to ensure 
international protection from Belgrade, in order to counter the Italian aspirations for national 
completion and strategic security in the Adriatic Sea. 
There was fierce ethnic competition for key official positions in the state apparatus. The Serbs were 
seen to hold the most prestigious positions and to control the economy. The state was dominated by 
Serbian institutions (above all, the Serbian House of Karadjordjevic), including the military, the 
political leadership, and the civil service. These institutions were mechanically transferred to the 
new parts of Yugoslavia, even though these old Serbian institutions lacked the integrative potential 
for a new state that was five times larger than Serbia and that now brought under its dominion 
fragments of old empires that were arguably more developed than Serbia from a legal, cultural, and 
economic standpoint. After the creation of Yugoslavia as a unified nation and centralized state 
under Serbian domination, the Croatian political parties entered the opposition, obstructing the work 
of parliament and state organs. Practically from the very founding of Yugoslavia, the Croatian 
national question was opened up. 
The culmination of ethnic tensions between the two major ethnic groups in the SHS – the Serbs and 
the Croats – was reached in the summer of 1928, when a Serbian MP, Puniša Raĉić, assassinated 
the most influential Croatian politician, Stjepan Radić, his brother Pavao and the MP Đuro 
Basaricek. . During the funerals, attended by around 100.000 people scattered in the streets of 
Zagreb, impressive demonstrations and violent uprising took place all over Croatia (Kulundţić, 
1967:173). 
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Figure 13: The Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
 
 
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7251376.stm 
 
Table 1. Serbs on the Territory of the former Croatia in 1910, 1921 and 1931. 
(Source: Population census) 
Year Total 
Population 
Serbs 
Count 
 
Percent 
1910 3,460,584 611,257 17.7 
1921 3,443,375 606,252 17.6 
1931 3,785,455 636,284 16.8 
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The existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came actually to an end. A few 
months later, the State assumed the name of ―Yugoslavia‖, with the pointless purpose of reinforcing 
the State and creating a common feeling of national union. King Aleksandar took actual sovereignty 
of its own kingdom only after Pašić‘s death: in 1929 he changed the denomination of the Yugoslav 
State, strengthening the authoritarian regime in a dictatorship and leading to an increasing 
discontent of Yugoslav nationalities and a rapid development of centrifugal nationalist movements.  
King Alexander‘s imposition of dictatorship in 1929 decisively defeated the idea of Yugoslavia as a 
liberal state based on ―national unity.‖ Through repression and persecutions, the King imposed his 
own version of national unity, including extensive regional reorganization aimed at severing ties 
among ethnic communities and lessening their potential for resistance. This policy was not only 
unsuccessful, it intensified dissatisfaction among the national groups it sought to include in the 
monarchy‘s ideal of Yugoslavism, including Serbia. Such a policy found support only among 
diaspora Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
The king was assassinated on 9 October 1934 in Marseilles, France, right by the IMRO (Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization)
58
 but organized by the Croatian nationalists, the 
“Ustaše‖.  
Because Alexander's eldest son, Peter II, was a minor, a regency council of three, specified in 
Alexander's will, took over the role of king. The council was dominated by the king's cousin Prince 
Paul. 
In the late 1930s, internal tensions continued to increase with Serbs and Croats seeking to establish 
ethnic federal subdivisions. Serbs wanted Vardar Banovina (later known within Yugoslavia as 
Vardar Macedonia), Vojvodina, Montenegro united with Serb lands while Croatia wanted Dalmatia 
and some of Vojvodina. Both sides claimed territory in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina 
populated by Bosniak Muslims. The expansion of Nazi Germany in 1938 gave new momentum to 
efforts to solve these problems and, in 1939, Prince Paul appointed Dragiša Cvetković as prime 
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minister, with the goal of reaching an agreement with the Croatian opposition. Accordingly, on 26 
August 1939, Vladko Maĉek became vice premier of Yugoslavia and an autonomous Banovina of 
Croatia was established with its own parliament. 
These changes satisfied neither Serbs who were concerned with the status of the Serb minority in 
the new Banovina of Croatia and who wanted more of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Serbian territory. 
The autonomous Croat province, Banovina, was to embrace the Savska Banovina, the Primorska 
Banovina and the district of Dubrovnik. The new Banovina of Croatia would enjoy wide autonomy. 
A joint government would be formed to see the agreement (Sporazum) through. It was based on 
Article 116 of the 1931 Constitution, which provided for emergency measures in case of a threat to 
the country's security. After some additional talks the final version was signed by Prince Paul on 24 
August 1939. The Agreement opened with the statement that Yugoslavia is the best guarantee of the 
independence and progress of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This declaration of principle by the HSS 
reaffirmed its acceptance of the Yugoslav state. The Banovina of Croatia comprised more territory 
than envisaged in the provisional agreement of 27 April, by including several districts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina inhabited by Croats. The Croatian nationalists Ustaše were also angered by any 
settlement short of full independence for a Greater Croatia including all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Adopted mainly by the liberal intelligentsia among the Serbs and Croats, the Yugoslav idea could 
not be implemented in the undeveloped, predominantly agrarian society, impregnated by various 
feudal traditions religious intolerance, and often a xenophobic mentality. It was the example of an 
imagined community. Both Serbs and Croats used linguistic nationalism in the form of a Yugoslav 
idea as and when needed, as an auxiliary device in respect of their own national integrations. Within 
the framework of their different political and socio-economic backgrounds, the Serbs and the Croats 
used it with fundamentally different interpretations of its real content. 
Serbia had a stronger position in the negotiations over Yugoslavia, largely owing to its reputation as 
one of the victors in the Balkan Wars (1912–13), then as a state on the side of the Entente during 
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World War I (in which Serbs suffered enormous casualties), and finally as an organized military 
force capable of blocking the pretensions of neighboring countries to Yugoslav lands (primarily 
Italy‘s claims on Dalmatia). For these reasons, Serbia believed that it had the right to speak in the 
name of all Yugoslav peoples and to influence decisively the form of the state in conformity with 
Serbian national interests. Given the historical circumstances and balance of power, the Serbian 
position prevailed. Serbia‘s basic objective remained the unification of all Serbs in one state. 
Following this nationalist ideology, Serbia entered World War I with the aim of bringing together 
all Serbs and Serbian lands, including those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina (all 
under Austro-Hungarian rule). 
Pressed by an internal Yugoslav movement (which was especially strong in Dalmatia and among 
Croatian Serbs who were pushing for unification with Serbia), Croatia joined Yugoslavia, but with a 
strong feeling of its unequal position in the partnership. 
 
2.6. The Independent State of Croatia and World War II 
 
As previously seen, in 1939 according to the Cvetković-Maĉek Agreement, the Croatian Banovina 
was established. However, the Agreement was an emergency political measure meant to unify and 
strengthen the country on the eve of a new European war. For that it was too late. Far from 
strengthening Yugoslavia King Alexander's dictatorship had disrupted political life and created 
disorientation among the Serbs, without breaking the Croats' striving for self-rule. The Serbs, as it 
turned out, were the only ones to fall for their own propaganda of 'one nation with three names.' 
However, the Agreement wasn‘t accomplished to the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, and it became 
obsolete when the marionette Independent State of Croatia was established as a de jure independent 
Croatian state.  
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Prince Paul submitted to the fascist pressure and signed the Tripartite Treaty in Vienna on 25 March 
1941, hoping to still keep Yugoslavia out of the war. But this was at the expense of popular support 
for Paul's regency. Senior military officers were also opposed to the treaty and launched a coup 
d'état when the king returned on 27 March. Hitler then decided to attack Yugoslavia on 6 April 
1941, followed immediately by an invasion of Greece where Mussolini had previously been 
repelled. The Kingdom‘s territory was later divided by the Axis forces and their allies. The 
independent Croatian state was proclaimed, including a large part of Bosnia Herzegovina, with Nazi 
blessing. The proclamation of the 'Independent State of Croatia' on Zagreb's radio was made on 
April 10, 1941 by one of Pavelić's followers, former Austrian-Hungarian officer Slavko Kvatemik. 
This was not the Germans' favorite option, however. It was adopted in the absence of a better 
alternative following the entry of German troops into Croatia's capital earlier that day.  
The terror started on the same day Ante Pavelić arrived to take over his ―state‖. His mix of Nazi 
brutality and racism, fascist irrationality and reinvented primitivism soon turned Croatia into a 
pandemonium of anarchy and genocide. The all-pervasive Serbhatred and copycat Nazi 
antisemitism were coupled with the proclaimed goal to turn the NDH into an 'Ustaša-state' (Ustaška 
drţava). 
Pavelić's creation was to grow into a paradigmatic manifestation of 'native fascism in South Slav 
lands: rabidly nationalist, racist, antidemocratic, and violent to the point of genocide. 
An elaborate apparatus of internal control was soon established. On 10 May the Ustaša movement 
constituted an armed militia (Ustaška vojnica) as its military muscle, and the Ustaša Supervisory 
Service (Ustaška nadzorna sluţba, UNS) the security service similar in structure and methods to the 
Gestapo in Germany. The tools of terror were ready; the bloodbath could begin. 
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Figure 14: The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Independent_State_of_Croatia_1941-43.png 
 
The first recorded mass murder of Serbs occurred in Bjelovar on the night of 27-28 April 1941, 
when between 180 and 190 unarmed civilians of all ages were shot. Such instances were repeated in 
different areas throughout the month of May. 
59
 
The Serb population in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Srem was shocked by the speedy fall of 
the state they regarded as their own, and displayed mute acceptance of the new order. Some saw it 
as a re-enactment of Austria-Hungary - a state which while not loved, was well respected. As they 
were to learn to their peril in the NOH there was no rational correlation between a Serb's deeds and 
the state's attitude. Having a Serb identity was a political act in itself tantamount to treason: "those 
who 'wanted to be Serbs' and who ' insisted on being Serbs' should be punished for that."
60
 
Pavelić postulated a thoroughly demonic concept of the Serb. The hatred of the ' Vlach ' was the 
cornerstone of his followers ' outlook and above all the key defining trait of their Croatness. The 
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Serb was a subhuman beast (Starĉević), racially different from the Croat and genetically inferior to 
him (Sufflay), a 'scheming Byzantine oriental... an alien thorn in Croatia's very flesh ' (Pavelić). 
On 17 April 1941, Pavelić enacted a fiat called The Law on the Protection of the People and the 
State. It literally made it ' legal' for the regime to kill anyone. Pavelić's men were frank about the 
Serbs: "Destroy them wherever you see them, and our Poglavnik's blessing is certain."
61
 
Pavelić's ' minister of justice' was equally clear: 
“This State, our country, is only for the Croats, and not for anyone else. There are no means which 
we will not be ready to use in order to make our country truly ours, and to cleanse it of all Serbs. 
All those who came into our country 300 years ago must disappear. We do not hide this is our 
intention. It is the policy of our State. In the course 'Of its execution we shall simply follow the 
Ustaša principles”. 62 
In a highly publicized speech in the town of Gospić (Lika) on 22 July 1941, Mile Budak, Pavelić's 
minister of education, announced to the roar of approval, "We have three million bullets for Serbs, 
Jews and Gypsies. We shall kill one third of all Serbs. We shall deport another third, and the rest of 
them will be forced to become Catholic." The so called Serbs, Budak (r.) added, are not any Serbs at 
all, but people brought by the Turks "as the plunderers and refuse of the Balkans ... They should 
know, and heed, our motto: either submit, or get out!" Ustaša ideology evolved from three 
intertwined intellectual, social and emotional components: Ethnicity, religion, and violence. 
63
 
In the tradition of Starĉević, the Serbs' nationality was denied and the term Vlachs or 'Greek-
Easterners' (Grko-iztočnjaci) applied instead. Paradoxically, however, they were also depicted as 
apostates and traitors, implicitly not of alien stock at all, but apostates who had betrayed 'their 
mother country' Croatia to foreign, Austrian, Hungarian, or Serbian interests. The implication was 
that they were Croats who had converted to Orthodoxy and thus accepted the Serb name by default 
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This view was reflected in Pavelić's 1942 experiment with the Croatian Orthodox Church, which 
was a religious body created during World War II in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).The 
reason for formation of this church was that Orthodox Christian Churches are state-based. Since 
Orthodox Christians lived on the territory of NDH, and not that of Serbia, as well as the fact that 
many countries and peoples of Orthodox Christian faith, that were friendly to NDH, couldn't have 
properly organized religious life in NDH (Bulgarians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Montenegrins etc.). 
Authorities finally made a move to organize domestic Orthodox Church. This was also part of 
policy to eliminate Serbian culture -- and the Serbs -- from Nazi Croatia. 
The religious component was prominent. The old notion that Serbs were 'Orthodox Croats' was 
replaced by the demand for outright conversion or death.  Orthodox priests and other prominent 
local leaders were the first targets of Ustaša slaughters. 
Forced conversions from Orthodoxy to Catholicism figured prominently on the Ustaša agenda: 
since being Croat was equivalent to confessing to the Catholic faith, and being Serb followed the 
profession of Orthodoxy, they now began to convert the Orthodox to Roman Catholicism under 
duress. Forced conversions were actually a method of Croatization.
64
 
When the anti-Serb and anti-Jewish racial laws of April and May 1941 were enacted the Catholic 
press welcomed them as vital for "the survival and development of the Croatian nation.
65
 
 In late spring and summer of 1941 dozens of towns and villages throughout the NDH were 
subjected to a wave of terrorist operations. It was unprecedented, far bloodier than anything seen in 
the Balkans until that time. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs, as well as tens of thousands of Jews 
and Gypsies, were murdered on the spot or led away to camps to be killed. 
The number of victims will never be known; it is still a politically charged issue. Holocaust 
historians estimate that half a million, and perhaps as many as 530,000
66
 Serbs were killed.  
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Yad Vashem center in Jerusalem quotes a similar figure: 
More than 500,000 Serbs were murdered in horribly sadistic ways (mostly in the summer of 1941), 
250,000 were expelled, and another 200,000 were forced to convert to Catholicism. 
Some 30,000 of Croatia's Jews died ... 80 percent of the country's Jewish population.
67
 
Given that, in April 1941, the Serbs constituted about one third of the total NDH population of six 
million, this level of casualties makes them the second hardest hit population in Hitler's Europe, 
right after the Jews.
68
 
The NDH needed no quasi-legislation for the slaughter to begin. With all power in the hands of 
Pavelic, and some 30,000 armed Ustaša volunteers at his disposal by June 1941 he and his 
henchmen on the ground felt they could do literally as they pleased. They would pick up a Serb 
village or town, as they did in Glina in August 1941, have it surrounded, order all inhabitants to 
gather in the local Orthodox Church, tie them and kill them on the spot. They could throw them 
down a nearby karst pit - as they did at Golubinka near MeĊugorje, in Herzegovina - or send them 
to a death camp such as Jadovno, which operated in June-August 1941. Throughout the summer of 
1941 one of these scenarios was unfolding on daily basis. The method of killing, in the camps and 
villages alike, was typically a slit throat or a blow with a heavy club in the back of the head. More 
piquant methods, such as sawing off the head of the victim, were too time consuming and therefore 
rare. The hardest hit areas were in Herzegovina and the Krajina. 
Between May and August 1941 over a dozen camps were established to handle huge numbers of 
Serbian and Jewish deportees from all over the NDH (Danica, Caprag, Kerestinec, Pag, Kruscica, 
Tenj, Loborgrad, Gornja Rijeka, Ojakovo, Sisak, Jastrebarsko, Jadovno, Lepoglava ... ). The system 
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of hastily constructed and rudimentally organized facilities, of which the one at Jasenovac was the 
most prominent, turned the NDH into 'a land of concentration camps.'
69
 
The wave of anti-Serb terror caused a series of Serb uprisings all over the Independent State of 
Croatia, which eventually turned into a major guerrilla war with international ramifications. 
Uprisings also occurred in the summer of 1941 in Serbia and Montenegro but their motivation was 
resistance rather than survival. The political and social contexts were different, which was reflected 
in the response to German pressure. By the end of 1941 both had been pacified, and remained so - 
in the case of Serbia - for almost three years, until the arrival of the Red Army in late September 
1944.  No such pacification could be effected in the NDH. The constant threat of Ustaša massacres 
gave the Serbs an unmatched incentive for immediate and sustained resistance. It was at first an 
exclusively anti-Ustaša resistance. 
In eastern Herzegovina a spontaneous Serb uprising occurred as early as June 1941, in response to a 
wave of savage slaughters the Ustašas carried out in the area of Bileca Gacko Nevesinje and 
Trebinje.
70
  The regions of western Bosnia, Lika, Kordun, and northern Dalmatia, which were also 
the scene of savage mass slaughters, were up in arms by late July. At the same time, other areas 
with a Serb majority or plurality - Srem, Semberija, parts of Siavonija and Podravina remained 
relatively quiet for as long as they were less brutally affected by terror. 
The initial form of self-defense in many Serb villages was to establish village guards, to set up 
observation posts and patrols on the surrounding roads and to warn their inhabitants if an Ustaša 
column was approaching. When alerted of danger people escaped into the surrounding countryside. 
Rudimentary sanctuaries (zbegovi) were organized in remote spots, such as caves and hidden 
crevices, to accommodate women, children and the infirm. Village committees organizing such 
evacuations were usually led by men with some prior military experience, typically reserve officers 
or gendarmes. They soon joined the ranks of the two factions of the clandestine Yugoslav resistance 
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forces: the communist-led Yugoslav Partisans and the royalist Ĉetniks, both fighting for the 
liberation of Yugoslavia from Nazi occupation.  
As previously seen Yugoslavia formally surrendered to Germans forces in 1941, but a small group 
of officers led by Colonel Draţa Mihajlović refused to surrender and continued to resist the 
occupation from a base in western Serbia. They called themselves the Ĉetnik Detachments of the 
Yugoslav Army of the Fatherland. The Ĉetnici also represented the royal government in exile. They 
received a British military liaison officer and considerable amounts of British supplies and 
equipment. However, they avoided attacking the occupiers because they feared reprisals against the 
noncombatant population. The Ĉetnici believed their military actions could not influence the course 
of the war, and they waited instead for the Allies to defeat the Axis powers. They were later 
discredited in Yugoslavia as collaborators because of their unwillingness to resist. 
The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) under Tito also refused to accept defeat. It remained 
inactive, however, until Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Through the 
Comintern (Communist Internal Trans), the CPY received orders from the Soviet Union to resist the 
German occupation. Initially the military committees of the CPY collected arms and organized 
available manpower. Then they conducted small armed attacks and acts of sabotage against 
occupying Axis forces. They waged their military campaign without regard to the fate of civilians 
living under the occupation--often the occupiers executed large numbers of civilians in retaliation 
for attacks and sabotage. The difference in strategies and political views quickly brought the Ĉetnici 
and CPY forces into a state of civil war. 
The CPY military wing formally became the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of 
Yugoslavia (commonly known as the Partisans) on December 22, 1941. With approximately 80,000 
fighters, the Partisans fought occupying forces, collaborators such as the Ustaše in Croatia, and their 
political opponents, the Ĉetnici. By the end of 1942, the Partisans had grown to 150,000 troops 
organized into two corps, three divisions, thirty-one brigades, and thirty-eight detachments. Axis 
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occupation forces launched several major offensives to destroy the Partisans, but they failed in each 
case. Although the Partisans liberated some areas of the country, they generally avoided major 
engagements with superior forces. By late 1943, the Partisans began to resemble a regular army. 
On 25 November 1942, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 
was convened in Bihać, modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina. The council reconvened on 29 
November 1943, in Jajce, also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and established the basis for post-war 
organization of the country, establishing a federation (this date was celebrated as Republic Day 
after the war). It was a quasi-legislative body under Communist control, which was supposed to 
provide a pseudo-legal cover for Tito's intended take-over of post-war Yugoslavia. 
As the Germans retreated from Greece through Yugoslavia and the Soviet Red Army advanced into 
Romania in 1944, the Partisans cleared most of the German troops from the country while 
simultaneously battling their domestic Ustaše and Ĉetnik enemies. Tito flew to Moscow to meet 
Stalin and to coordinate Partisan and Red Army operations on Yugoslav territory. The Red Army 
wheeled north after entering the country and, together with the Partisans, liberated Belgrade on 
October 20, 1944. The Red Army pursued the retreating German forces from northeast Yugoslavia 
into Hungary, leaving the Partisans in control in Yugoslavia. The 800,000 troops of the People's 
Liberation Army officially became the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) on March 1, 1945. 
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2.7 Socialist Yugoslavia 
 
After the Second World War, the Communist partisan Tito, who had resisted the fascists, came to 
power. He and the Communist Party recognized the persecution that Serbs had suffered under the 
Nazis, and attempted to placate ethnic tensions with a complex state structure based on national and 
historical ethnic group characteristics. On 31 January 1946, the new constitution of Federal People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia, modeled after the Soviet Union, established six republics, an autonomous 
province, and an autonomous district that were part of SR Serbia. The federal capital was Belgrade. 
No debate was ever allowed on the issue of internal borders, although many questions remained 
unanswered. Just over one percent of all inhabitants of the Republic of Serbia were Croats, while in 
1948 - even after the Ustaša genocide - the Serbs accounted for 17 percent of the population of 
Croatia. Ethnically devoid of balance, those boundaries had a dubious basis in history. They had 
never been subjected to a popular plebiscite, let alone to the process of negotiation, signature and 
ratification by the representatives of the peoples affected by them. One consequence of Tito's 
division of Yugoslavia was to split the Serbs into four federal units, leaving a third of them outside 
the confines of the Republic of Serbia. Furthermore, within Serbia two autonomous provinces were 
created, thus diminishing that republic's coherence even further. ' Serbia-proper' (or ' Inner Serbia,' 
Uţa Srbija) was effectively reduced to the boundaries of the Kingdom before the Balkan Wars of 
1912-13. No other federal republic had autonomous provinces carved out of its land although the 
same set of ethnic, historical, cultural, and geographic principles would have dictated the granting 
of the same status to Istria or Dalmatia, let alone the Krajina. Communist Yugoslavia was built not 
on a nationality or supra-nationality, but on territorial adjudications which wouId have been 
impossible at any point between 1918 and 1941. The Serbs of western Yugoslavia, who had 
provided the core fighting force of the Partisan movement (as well as some of its most competent 
enemies), were dismayed by Tito's territorial arrangements. At the First Congress of Serbs in 
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Croatia, held in Zagreb in September 1945 they were told, neither for the first nor for the last time, 
that those arrangements did not matter since the Yugoslav state remained in place: "The boundaries 
of our federal units do not cut up or divide the Serbian people, but provide firm links that tie 
together all Serbs in Yugoslavia.‖71 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (Article 1) defined this state as „the national 
state of Croats, Serbs in Croatia and other nationalities‘. Apart from Articles on national equality, 
‗brotherhood‘ and unity, this Constitution does not provide further details on the implementation of 
the Serbs‘ ethnic rights in Croatia, but determines the exercise of their civil rights through the rights 
of ‗the working class and working people‘. Within such a constitutional and socialist-based system 
the Serbs in Croatia felt secure. 
The new regime was not, of course, officially anti-Serb; but its newly-promulgated principle of 
equal contribution to victory and equal suffering for it the corollary of ' brotherhood and unity,' had 
as its chief practical consequence a massive official cover-up of Ustaša crimes. 
Tito's edifice thus came to be built on three fictions: the myth of Yugoslav nations' equal 
contribution to the Partisan victory; the myth of all groups equal suffering under the 'occupiers and 
their domestic servants'; and the equating of the Ĉetniks with Pavelić's Ustaše. These three myths 
were firmly imposed by the Communist authorities in Zagreb. The Serbs in the Croatian 
Communist Party, indoctrinated in Partisan ranks, provided the middle ranking apparatus and a 
disproportionate number of army and police personnel, but not the top-ranking leaders. They were 
in the forefront of enforcing ideological rigidity among their own people, by imposing 
collectivization of agriculture in the Serb-majority areas and preventing the rebuilding of Orthodox 
churches demolished by the Ustaša regime (or even ordering the demolition of those that had been 
spared). In the name of ' brotherhood and unity,' they even opposed the desire of local Serbs to 
exhume the bodies of Ustaša victims from mass graves and mountain pits for proper funeral. 
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Consequently the process of de-Nazification never took place in Yugoslavia. This has been, and still 
is, a paramount factor of Croatian society and politics. 
Power was devolved and Tito attempted to suppress nationalism by means of the one-party state. A 
policy of full ethnic equality was proclaimed and to some extent successfully implemented, and a 
minority of the population wanted to be called Yugoslavs rather than be identified with any ethnic 
group.  
The Krajina Serbs emerged from the Second World War as a devastated community. Decimated by 
genocide and years of fighting, pauperized, devoid of traditional local leaders and intel1igentsia, the 
rural population literally faced starvation in 1945-1946. 
Croatian Communist authorities devised a plan to resettle tens of thousands of homeless Serbs not 
by rebuilding their houses and villages in the Krajina, but by physically relocating them to 
Vojvodina and housing them in the confiscated properties that had belonged to the expelled German 
minority. The priority was given to Partisan veterans and their families. In 1945-1947 some 60,000 
Krajina Serbs were resettled in the northern Serbian province under the colonisation program. 
The Serb-Croat ethnic balance, already altered through massive bloodletting in 1941-1945, thus had 
continued to shift under Tito's Communists: by the time of the 1948 census the Serbs constituted 
only 14.5 percent of Croatia's population. The cultural balance was shifting, too. 
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Figure 15: The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) 
 
Source: http://www.libreria-mundoarabe.com/Boletines/n%BA54%20Nov.07/IslamBalcanesEstadoYugoslavo.html 
 
Over the ensuing two decades the regime relied extensively on the Krajina-Serb lower and middle-
ranking nomenklatura, notably during the 'Croatian Spring' of 1970-1971. This created the illusion 
of influence and the semblance of a stake in the political order, but in reality the Serbs in Croatia 
lacked both. Their cultural and political institutions - such as the Club of Serb Deputies in the 
Croatian assembly - were abolished. They lacked leaders and strategy. They were singularly ill-
prepared for the crisis of the Yugoslav state that became acute within a decade of Tito's death in 
1980. 
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2.8. The SAO Krajina and the war in Croatia 
 
Following the first multi-party elections for more than 50 years, held on 22 April and 6 May 1990, 
Croatia began the transformation to a parliamentary democracy and market economy. Along with 
other republics of the former SFRY, Croatia also began a political struggle for equality within the 
federation. According to the then SFRY Constitution (1974) the Croatian Republic had all the 
prerogatives of a state, including the right of self-determination and secession. 
After the formation of the new, democratically elected government, the Croatian parliament adopted 
Croatia‘s first civil Constitution on 22 December 1990. According to the Constitution, Croatia was 
declared a republic with a semi-presidential system of government.  
The genocide attempted by Croatian Quislings in 1941-1945 was still in vivid collective memory in 
1991. It shaped the determination of the Krajina Serbs not to live under a post-communist Croatian 
government which took some pains to revive the symbolism, discourse, and even some methods of 
the Ustaša state. The internal history of Communist Croatia also played a role. Croatia kept the 
Krajina in 1945 but thereby kept its Serbian Question. The Serbs in Croatia may have had little real 
clout under Tito and after him, but the Communist apparat and the police were disproportionately 
Serb. This was resented by Croats just as Serb privileges had been resented before1881, and Serb 
identity thereafter. As the Croatian Party (Savez komunista Hrvatske, SKH) became more 
nationalistic this was consequential; when Communists failed, this nationalism detonated. The 
Serbs were identified as the origin of the Communist revolution. In 1990-1991 the Krajina Serbs, 
Communists and all others, had the memory of the genocide as a salient feature of their outlook. 
Their fears were kindled by the government of Franjo TuĊman and his Croatian Democratic 
Community (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), which came to power in 1990 after the first 
multiparty election since Second World War. It was composed of hard-line nationalists with strong 
emigrates‘ connections.  
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Serbs occupied a disproportionate number of state posts throughout the SFRJ, including in Croatia, 
and dominated the Yugoslav People‘s Army (JNA). By contrast, Croatia‘s Serb minority viewed the 
nationalism that accompanied the Croatian independence movement with alarm, recalling Croatia‘s 
prior incarnation as a fascist puppet state during the Second World War, and the thousands of Serbs, 
Jews, and Roma who had died in the Jasenovac concentration camp. 
The violations of the rights of Serbs in Croatia began soon after the HDZ electoral victory in April 
1990. Thousands of Serbs were soon fired from their jobs or else forced to sign humiliating 
'declarations of loyalty' to the new government in Zagreb. Next came clandestine distribution of 
weapons to ' reliable Croats' in the villages, members of the ruling party. Nocturnal shots fired at the 
windows of Serb apartments, Ustaša slogans spray-painted on Serb-owned houses and businesses, 
threatening late-night telephone calls, all became the order of the day in the summer of 1990. 
Within months over one-hundred-thousand Serbs, mainly women, children, and old people, left 
their homes and sought refuge in Serbia. On May 30, 1990, the newly-founded Serb Democratic 
Party (SDS), led at that time Jovan Rašković, decided to break all ties to the Croatian parliament. 
 In June the Serbs established the Association of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika in 
Knin. The Serbian National Council was founded in July 1990 to co-ordinate opposition to Croatian 
independence. Its position was that if Croatia were to secede from Yugoslavia, then the Serbs 
should have the right to secede from Croatia. Milan Babić, a dentist from Knin, was elected 
president of the Council. In August 1990 a referendum was held in the Krajina affirming Serb 
sovereignty and autonomy' within Croatia. As expected it was declared illegal and invalid by the 
Croatian government. Also in August, barricades of logs were placed across roads leading to Serb-
majority areas. This effectively cut Croatia in two, separating the coastal region of Dalmatia from 
the rest of the country. Franjo TuĊman (I.) and his followers were undeterred: a new Croatian 
constitution was passed in December 1990. It treated Serbs as an ethnic minority by abrogating their 
previous status as a constituent nation of the Republic of Croatia. A community of blood and soil 
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(or kinship) was promoted by TuĊman who considered himself the ‗President of all Croats‘. He 
would address the people as ‗the Croat brothers and sisters and others‘. Babić's administration 
responded by announcing the creation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Srpska 
autonomna oblast, SAO Krajina) on 21 December 1990. On 1 April 1991, it declared that it would 
secede from Croatia. Other mainly Serb communities, in western and eastern Slavonia, announced 
that they would join the SAO Krajina. Tudjman's government staged a referendum on independence 
on 19 May 1991. On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia both declared their independence from 
Yugoslavia.  
During talks held in Ohrid on 19 April 1991, it was agreed that a referendum would be called to 
decide whether the SFRY would be preserved as a federation or transformed into a confederation of 
sovereign states. The referendum, held in Croatia in May 1991, had a 94 percent vote in favour of 
an independent and sovereign Croatia. Consequently, on 25 June 1991, the Croatian parliament 
passed a Constitutional Act on Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, formally 
severing its ties with the SFRY. Slovenia declared its independence and sovereignty on the same 
day. Slobodan Milošević‘s government in Belgrade refused to accept the results of the referendum 
and, supported by the JNA, began a military intervention with the stated aim of protecting the 
Serbian minority in the Republic of Croatia. 
Milošević‘s aggression towards Croatia coupled with the mobilization of a part of the Serb minority 
in Croatia, and compounded by the nationalistic policy instigated by the HDZ against the Serbs in 
Croatia, led to a bloody war. 
Fighting was heaviest in Baranja, Eastern Slavonia. Local Serb forces backed by the JNA seized the 
area. Croat forces in Vukovar held out for over 100 days before surrendering in November 1991 but 
the city was devastated by some of the worst fighting in Europe since the Second World War. 
Neighbours fought neighbours in brutal inter-ethnic warfare with tens of thousands displaced in 
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many parts of Croatia. By the end of 1991 close to a third of Croatian territory was under Serb 
control. 
In Croatia bloody clashes between insurgent Serbs and Croatian security forces broke out almost 
immediately, leaving dozens dead on both sides. At this point the Serbian cry was ' Yugoslavia'. 
The European Community (after December 1991, the European Union) and UN attempted to broker 
ceasefires and peace settlements. After Brussels decided to recognize Tito's borders as international 
frontiers, however, such efforts were to no avail. The Yugoslavia's divorce should have reflected the 
nature of its ' marriage' in 1915. Yugoslavia came into being with the approval of the international 
community - a voluntary union of its three initial constituent peoples: Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 
Prior to 1918, only Serbia and Montenegro were sovereign states: the rest of Yugoslavia was 
incorporated into Austria-Hungary. They joined Serbia in union as peoples, not as ' states. 'The right 
to secession remained vested in the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia (as distinct from national 
minorities), and not in Tito's arbitrarily delineated republics. EU negotiator Lord David Owen thus 
conceded that Tito's internal boundaries were arbitrary and that their redrawing should have been 
countenanced at the outset of the crisis in 1990- 1991. This outcome flowed from the decision of the 
Foreign Ministers of the European Community on 16 December 1991, and was given a legal basis 
in the Opinions issued by the Badinter Arbitration Commission established by the European 
Community four months earlier. A wide-scale war broke out four months earlier in August 1991. 
This time the Krajina Serbs had the benefit of JNA officers and equipment, and they fought with 
conviction and enthusiasm. Over the following months a large area, amounting to a third of the 
Republic of Croatia, was controlled by the Serbs. On 19 December 1991, the SAO Krajina 
proclaimed itself the Republic of Serbian Krajina. On 26 February 1992, the SAO Western Siavonia 
and SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem were added to the RSK. The Serb Army of Krajina 
(Srpska vojska Krajine) was officially formed on 19 March 1992, its officer corps consisting 
entirely of the former YPA personnel. The self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina consisted of 
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a large section of the historical Military Frontier as well as parts of northern Dalmatia with a 
majority or a plurality of Serbian population, including the city of Knin which became its capital. It 
covered an area of 17,000 square kilometers, but it was strategically vulnerable, politically 
unconsolidated, and economically weak. A ceasefire agreement was signed by Presidents TuĊman 
and Milošević in January 1992, paving the way for the implementation of a UN peace plan put 
forward by former U.S.  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Under the Vance Plan, four United Nations Protected Areas 
(UNPAs) were to be established in the Krajina. On 21 February 1992, the creation of the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was authorized by the UN Security Council for an initial 
period of one year. The agreement effectively froze the front lines for the next three years. The two 
sides had fought each other to a temporary standstill. The partial implementation of the Vance Plan 
drove a wedge between the governments of the Krajina and Serbia, the RSK's principal backer and 
supplier of fuel, arms and money. Milan Babić strongly opposed the Vance Plan but was overruled 
by the RSK assembly. On 26 February 1992, after a long and arduous meeting with the leaders of 
Serbia in Belgrade, Babić refused to relent and was forced to resign. He was replaced as President 
by Goran Hadţić, a Milošević loyalist. Hadţić signed the Vance Plan, which implied the 
recognition of Croatian sovereignty. Babić (I.) remained involved in politics as a much weaker 
figure. 
The position of the Krajina eroded steadily over the following three years. On the surface, the RSK 
had all the symbols of a state: an army, parliament, president, government and ministries, currency 
and stamps. But it was surrounded by hostile territory. On two sides lay Croatia, and though the 
Bosnian Serb Republic gave the RSK some protection on the third side, Krajina was itself all but 
split in half by enemy territory. The economic situation soon became disastrous. By 1994, only 
36,000 of the RSK's 430,000 citizens were employed. With few natural resources of its own and no 
access to its natural markets, it had to import most of the goods and fuel it required. Agriculture 
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operated at little more than a subsistence level. Professionals went to Serbia or abroad to escape the 
hardship. 
It was becoming clear by the mid-1990s that without a peace agreement, or more energetic support 
from Belgrade, the RSK was not economically viable. In Serbia, however, it was seen as an 
unwanted economic and political burden by Milošević. To his frustration, the Krajina Serb 
assembly continued to reject his demands to settle the conflict by accepting the principle of 
Croatian sovereignty. 
 
Figure 16: The Republic of Serbian Krajina (1992-1995) 
 
 
Source: 
http://bs.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datoteka:Map_of_Republika_Srpska_Krajina.png&filetimestamp=20100501
051021 
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The RSK's weakness adversely affected its armed forces. Since the 1992 ceasefire agreement, 
Croatia had spent heavily on importing weapons and training with assistance from American 
contractors. In contrast the Krajina forces had grown steadily weaker, with its soldiers poorly 
motivated, trained and equipped. Croatian preparations took almost two years, and proceeded with 
the support of Germany and the United States, political as well as military. 
Political divisions between Hadţić and Babić led to tensions between their supporters; Babić 
himself was assaulted in an incident in Benkovac. Serbian positions around Maslenica in southern 
Croatia, which curtailed their access to the sea at Novigrad and reopened the vital Adriatic highway. 
In a second offensive in September 1993 the Croatian army overran the Medak pocket in southern 
Lika, committing shocking and well documented atrocities against the unarmed civilians trapped in 
the area. 
Following the anticipated failure of the international plan for reintegration (Z-4), the beginning of 
the end of the RSK came in the first week of May of 1995, when Croatian forces gained control of 
western Slavonia (Operation Flash), to Belgrade's conspicuous indifference. Finally on August 4, 
1995, Operation Storm was launched by the Croatian army and police. It was a massive, brutal and 
well announced onslaught. 
As Croatian troops launched their assault on August 4, U.S. NATO aircraft destroyed Serbian radar 
and anti-aircraft defenses. Following the elimination of Serbian anti-aircraft defenses, Croatian 
planes carried out attacks on Serbian towns and positions. The roads were clogged with escaping 
civilians. Croatian aircraft bombed and strafed refugee columns. Several thousand Serbs lost their 
lives during the exodus, or else were killed by the Croatian forces if they stayed behind. It was the 
biggest act of ethnic cleansing in post-1945 Europe. A few thousand remained, mostly the elderly, 
in an area inhabited by half a million people a century ago. It was not the first mass migration 
produced by war in the Balkans, but it was among the largest. Most of the refugees ended up in 
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Serbia and the Serbian part of Bosnia (Republika Srpska). Massacres continued for several weeks 
after the fall of Krajina. 
To the Croats, its causes were in the program of a 'Greater Serbia,' pursued and elaborated for a 
century and a half that separated Ilija Garašanin in the 1840s and Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. 
It was a war of Serbian aggression and Croatian Defence of the Motherland, plain and simple. It 
was also a war, it is often implied yet seldom openly stated in Croatian sources, between an outpost 
of the ' Western' civilization and a relic of an inherently incompatible and indubitably more 
primitive ' Byzantine' one. To the Serbs the war was above all a reaction to what they perceived as 
intolerable provocation, an existential response to the revamping of Ustašism in rhetoric, symbols, 
and substance. In their view, they were reacting to Tudjman's escalating political ploys in Zagreb 
and his minions' terrorist acts on the ground. The establishment of autonomous regions, and the 
subsequent proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, was seen as an act of rebellion by 
most Croats and as necessary response by most Serbs. 
Croatia celebrates August 5 as Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day. In reality there was 
hardly any fighting. Belgrade ordered a retreat. The Krajina leaders obeyed. A handful of Croatian 
officers (such as General Ante Gotovina, I. with TuĊman in Knin, August 1995) were indicted by 
the ICTY at The Hague for command responsibility for the atrocities committed by Croatian forces 
against the civilian Serb population. The key leaders and masterminds - starting with Franjo 
TuĊman, who died in bed in 1999 - remained immune. The crime itself, not unlike the horror that 
preceded it in 1941-1945, remains unacknowledged and untainted for. 
The international community‘s only major success was the Erdut Agreement, in November 1995, 
which enabled the beginning of the peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia into the Republic of 
Croatia. 
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The 1991–5 conflict resulted in many terrible consequences and much suffering among the Serbian 
and Croatian communities. Yet amid this tragedy there were rays of hope, and examples of good 
practice and of peaceful coexistence between Serb and Croat communities. 
At the end of 1995, Eastern Slavonia was devastated. It was populated by an estimated 150,000 
people, 85 per cent Serbs and 8 per cent Croats, including about 60,000 Serb refugees from other 
parts of FRY, who lived in the ruins of the towns and villages. The Krajina Serb government was in 
a state of collapse after its flight from Knin in August.  
The Serbs living in Eastern Slavonia avoided the tragic consequences of those living in other parts 
of ‗Republika Srpska Krajina‘, by accepting the Erdut Agreement. Following considerable efforts 
and substantial guarantees by the international community, the Basic Agreement on the Region of 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, a bilateral agreement between the Croatian 
government and the local Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia (the Erdut Agreement), was signed in 
November 1995. According to the Agreement, demilitarization was to be carried out under the 
Serbs‘ control, while a two-year transitional period, under UN auspices, initiated the process of the 
peaceful reintegration of Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium into the Republic of 
Croatia. 
This Agreement was elaborated simultaneously with the Dayton Accord on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and was closely related to it. The Erdut Agreement‘s brevity was an advantage in that 
it made the mandate clear, yet it was also a disadvantage because it did not spell out how the 
mandate was to be implemented. 
Based on the Erdut Agreement‘s provisions, the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established on 15 January 1996. The 
UNTAES mandate was primarily to supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of the region within 
30 days; to monitor the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; to contribute, by its 
presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the region; to establish and train a transitional 
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police force; to organize elections; and to monitor and facilitate the determining of territory within 
the region. The UNTAES mandate ended on 15 January 1998. 
The Erdut Agreement greatly contributed to peace and the (re)integrating of the region of Eastern 
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into the legal and political system of the Republic of 
Croatia. It also led to new, inconceivable, rights for Serbs, including autonomous organizations, and 
their representation in the Chamber of Counties. Further, this led to the foundation of the Joint 
Council of Municipalities, and the Serb National Council as a main body representing Serbs in 
Croatia. The latter Council was designed as a consultative body to make representations on the 
situation of the Serb minority in Croatia. 
 
2.9. The Serbs in Croatia today: status and perspectives  
 
After the end of the war, Serbs became the target of a severe bureaucratic apparatus that made it 
impossible for them to obtain Croatian citizenship, to return to their pre-war homes, and to have 
access to a series of human and civil rights. During the final years of Franjo TuĊman's era, tensions 
between Croats and Serbs reduced but with significant problems remaining. The two pressing issues 
are high levels of official and societal discrimination against Serbs and the indeterminate position of 
hundreds of thousands of Serb refugees (some of whom have returned) who have not had their 
property restored or been compensated for their losses. New laws continue to be introduced to 
combat discrimination, demonstrating an effort on the part of authorities, but it will take time to 
assess their implementation and efficacy.  
Recent court decisions also suggest progress on property restoration and allocation of reconstruction 
funds to Serbs but, again, these are small advances relative to the size of the challenge.
72
 Lengthy 
and in some cases unfair proceedings, particularly in lower level courts, remain a major problem for 
returnees pursuing their rights in court. Croatian Serbs continue to be discriminated against in 
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access to employment and in realizing other economic and social rights. Some cases of violence and 
harassment against Croatian Serbs continue to be reported.
73
 
The current reasons why many Serb refugees still have not returned vary: 
 Integration at the current place of displacement. 
 Appalling economic conditions in areas they fled from, by and large rural ones. 
 Fear of prosecution for war crimes. The Croatian legal system, like the ICTY, has secret lists 
of war crimes suspects, and many returnees were caught by surprise when the authorities 
arrested them upon re-entering the country. 
 Fear of retribution. 
 Ethnic discrimination. 
 Unfavorable property laws. 
The property laws allegedly favor Croats who immigrated into the previously Serb-dominant areas 
after having been forced out of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Serbs. Under the current law, a 
person who occupies someone else's previously vacated house and does not have alternative 
accommodation (such as their own home or a place in a refugee camp), is allowed to stay in 
someone else's private property as a refugee, without being charged for squatting. The number of 
such individuals and families has dropped significantly in the 2000s, and a certain amount of 
property was returned to its previous owners. However, at the same time not all of the former 
refugees actually left the same houses, and instead remained in the occupied houses illegally. In 
2004, the authorities noted around 1,400 houses still occupied by former refugees, and in 2005, this 
number was reduced to 385 housing units. 
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With regard to reparation of war damages, the plight of the Serbs is similar to the plight of the 
Croats - the money and/or resources offered by the government often amount to only a small 
fraction of the value of the people's properties prior to the war. In a recent public protest, a group of 
Serbs from Vukovar who had worked in the Borovo shoe factory demanded that their pre-war 
employment was honoured as it was for the Croatian employees which have stayed loyal to Croatia 
during war. Because during Krajina period Serb workers have made payment outside Croatia 
pension funds (in Krajina pension funds) state position is that they have lost this and many others 
workers‘ rights.  
Successive peacetime governments have worked with local Serb representatives to attempt to 
rectify war-related problems with the support of the international community and under the watch 
of the independent media. At the same time, cooperation on the lower levels has been lacking. The 
participation of the largest Serb party SDSS in the Croatian Government of Ivo Sanader has eased 
tensions to an extent, but the refugee situation is still politically sensitive. In 2005 and 2006, the 
presidents Mesić of Croatia and Tadić of Serbia exchanged official visits and met with the 
respective national minorities of their respective countries. 
If we look at the following table, we can conclude that during the course of history, the population 
of Serbs in Croatia has steadily gone down. This trend can chiefly be attributed to the casualties of 
war, as well as the mass migrations that were induced by it. Today, Serbs represent only 4, 54% of 
the total population in Croatia. They are still the largest national minority in Croatia, but they have 
been numerically seized if compared to the situation before the war, in 1991. 
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Table 2: Serb demographics in Croatia 
Population of Croatia 1931-2001 
Year Serbs % Total pop. 
1931 633,000 18.45 % 3,430,270 
1948 543,795 14.39 % 3,779,858 
1953 588,756 14.96 % 3,936,022 
1961 624,991 15.02 % 4,159,696 
1971 626,789 14.16 % 4,426,221 
1981 531,502 11.55 % 4,601,469 
1991 581,663 12.16 % 4,784,265 
2001 201,631 4.54 % 4,437,460 
Source: the Croatian Institute for Statistics, www.dzs.hr 
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Figure 17: Territorial distribution of the Serbs in Croatia 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICS OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN 
CROATIA 
 
 
Judging by the number of recognized national (ethnic) minorities, Croatia can be considered as one 
of the most multiethnic Eastern European transitional democracies. The last census, in fact, in 2001 
registered that 22 minorities live in Croatia and are entitled to public (government) support in their 
language and cultural preservation and development. They differ in the number of belongers, 
tradition, position and political influence. Of all the ethnic minorities, three minorities, Serbs, 
Bosniaks and Roma are in a specific position and have great importance for the resolution of 
minority issues in Croatia. These three ethnic minorities are still in the process of resolving the 
status issue of its members and the construction of minority institutions. 
But the minority corpus only makes a modest 7.5% of the total country population of 4,381,352 
inhabitants. Despite the increase in number of recognized minorities, their share in the total 
population of just halved compared to 15% from the 1991 census. The largest portion of this 
decrease relates to the Serbs, who in 1991 constituted 12.16%, and now constitute 4.58% of the 
Croatian population, which means that the number of Serbs was reduced by two thirds compared to 
their number in 1991. No other minority exceeds one-half percent of the total population. (Mesić, 
2003:165) It could be concluded that this reduction occurred primarily because of forced emigration 
(i.e. expulsion) during the war and due to the fact that many belongers of national minorities 
changed their ethnicity in the Census in order to avoid persecution. 
However, one of the main consequences of the significant reduction in the number of persons 
belonging to national minorities in Croatia is an increased public awareness of the need for 
additional mechanisms for the protection of national minorities. This has already resulted in the 
2002 Constitutional Law on National Minorities and the new, pro minority policy. 
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3.1 Legislative framework 
 
The situation in Croatia is unique in the context of the Western Balkans in that the country has 
minority rights provisions in the constitution, in a specific constitutional law on the rights of 
national minorities (the current version was adopted in 2002), and in several other Acts of 
legislation. This creates a very broad legal framework for the protection of minorities in Croatia, 
including constitutional rights guaranteeing equality with citizens of Croat nationality and the 
realization of ethnic rights in accordance with international standards, freedom to express their 
national identity, freedom to use their language and script, and cultural autonomy. According to 
Article 82 of the constitution, ―Laws (organic laws) which regulate the rights of national minorities 
shall be passed by the Croatian Parliament by a two-thirds majority vote of all representatives.‖  
Croatia is one of those countries that regulated the position and rights of national minorities with a 
special act – the Constitutional Act on Rights of National Minorities. The first act concerning 
protection of national minorities was adopted in 1991, but a number of revisions and amendments 
of the act were made in the subsequent years. 
The constitutional law further elaborates these rights, making specific reference to all major 
international human and minority rights instruments and allows for necessary ‗positive measures‘ to 
implement these rights (known as ―positive discrimination‖).  
The legal and institutional framework for the protection of minority rights has changed in the 
independent Croatia several times, as well as the list of recognized minorities. As one of six 
Yugoslavian republics, Croatia was defined as a "national state of the Croatian people, the state of 
the Serbian people in Croatia and the state of the nationalities living in it."
74
 
National minorities, according to the new Constitutional Law, are ―a group of Croatian citizens the 
members of which have been traditionally living in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and the 
members of which have ethnic, language, cultural and/or religious characteristics different from 
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other citizens, and who are guided by the desire to preserve these characteristics‖ (Article 5). For 
the first time, then, in Croatian law, the concept of a national minority is defined. 
In the Preamble of the new Croatian Institution, the national minorities that are considered 
"autochthonous" are explicitly listed:  
... [Croatia is constituted as] the national state of the Croatian people and the state of members of 
autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, 
Austrians, Ukrainians, Ruthenians and others, [...] 
The constitutional changes in the beginning of 1998 were rather controversial on this matter, 
deleting Slovenes and Muslims [Bosniaks] from the list. However, they are now included among 
"others". 
In December 1991 the Croatian Parliament passed the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia (NN 65/91). Passing this law was a precondition for the international recognition of Croatia 
as independent state in January 1992. At that time Croatia, like the other states that were created 
after the crackdown of the former Yugoslavia, had been left a relatively high degree of protection of 
collective rights of minorities (right to education in own script and language at all levels of 
education, right to the official use of the language, various opportunities for the preservation of 
ethnic, language and religious identity and the institution of the political representation of minority 
interests). Croatia took over and recognized all these inherited rights. (Vasiljević, 2004) The 
problem, however, came into being with the new minorities, that is, with the members of the 
peoples that had been constituent nations in the former Yugoslavia, particularly with the Serbs of 
Croatia, who in the socialist Croatia had the status of sovereign or constitutive people (Daskalović, 
2003). 
However, in 1996 Croatia was obliged to pass a new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National 
Minorities, as a result of its acceptance into the Council of Europe. 
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Some improvement in political cooperation on minority issues has also been achieved by the 
Agreement on the Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia And The Federal 
Republic Of Yugoslavia (23 August 1996), which in Art. 8 guarantees the protection of the rights of 
the Serb and Croat minorities respectively. 
On May 11, 2000 the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia in accordance with Articles 14, 15 and 
139 of the Constitution passed a proclamation of changes and amendments to the Constitutional 
Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or 
Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. 
According to these amended documents, Croatia shall protect the equality of members of national 
minorities which includes Albanians, Austrians, Bosniacs, Bulgarians, Montenegris, Czechs, 
Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Poles, Romanies, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, 
Slovenians, Serbs, Italians, Turks, Ukrainians, Vlachs, Jews and other ethnic and national groups or 
minorities. The intended purpose of these laws is to encourage their overall cultural and linguistic 
development. 
After the general elections of 23 November 2003, the Government of the Republic of Croatia 
reached and concluded agreements with representatives of national minorities, and in its programme 
it undertook the obligation to develop specific measures whereby it would continually work on the 
protection and promotion of national minorities, and resolve the remaining open issues faced by 
national minorities. The Government also committed itself to fully implement the Constitutional 
Law on the Rights of National Minorities, and the 2000 Law on the Use of Language and Script of 
National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia and the 2000 Law on Education in the Language and 
Script of National Minorities, which regulate details of language use in public and in 
communication with authorities and of mother-tongue education.  
In general, in the past few years a significant progress in improvement of national minority rights 
has been made, and especially so in the legislative sphere. There has also been improvement in the 
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exercise of their rights to their own culture and language as well as in extension of the rights of 
members of national minorities to participate in decision-making process. (Tatalović, 2004:111) 
Croatia has made enormous efforts in order to establish a legal system for protection of human 
rights as indispensable components of functioning of a democratic system. As a result of these 
efforts, Croatia has become a member of almost all international organizations on the global and 
regional level concerning human and minority rights. In consideration of the fact that Croatia used 
to be a constituent part of another state and that it gained its independence in 1991 after dissolution 
of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia committed itself to 
many agreements concerning this sphere by the on the basis of the Succession Agreement. Croatia 
has also concluded many other significant agreements concerning human and minority rights and it 
accepted furthermore the majority of controlling mechanisms as envisaged by international 
agreements in this field as well as all newly adopted additional protocols on the strength of which 
the sphere of protection of these agreements has been broadened. 
The admission of Croatia into the Council of Europe as well as the ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the additional Protocols brought in Croatia a new element of 
protection of human rights and secured the process of bringing the national legislation into harmony 
with international standards. Croatia is party to a full range of human rights obligations through its 
constitution and its membership in the Council of Europe, notably through ratification of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights). Croatia has also ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
and the Convention Against Torture. 
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3.2 The rights of national minorities in Croatia 
 
 
Despite the postwar and transitional hardships, Croatia managed to design a comprehensive model 
of the protection of its national minorities at the national, regional and local levels, and bring it into 
line with the European practice and standards. It should be noted that the model of cultural 
autonomy promotes the integration of national minorities and not their assimilation into the 
Croatian society. This model guarantees national minorities the preservation and the promotion of 
their identity (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious), either individually or collectively.   
 According to the adopted model of cultural autonomy, most ethnic rights of national minorities 
(education, science, libraries, protection of monuments) are enforced through the institutions 
professionally and administratively responsible for certain areas of social life, which enables the 
realization of the principle of the integration of national minorities into the Croatian society, but 
also guarantees the protection of their cultural and ethnic identity. The second aspect of the ethnic 
rights (information, publishing, cultural amateurism, cultural manifestations) is fostered through the 
activities of the national minorities‘ nongovernmental organizations, thus additionally ensuring the 
protection from assimilation. The model enables and fosters the development of the relationships of 
the national minorities with the states of their parent nation to facilitate their cultural and linguistic 
development. 
Croatia is one of the rare states, such as Slovenia and Romania, which not only ensures to its ethnic 
minorities the protection of their national and cultural identity, but it also reserves for them a special 
place in the Parliament. Thus, minorities have the right to political representation and to the 
harmonization of their specific interests, although the number of representatives is limited, which 
has a symbolic impact on state politics. 
Croatia employs an intricate system of minority self-governments and guarantee of representation in 
the Croatian Parliament. Members of national minorities elect no less than five and no more than 
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eight of their representatives in special election constituencies, pursuant to the elections law. This 
guarantee is further broken down in to representation numbers of minorities according to 
percentages of the population of Croatia. 
The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, adopted on 13 December 2002 by the 
Parliament and published on 19 December 2002 in the official gazette No. 154, determines the 
organization of local councils for national minorities in the Towns, Municipalities and Counties in 
order to enable the establishment of the national coordination of such councils to act as a body 
representative of the national minorities. 
Furthermore, the constitutional law mandates the representation of members of minorities in local, 
regional, and national legislative organs through a system of reserved seats in proportion to the 
share of the minority in the total population of the relevant level of government. Similar provisions 
apply for minority representation in executive organs of the state at local, regional (Councils of 
National Minorities) and national (Council for National Minorities) level, and they are to be given 
priority in recruitment to posts in state administration and judicial services if they are equally well 
qualified.   
Within the Parliament exists a committee for human rights, with a Subcommittee for the rights of 
ethnic and national minorities, which determinates the implementation of minority policy and its 
implementation in the process of accepting the new laws. The Committee is also an authorized 
working body that deals with the preparation of implementation of international protection of 
human rights, international treaties, minority rights and programs of international cultural co-
operation between international groups. 
The Council of National Minorities was established in 1998 as a non-governmental, coordinating 
and consultative body for all recognized minorities in Croatia with the aim to promote all minority 
communities. This body deals with the implementation and promotion of minority rights, by giving 
legislative proposals that concern minority issues in politics, conveying their views to the 
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Parliament, to the government agencies and to the government with the aim of solving specific 
problems, as well as cooperation with governmental and international organizations. (Stanković 
Pejnović, 2010:154) 
In Croatia, members of national minorities are given the right to freely use their language and script 
for both private and public use, including the right to set up signs
75
 and other information in the 
language and script they are using. 
The Croatian minority law gives national minorities the right to education and schooling in the 
language and script that the national minority is using. 
Article 18 of Croatia‘s law gives the task of promoting the understanding for members of national 
minorities to the radio and television stations of national, regional and local levels, further the law 
states that national minorities have the right to perform activities of public information consistent 
with the law. 
Under the Constitutional Act, the Republic of Croatia ensures realization of special rights and 
freedoms of members of national minorities enjoyed by them individually or together with other 
persons belonging to the same national minorities, and when being determined by this 
Constitutional Act or special acts, together with members of other national minorities, which is 
stipulated. This especially refers to:  
− usage of own language and script, in private and public use, and in official use;   
− education and schooling in the language and script they are using;   
− usage of own insignia and symbols;   
− cultural autonomy by means of keeping, developing and expressing their own culture, and 
preserving and protecting their cultural material heritage and tradition;   
− right confessing own religion and founding of religious communities together with other members 
of this religion;   
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− access to media of mass communication and performing of actions of public information 
(receiving and distribution of information);  
− self-organizing and uniting for realization of common interests;   
− representation in representative bodies on national and local level, and in administration and 
judicial bodies;   
− participation of members of national minorities in  public life and administration of local affairs 
by means of Councils and representatives of national minorities;   
− protection from every act that endangers or may endanger their existence and exercise of rights 
and freedoms. 
Although the model of cultural autonomy and political representation of national minorities in 
Croatia can structurally get high marks, there are still some problems in its implementation:  
• inadequate training and preparedness of some institutions;  
• insufficient interest of some bodies of local and regional self-government;  
• lack of interest and/or motivation of members of national minorities or their organizations.  
Resolving these problems and eliminating prejudices (mostly the consequence of the war) in a 
portion of the population towards some national minorities are the priorities in advancing the 
position of national minorities in Croatia. (Tatalović, 2006:50) 
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3.4 Serbs: from constitutive people to minority 
 
 
In the ex-Yugoslavian Constitution, the notion of ―people‖ (narod) was reserved for the six 
constituent federal nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims). 
Their members living in other republics were, in principle, considered nationalities, except for 
specific historical or political reasons. Minorities are simultaneously renamed nationalities 
(narodnosti), as it was thought that the former term has a pejorative connotation. In such a 
conception of federalism, the Serbs in Croatia could not have only the status of national minorities 
(nationalities). An additional, important factor was a kind of moral compensation to the mass 
extermination of Serbs under the Ustasha regime in NDH (Independent State of Croatia), and for 
their massive participation in the partisan movement. However, they were not fully equivalent to the 
Croats regarding the Croatian nation-building. 
76
 
The SFRJ (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) tried to solve the nationality question by 
establishing a complex institutional framework of representation and power-sharing which 
eventually collapsed when the constituent republics entered the logic of nationalism.  
The dynamics of new nationalism and the breakdown of federal structures affected the situation of 
minorities in several ways. To the degree that the constitutional framework of representation and 
power-sharing of "nations" within the SFRJ dissolved, groups that had formerly constituted 
numerical minorities in one of the republics while being majorities in another republic now found 
themselves legally unprotected and vulnerable to violent hostilities. The nationalizing states also 
restricted the rights of what had formerly been "nationalities", i.e. minorities. In fact, only through 
pressure from the EC and the UN have the rights of minorities become incorporated into the legal 
framework of the new states.  
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In the new Croatian legislative framework, Serbs are considered as a new national minority, whose 
defining characteristics is that they have become minorities by losing their status as constituent 
―nations‖ of the SFRJ and that, after the collapse of the federal structures, they now rely on one of 
the successor states of the former Yugoslavia as their external national homeland. New national 
minorities have been particularly affected by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, in so far as 
they have inevitably been involved in border conflicts between the new states. As a consequence of 
their involvement in the civil wars in ex-Yugoslavia and the corresponding loss of inter-ethnic 
communication and trust, they have also suffered from post-war discrimination. 
Main problems concentrated on violation of human rights, especially of members of „new‖ national 
minorities and absence of independent judiciary. 
Respect of human rights of members of certain national minorities, especially Serbs, Bosniacs and 
Roma, is still conditioned by the legacy of war and discriminatory policy from the 1990s. 
Discriminatory legal regulations have mostly been changed by new legal solutions, but in certain 
fields of realization of the rights they often do not have any impact on improvement of the situation. 
Problems of discrimination can still be encountered in recognition and realization of a broad 
spectrum of the so-called acquired rights, such as right to status, property, pension and social rights, 
labour code, tenancy rights, compensation of victims of terrorist acts, etc. This discrimination 
affects to the largest degree citizens of Serbian nationality in the category of refugees, displaced 
persons and persons who lived in the areas under the UN protection during the war. 
One of the basic problems that cause such a discriminatory attitude towards the mentioned category 
of citizens, and therefore affect their survival and/or their sustainable return to Croatia, is the fact 
that judiciary and civil-service bodies, unlike the relation towards members of the majority nation, 
do not recognize them the fact of war as legally relevant in realization and recognition of their 
acquired rights. Consequently, some categories of the citizens did not experience the war as a form 
of «greater force» and thus legal regulations designed to be implemented under normal (peaceful) 
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conditions were applied restrictively in their case (especially in the case of members of the Serbian 
national minority). 
In line with possibilities provided by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, over the years Serbs in Croatia have 
restored a part of their institutional and organizational tradition in accordance with the requirements 
of new times and their new status as a national minority. 
Serbs in Croatia practically have one political party – the Independent Democratic Serb Party 
(SDSS). Others, like Serb People's Party, which was founded by TuĊman's regime in the early 
1990's, and the Party of Danube Serbs, founded in connivance with the former regional HDZ 
leaders, are either close to disappearance or have never seriously started operating. The SDSS 
covers the largest part of political representation of Serbs in Croatia, from the Parliament to 
municipalities; the Serbs now have three parliamentary deputies (all three are from SDSS ranks) 
and more than 250 councilors in county assemblies (in six counties), towns and municipalities 
(more than 30 towns and municipalities). After the 2005 local elections, the SDSS won executive 
power in 15 municipalities, and it participates in power in the same number of municipalities and 
leading officials or their deputies are chosen from the SDSS ranks. In line with the Erdut 
Agreement and the Constitutional Decision, SDSS representatives perform the duties of Deputy 
County Prefects in two eastern Slavonian counties and they are members of local governments in 
the Sisak-Moslavina County, the Šibenik-Knin County, the Karlovac County and potentially in the 
Lika-Senj County. On the State level, the SDSS holds 13 official positions in various ministries 
(one state secretary, seven assistant ministers, four ministers' advisors, two deputies of the Head of 
the Government's Office). All this has been achieved in the period of ten years, and the largest part 
has been achieved in the period from 2003 to the present day. In that period Serbs have outgrown 
the limits of the regional political force (eastern Slavonia) and a nongovernmental organization and 
grown into a national political force; in terms of the councilor and deputy mandates, the SDSS is 
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now the sixth party in the country. Even though it appears as the representative of Serbs in the 
Republic of Croatia, the SDSS is, in terms of its political programme and ideology, a party of left 
orientation, with special interest in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic issues, balanced regional 
development, social justice and anti-fascist tradition. In the next coming period, the SDSS plans to 
improve the representation of Serbs by winning at least four mandates, firstly in the Croatian 
Parliament, and then, in local elections in the areas and regions where Serbs have not been 
adequately represented (e.g. in western Slavonia). 
In line with the Constitutional Law, Serbs in Croatia are entitled to elect their minority councils – 
from the level of municipalities to the level of counties. These councils act as minority self-
government and corrective mechanisms of government, if the government's decisions are contrary 
to the minority rights or interests. The county minority councils may form their national 
coordination bodies and transfer part of their authority envisaged by law to those bodies. The Serb 
National Council (SNV) has taken advantage of the possibilities defined by the Constitution, and 
under its aegis, structured the self-government of Serbs in Croatia in the majority of municipalities, 
towns and counties where Serbs have legal preconditions for the election of councils. At the 
elections for national minority councils, held in June 2007, the SNV put up its list of candidates in 
almost all towns, counties and municipalities, and won 1,684 mandates, i.e. over 84 % of the total 
number of councilor posts (others were won by other lists). This means that the SNV has formed the 
councils in 19 counties with 470 councilors, in 49 towns with 657 councilors, in 54 municipalities 
with 527 councilors, and also with 30 representatives (who are elected in places where the number 
of Serbs is lower than the legally defined minimum for the election of councils). The mentioned 
number of councils and councilors is potentially a huge force; however, due to the lack of adequate 
working conditions, undefined status and insufficient training, the potential of these councils has 
not been fully used so far. For this reason, the SNV, as the national coordination body, sees the 
following task as its obligation: after the next elections in 2011 it should overcome the state of 
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horizontal fragmentation, status instability and functional lack of training of a certain number of 
councils and turn them into a true body of Serb self-government in the Republic of Croatia as 
regards the issues of culture, media, education, employment and development. 
In line with the Erdut Agreement and the Croatian Government Letter of Intent, and prior to the 
adoption of the new version of the Constitutional Law on National Minority Rights, a regional body 
of minority self-government was formed on the territory of two counties, the Osijek-Baranja County 
and the Vukovar-Srijem County, called the Joint Council of Municipalities (Zajedničko vijeće 
općina – ZVO).   
The ZVO is a co-founder of the SNV, and it has retained the status of an autonomous, regional body 
of minority self-government of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium within the SNV.  
The ZVO played an extremely important role in the process of peaceful reintegration as well as 
affirmation of the constitutional rights of Serbs in the Republic of Croatia; at present it devotes 
special attention to the advancement of local self-government work in Serb communities, education 
in Serbian language and script, realization of different rights of members of the Serb community in 
that area, building of multi-ethnic tolerance and development of Serb communities in the area. The 
ZVO is also a co-founder of the ―Novosti [News]‖ weekly, the founder of Radio Danube and the 
publisher of a monthly bulletin. 
Over the past two decades, two non-governmental organizations have been active in the sphere of 
culture and civil society; they are, in various segments, also active in the realization of rights and 
interests of Serbs in Croatia. Over the mentioned period, there have also been other organizations, 
but their importance and continuity, and their identity among the Serbs (and with the Croatian 
public) are far from the recognizability of the two mentioned organizations. 
The Serb Cultural Society (SKD) ―Prosvjeta‖, which emerged under the wings of the Serb anti-
fascist movement in Croatia, was founded in 1944 in Glina. Its operation was banned in the socialist 
period in the early 1970's; however it renewed its activity twice in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
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After the SNV and the SDSS, SKD ―Prosvjeta‖ is the most ramified Serb organization with most 
members in Croatia. 
The Serb Democratic Forum (SDF) is the first Serb non-government organization that was 
established against the background of disintegration of the former joint state. The Forum has long 
functioned as a basic organization of Serbs in Croatia and a central institution which worked out the 
programme of a largest part of Serb institutions in Croatia and developed their staffing. In that 
period the Forum acted as a substitute for non-existent Serb organizations, gathering the leading 
intellectuals and political figures. 
In the first half of the 1990's, the Forum's activity was marked by peace-keeping efforts, defence of 
Serb's rights in cities, humanitarian assistance and proposals for the legal and political status of 
Serbs in Croatia. 
As of 1995, the SDF has directed its activities towards the provision of legal assistance, restoration 
of inter-ethnic trust and refugee return. Until 2000, with the aim of realizing those three basic 
activities, the SDF formed offices in almost all urban returnee centers; for a majority of returnees 
and those who remained in those areas it was the only body they could address and receive the 
necessary assistance. Offices have also been opened in Belgrade and Banja Luka for the purpose of 
return; they soon developed into independent organizations. The activity of the SDF Belgrade is 
especially noticeable. 
In the period after 2000, the SDF has broadened its activities to another two fields – social 
programmes and reconstruction assistance and the development of areas of return. 
Since 1996, the SDF has published the monthly ―Identitet [Identity]‖, which deals with the issues of 
refugees, refugee milieus, but also wider social and political topics. 
Along with a stronger political representation of Serbs in the areas of return, especially after the 
2001 and 2005 local elections, elected representatives of Serbs and local authorities have taken over 
part of activities that used to be performed by the SDF; thus, the SDF is now facing the need to 
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redefine is immediate future in terms of its organization and programme. This presumes a greater 
SDF openness towards other key institutions of the Serb community, which was insufficient in the 
past years. 
Serbs in present day Croatia, after experiencing ordeal of almost disappearing from the territory of 
Croatia in the 1990's, are re-establishing themselves again as an important part of the Serb people 
and an important part of the Croatian society.  
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CHAPTER 4 : NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 
National identity, as one of social collective identities that define the individual‘s personality, is a 
modern phenomenon built in the Modern era and contemporary society by the end of the 18
th
 
century onwards. (Korunić, 2003) It is a multidimensional concept that has been developed and 
analyzed in various disciplines and that is relevant to a wide range of research fields. However, the 
objectification of the notion of national identity still remains a problem, as well as the criteria that 
determine the nation. 
The term national identity contains two important constructs that must be analyzed: identity and 
nation. First, national identity has to be considered as one particular form of identity, a definition of 
this latter term as well as a differentiation between individual and collective identity will therefore 
be necessary in order to understand the construct of interest. Second, as we talk about "national" 
identity, we refer to the concept of a nation. The most common usage of ―nation‖ is as a political 
concept, and most studies of national identity investigate ―nations‖ in political terms. 
First of all, it is important to clarify that Serbs in Croatia represent a national, ethnic, cultural and 
religious minority, with a strong civic identity as a result of their historical legal status and political 
engagement. Due to the fact that Croatia was part of former socialist Yugoslavia, based on a 
communist ideology of classification of its citizens, class identity is also one kind of identification 
that described, among the others, the Serbs in Croatia. In order to define the elements of Serb 
national identity in Croatia all of these aspects of their minority identity will be covered and further 
explained. 
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4.1 The concept of identity 
 
 
The concepts of identity and national identity originally stem from the social  sciences, particularly 
from sociology and political science, but have also been studied in  psychology, philosophy and 
geography. Identity is an abstract concept; therefore we can distinguish different uses and meanings 
for the concept of ―identity‖. The most frequent meanings are the following forms: personal identity 
and collective identity, gender, cultural, ethnic, social, national and multicultural identity.  In some 
researches ―cultural identity‖, ―ethnic identity‖ and ―national identity‖ become synonyms by being 
related; in other researches each has its own meaning by using different concepts. Generally 
speaking, the term of identity involves language, culture, history, customs, national and political 
attitudes. The individual or the group is able to have in the same time several different identities: a 
national, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural and political identity. 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, identity is defined as "those attributes that 
make you unique as an individual and different from others" or "the way you see or define yourself" 
(Olson, 2002). Identity can therefore be seen as the positioning of the "self" as opposed to the 
"others". This concept refers to individual rather than to collective identity and may be determined 
by the gender as well as the territorial, cultural, social, religious, ethnic, linguistic and national 
identity (cp. Smith 1991, p. 15). 
The term ―identity‖ is problematic. In its pure philosophical usage, it implies ―uniqueness,‖ the 
concept of being equal to oneself, and nothing else. From this basic concept, implying ―sameness 
and difference,‖ identity has come to refer to individuals, groups or conglomerates; it can also be 
used to refer to something externally or consensually defined, or to something subjective or 
individually experienced. Identity also refers to the permanence over time, to the notion of unity, to 
the ability to recognize and be recognized (Melucci, 1995:45). 
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The problem of identity becomes particularly accentuated in a time of social and civilizational 
crisis, when the turbulence shakes all the existing values and principles, and breaks down the 
established life schemes without yet ensuring new ones. This leaves individuals in a vacuum of 
social norms and their increasing uncertainty and insecurity. This is especially the case of what 
happened in former Yugoslavia. 
 
 
4.1.2. Social identity  
 
According to the theory of social identity, only by being a member of a group creates in an 
individual a sense of belonging and a positive social identity is built. The theory of social identity 
looks at the national group as at any other social group, so we can conclude that national identity 
derives from the feeling of belonging to a particular nation that is to a national group. An individual 
shares with his national group common beliefs, attitudes, values, customs, language, religion.  
There is no straightforward relationship between identity and social con-cepts such as Religion, 
Family and Gender. Our identities are embedded in a Web of Identity (Livesey, 2004), which is a 
visual representation of the intersection between identity and society. The Web of Identity 
illustrates that the interaction between identity and social structure is complex and multi-layered. 
Individuals are surrounded by large social forces; they live out their lives, making decisions and 
choices but have limited options available to them. 
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Figure 1: Web of identity (Livesey, 2004) 
 
In sociology and political science, researchers consider the idea of social identity and refer to this 
notion as "to a person's self- definition in relation to others." Social identity is "sustained primarily 
through social comparison, which differentiates the in-group from relevant out-groups." 
(Spießberger and Ungersböck, 2005:1) 
Jelić (2003) suggested that national identity is an important part of social identity that results from a 
feeling of belonging to a particular national group, to which an extreme emotional importance is 
given. Essential for national identity is the individual's subjective identification with the group, but 
also the recognition of the group by external members (Huić, 2004). 
Namely, the fact that one is a member of various social groups is a very important contributing 
aspect of an individual‘s self-definition. In that sense, "group" has not only objective, social, but 
also psychological, meaning. (Vasović, 1999) 
Social identity can be seen as a quite certain consequence of group membership: it is defined as the 
part of an individual‘s self-reflection which derives from knowledge of one‘s membership in a 
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social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership (Tajfel, 1981: 255). Although an individual‘s view of himself is much more complex, 
some aspects of that view are undoubtedly contributed by one‘s membership in certain social 
groups and categories. Some memberships are more prominent and more important for an 
individual than others; and both their importance and their salience may vary as a function of time 
and a variety of social situations.  
An individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership in new groups if these 
groups have some contribution to make to the positive aspects of his social identity. But, if a group 
does not satisfy this requirement, if possible the individual will tend to leave it, literally or 
symbolically, if this does not conflict with some of his own important values. 
In a socialist society, such as was former Yugoslavia, social categorization was not created out of 
social reality, but imposed from above and ideologically prescribed. That is, the social consensus in 
regard who was "in" and who was "out" of a certain group was replaced by ideological 
differentiation or homogenizations which were normative in character. Thus, the limited and 
prescribed scheme of social structure narrows an individual‘s perspectives and the available 
repertories of group identification. This provides the basis for a limited choice of identity models. 
In the context of an ideological paradigm of "classless and pacified society" differences between 
classes were erased, and the importance of confessional and ethnic belonging were denied. At the 
same time, new social categories ("working people", "nation of proletariat"), supranational 
affiliations ("Yugoslav"), as well as new elements of social structure were established. 
This limited, ascribed and static paradigm of identities made socialist society similar to a traditional 
one, and at the same time differentiated it from the modern and democratic one. However, in 
traditional as well as in modern democratic society, the established social consensus about the 
criteria of membership to certain groups was the product of social, political, cultural, and economic 
evolution.  
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Forced "intervention" in the given social reality and existing social categorization in the post-
revolutionary period, caused individuals and whole social groups "overnight" to be left without not 
only their social, but also their psychological grounds. The new categorization which was beyond 
any social experience, constituted an uncertain basis for an individual‘s self-image. (Vasović,1999) 
Obstacles in establishing social identities manifested themselves in the previous Yugoslav society 
in different ways. The most striking examples are found in the class, ethnic and confessional group 
identifications. 
One example of empty identities is related to the fate of the national/ethnic identification in 
multiethnic former Yugoslavia. This kind of identity reaches the very core of an individual‘s self-
identification and self-respect, because it is formed early in an individual‘s life cycle and has a 
strong emotional charge. The Communist regime in former Yugoslavia, however, offered as a 
solution for historical interethnic conflicts, suppression and denial of the importance of any kind of 
ethnic identity. In the name of so called "brotherhood and unity" it introduced the supranational 
concept of "Yugoslav identity". (Vasović, 1999) 
However, some data indicate that Yugoslav affiliation had also an additional psychological 
function: that is, the defense of the positive social identity for those minority groups who lived in 
ethnic enclaves. Namely, Croats in Vojvodina and in Bosnia, Muslims in Bosnia and in 
Montenegro, Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija, etc., emphasized Yugoslav identity much more than 
their compatriots from ethnically homogenous social environments (Pantić, 1991). Accepting 
"Yugoslav", which was socially and ideologically a highly desirable identity, was a means of 
gaining parity with, or a positively valued differentiation from, the ethnic majority, and, hence, the 
means of rejecting the "inferior" status of the group. But, this kind of identity was mainly 
instrumental. Yugoslav self-identification also provided individuals a means of avoiding competing 
claims to their national allegiance. This was especially important for the children of nationally- 
mixed marriages, where each parent might expect their child to recognize their particular national 
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identity. By identifying as a Yugoslav, one could resist claims that others might make on one's 
identity and thus avoid potential conflicts. (Sekulic, Massey, Hodson, 1994:85-86) 
Yugoslav identification also provided a way of breaking with an increasingly discredited past, 
especially among younger persons it was a protest against traditional nationalist politics that seemed 
to be at the heart of the region's problems (Banac, 1984). 
 In the context of political events in the former Yugoslavia, obviously it did not present authentic, 
stable or sufficient ground for an individual‘s self-definition and self-respect. 
 
4.1.3. Collective identity 
 
Collective identity can be perceived as positioning the "self" of a community as opposed to the 
"others". Concerning national identity, the fronts are specified and the "national self" is opposed to 
"not national" or "foreign" (Smith, 1991: 8). 
It is necessary to differentiate individual from collective identities as well as the various forms of 
collective identity. A collective identity is formed when the members of a group accept the 
common, collective norms and demands as the historical and cultural frame of reference which 
determines their place in a community. Individual identity comes about when a person learns to 
differentiate oneself from the environment and consciously to reevaluate tradition, becoming 
thereby an independent and autonomous individual. But both collective and individual identification 
go through a process of socialization which has two phases: adaptation to socio-cultural norms 
(identification), and separation and critical evaluation of the given standards (constitution of 
identity). Only when both phases are passed one may speak of the formation of a mature personality 
with a distinct identity.  
A traditional society emphasizes collective identity, while modern society stresses the importance 
of achieving individual identity (in cultural terms this is the opposition of collectivism and 
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individualism; in political terms it is between liberalism and communitarianism). That is to say, one 
can speak about two sides of the formation of identity: one consists of homogenization (that is 
linked with heteronomy) and another with differentiation (that leads to autonomy). A complete 
achievement of identity is reached when both of these sides are reconciled and a balance attained 
which enables individuals to realize both personal and social integration. When these dimensions 
are in collision, the results are either collectivist or individualist extremes. (Golubović, 1999) 
Since the process of socialization that stimulates identification is under the strong impact of culture 
(from the primary institutions to the more complex social institutions), the social and cultural 
settings should be analyzed in order to understand why certain forms of identification prevail. 
If collective identity is in question one may distinguish the following forms: cultural identity which 
expresses individual and group identification with the basic values and patterns of behavior and 
attitudes; religious identity that relates to identification with given beliefs and confessional 
belonging; ideological/political identity that expresses the acceptance of the particular political 
demands of given political groups (or states); regional/ethnic identity that relies upon a recognition 
of ethnicity as a focus of identification; class identity in which the recognition of a given class is the 
primary group identification; professional identity which refers to an adherence to a particular 
vocation, and generational identity that links individuals with the same generation. (Golubović, 
1999) 
According to Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernard Giesen‘s theories of collective identity, who 
also developed a typology of symbolic codes of national identity, the collective and hence national 
identity is never pre-given and unchangeable. They examine the mechanisms by which the stability 
of national identity is achieved, and the submission of this kind of prevalence of different interests, 
values and desires of the members of the nation is enabled. They consider that for this is responsible 
the social construction of borders, which enables the separation to perform on a symbolic level, in 
three forms, which in practice are intertwined: primordial, civic, and cultural or sacred form. 
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Thus, three ideal-types of collective identity are distinguished. The first is the primordial code, 
which refers to the naturally given and, therefore, to unquestionable differences: it is about 
differences caused by race, gender, kinship, etc. These properties, however, can be socially 
constructed on a variety of myths about the origin of a particular collectivity.  
The second ideal type is the construction of collective identity in the scope of the civil code, when 
the core identity of is formed by institutions, customs, traditions and the basic laws of the 
community. The boundaries of such a shaped identity are thus not completely impassable as the 
ones in the primordial code, and, therefore, the elements of modern societies and states, such as 
obeying the law and the constitution, the parliament and other state institutions, allow the inclusion 
of all. It is considered therefore that others can also gain our collective identity. 
In the third ideal type, collective identity is formed on the basis of the sacred, regardless of whether 
God is defined as sacred, progress or rationality: it is expressed in ideologies or religions. 
(Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah/Giesen, Bernhard, 1995) 
Due to its less rigid form of socialism, there was more space in Yugoslavia for the growth of 
individual identities on behalf of the collectivist form of identity, which was weaker. Still, what 
prevailed over the large part of the population was an authoritarian model of identity. 
Unlike in other ex -socialist countries, where the religious form became dominant during the 
Solidarity resistance and afterwards, in the states of the former Yugoslav republics national/ethnic 
identity absolutely prevailed. This absolutization of ethnicity is accompanied by a trend towards re-
traditionalization in terms of a revival of the past history from time immemorial with its historical 
myths so as to confirm a "glorious past" of one‘s own nation. 
According to Jonathan Friedman, a time of crisis produces a desire for roots and security by a return 
to stable traditional values with an increase in primitive cults (Friedman, 1994: 243). This new form 
of the collectivist identity enables mobilization of the population when it becomes disillusioned 
with regard to the old ideologies, and when anxiety and fear are the responses to the actual threats 
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(Giddens, 1991:44). Confronted with the dilemma of authority vs. uncertainty, writes Giddens, 
people choose a new form of authority which seems to be biologically rooted (in terms of "blood 
and soil"). This seems more original and becomes more attractive to a population which has lost the 
old forms of identity which fostered a feeling of belonging. (Golubović,1999) 
Analyzing definitions of collective identity of a great number of authors (Brewer, 1993; 1999; 
Djurić, 1995, Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Ţagar, 2001), it can be noted that, although not always 
using the same terminology, they all specify that two important mechanisms are always present in 
social identity: differentiation and equivalency. It means that the knowledge and the sense of 
belonging to a certain social group are based on subjective and/or objective recognition of 
similarities with the members of one`s own group (equivalency), i.e. perceiving and realizing 
differences in relation to the entities from other social categories (differentiation).  
It is important to emphasize that every identity, whether individual or collective, is not a given fact, 
but a process. This means that it is formed under the influence of social factors, but also that once 
established identity can develop, transform or, occasionally, cease to exist. (Francesko,  
Kodzopeljic & Mihic, 2005) 
 
4.1.4. Civic identity  
 
Civic identity is based on a specific territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single 
political will, equal rights for the members of the nation, shared values, traditions and emotions that 
bind people together. (Sekulić, 2003:144) 
According to Ignatieff
77
 a civic nation is in principle a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, 
united in patriotic attachment, to a shared set of political practices and values, united by a civic 
                                                 
77
 See Ignatieff M. (1993) “Blood and belonging”: journeys into the new nationalism”, Farrar, Straus And Giroux, New 
York 
National Identity 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
122 
 
rather than an ethnic definition of belonging, by attachment to civic institutions like Parliament and 
the rule of law.  
Civic identity represents a sense of belonging, equality and solidarity with the local community 
members, being linked to the state structure. The civic identity is linked to the political or civic 
nation. 
Yugoslav identity was a typical example of a civic identity, adopted primarily by people of 
ethnically mixed backgrounds or by minorities who wanted to avoid being ―different‖. However, it 
was more accepted by the Serbs than by the Croats, especially among the Serb minority in Croatia. 
The identification with ―Yugoslav‖ in socialist Yugoslavia was a multifunctional phenomenon 
which served as a back door for those who wanted to avoid a narrow ethnic identification. With the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, its functional equivalent occurs in the form of a "civic" identity which 
replaces the ethnic identity. This difference, which is more or less "imported" from the modern 
Western political discourse, enters into the processes of identification. This civil identification is a 
Yugoslav equivalent in the sense that it allows people to express broadly, away from a narrow 
ethnic identification and from the intense ethnic revival in the first post-communist phase.  
In particular, it fulfills the function of escaping from a minority status in the same way that it was 
fulfilled by the Yugoslav orientation. (Sekulić, 2003:163) 
"Yugoslav" was first included in the third post-war census in 1961. Officially this category was 
reserved for "nationally non committed persons," and was treated as a residual category for those 
who offered no particular national identity (Petrovic, 1983). Table 1 presents the percentages of the 
population of Yugoslavia identifying as Yugoslav in 1961, 1971, and 1981. 
The modest decline in self-identification as a Yugoslav for the country as a whole between 1961 
and 1971 was primarily the result of a decline in Yugoslav identifiers in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia) in 1971. 
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Table 1. 
 
Apart from Bosnia between 1961 and 1971 and Kosovo, self-identification as a Yugoslav shows a 
general pattern of increase from 1961 to 1981, especially in Croatia and the Vojvodina, and in 
Bosnia between 1971 and 1981. (Sekulić, 1994:84-85) 
The category of ―Yugoslav‖ in the Population Censuses of the newly states formed after the 
dissolution of former Yugoslavia still exists but it is statistically irrelevant. It is connected to a state 
that no longer exists, and it will be probably excluded from the Census or included in the categories 
of ―Others‖.  
It is very likely that, in the absence of a common civic identity that the people can relate to, 
especially national minorities, the new European identity will be a substitute for the lost Yugoslav 
civic identity.  
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4.1.5. Class identity 
 
Class is also one type of collective identity in which the recognition of a given class is the primary 
group identification. (Golubović,1999) In Marx's sociology, class is the supreme and the only 
relevant collective identity and the sole motor of history.  
By class identity is understood the feeling of belonging to a class of individuals in society and the 
differentiation of those who belong to another class. (Bazić, 2009:34) 
 In socialist countries, such as ex-Yugoslavia, ideological/political and class identity were dominant 
forms of a collective identification, and the sole officially recognized form of identity, while 
individual identities were repressed into the closed circle of private, family life. The state was the 
only acceptable source of belonging; all the other forms, in particular religious, ethnic and 
professional, were marginalized. This was the reason why they emerged as the main focus after the 
fall of the totalitarian regimes.  (Golubović,1999) 
In the socialist period (until 1990), despite nominal ideological egalitarianism, the main criterion for 
class membership was the participation in political decision-making, so we could say that the 
membership of the ruling party was the main definition of "higher" class and the major mean of 
social mobility of the "lower" class, which consisted of manual workers, peasants and unemployed. 
"Middle" class consisted of "technocrats" (ie. engineers, managers) who were not directly involved 
in the political decisions, and "intelligence" - educated people, professionals, teachers, etc., which 
were a source of recruitment for the "political class" or the nomenclature. This layer (or slightly 
lower) can be attributed as the "remnants of the bourgeoisie", individuals who were not prone to the 
political regime, but who in their civil aspirations, or the residues of property inherited from 
previous regimes, formed a thin and very fragile layer of unstructured "intelligence." (Polšek, 2005)  
Theories of social class always refer to systems of social ranking and distribution of power. 
Ethnicity, on the contrary, does not necessarily refer to rank; ethnic relations may well be 
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egalitarian in this regard. Still, many poly-ethnic societies are ranked according to ethnic 
membership. The criteria for such ranking are nevertheless different from class ranking: they refer 
to imputed cultural differences or "races", not to property or achieved statuses.   
There may be a high correlation between ethnicity and class, which means that there is a high 
likelihood that persons belonging to specific ethnic groups also belong to specific social classes. 
There can be a significant interrelationship between class and ethnicity, both class and ethnicity can 
be criteria for rank, and ethnic membership can be an important factor for class membership. Both 
class differences and ethnic differences can be pervasive features of societies, but they are not one 
and the same thing and must be distinguished from one another analytically. (Eriksen, 1993) 
 
 
4.1.6. Ethnic identity 
 
 Ethnic identity, although a recent and uncertain term, can be approached according to the analysis 
of Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.4;6) as the sense of belonging to a named human population with 
myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a 
link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity.  
The most widely used definitions of ethnic identity proposed in previous literature include the 
following:   
• According to Max Weber, ―ethnic groups are those human groups that entertain a subjective 
belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or 
because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation 
of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship 
exists.” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:35).    
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• According to Donald Horowitz: “Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which 
usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.  Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and 
affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.” (Horowitz, 1985:52).  
• According to Fearon and Laitin, an ethnic group is ―a group larger than a family for which 
membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a 
conventionally recognized “natural history” as a group. (Fearon and Laitin, 2000:20).     
• In a subsequent refinement, Fearon defines a ―prototypical‖ ethnic group as one that has several of 
the following features as possible: (1) Membership is reckoned primarily by descent (2) Members 
are conscious of group membership (3) Members share distinguishing cultural features (4) These 
cultural features are valued by a majority of members (5) The group has or remembers a homeland 
(6) The group has a shared history as a group that is ―not wholly manufactured but has some basis 
in fact.‖ (Fearon, 2003:7)   
 
All definitions in this inventory agree that descent is somehow important in defining an ethnic 
group. The differences are over how precisely to specify the role of descent, and whether and how 
other features should be combined with it in defining ethnic groups.  The role of descent is specified 
in four different ways: (1) a common ancestry (2) a myth of common ancestry (3) a myth of a 
common place of origin and (4) a ―descent rule‖ for membership.  The features combined with 7 
descents include: (5) a common culture or language (6) a common history and (7) conceptual 
autonomy.  (Kanchan, 2006:6) Without the myths of origin, it's difficult to imagine a survival of an 
ethnic community. 
 
For the Serbs, the myth of common descent and ancestry dates back to the Sacrosanct Nemanjić 
dynasty and the first Serbian state, Ras or Raška (Rascia). As already explained in chapter 2 (―The 
Serbs of Croatia: a historical overview‖), the Nemanjić dynasty during its rule achieved to unite all 
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Serbian lands into a kingdom and also established the Serbian Orthodox Church. Rascia can be 
considered as the nucleus of the Medieval Serbian State, although it has been used to refer to 
various Serbian states throughout the middle Ages. Rascia was the crown land, seat or appanage of 
the following states: 
Serbian Principality (768-960), Catepanate of Serbia and Theme of Sirmium (960-1043), Grand 
Principality of Duklja (1043-1101), Serbian Grand Principality (1101-1217), Serbian Kingdom 
(1217-1345), Serbian Empire (1345-1371), Serbian Despotate (1402–1459).  
Though, Rascia is a regional name of one part of the Serbian lands, which gradually became the 
sign for the entire State. Different suppositions have been stated in the literature so far about the 
possible origin of the term "Raška". Some scientists supposed that the town of Ras78 transmitted its 
name to the surroundings. The others, however, attributed a crucial role to the river Raška, which 
flows through the region of the today's town of Novi Pazar and empties into the Ibar river. A certain 
role in forming a notion "Raška" could be attributed to the church organisation of the country, to 
Rascian bishopric, but only within a definite chronological framework. 
The analysis of the available historical sources, and the Byzantine ones are the oldest, shows that 
there was not such a term for the State of Serbian Princes until the middle of the 12th century. 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus connects the term "Rassa" with the border area between Serbia and 
Bulgaria in the 9th century.  
The turning point is the time of Stefan Nemanja. During his time the Serbs finally conquered the 
Rascian region. It was recorded in the sources that Stefan Nemanja, celebrating the victory over his 
enemies, built the monastery of St. George "in the very centre of Ras".  At that time Ras became the 
                                                 
78
 Ras (Stari Ras) was one of the first capitals of the medieval Serbian state of Raška, and the most important one for a 
long period of time. Located in today's region of Raška or Sandţak of Serbia, the city was right in the centre of the early 
medieval state that started to spread in all directions. It was founded between 8th and 9th centuries and got deserted 
sometime in the 13th century. Its favorable position in the area known as Old Serbia, along the Raška gorge, on the 
crossroads between the Adriatic Sea and state of Zeta, Bosnia in the west and Kosovo in the east added to its 
importance as a city. 
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centre of the Serbian State and only then the conditions were made for the old name to appeal in its 
new role.  
In other words, only from the time of Stefan Nemanja the term "Raška" becomes the signification 
for the Serbian State - a new political and areal whole in South-eastern Europe. And to use the 
viewpoints of Nemanja himself, that was the state which united the territories from Niš to Kotor. 
Finally, it is possible to draw a conclusion that the most important institutions of the medieval 
Serbian State were founded in the Rascian region during the period of the first Nemanjić.  
Additionally, the Rascian bishopric was the main religious centre of the country until the foundation 
of the Serbian Autocephalous Church at the time of St. Sava (1219). The Serbian Orthodox Church 
has actually saved the name of Ras until our days (Kalić, 1995), by nurturing the cult of the 
Nemanjić dynasty79 and preserving it alive among all the Serbs scattered around the world.   
The most significant prove of the importance of the Nemanjić dynasty and its cult in contemporary 
Serbian national and ethnic identity was the solemn escort of Prince Lazar‘s relics throughout 
Serbia in 1989, on the 600
th
 anniversary of the battle of Kosovo. 
 
Kosovo is particularly significant for the Serbs. At the moment when Kosovo stopped being the 
factual homeland of Serbian people (when the Turks came), it became their mythic homeland. 
Smith mentions that the devotion to the particular territories is of mythic and subjective origin, and 
that it is precisely this devotion and attachment that confirms the existence of the ethnic 
identification, and not the settlement or possession of the territories themselves. (Gavrilović, 
2003:725) 
                                                 
79
 Seventeen members of the Nemanjić dynasty (mostly rulers of the Serbian Kingdom) were declared saints by the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, generating a cult starting from the initiator of the dynasty, Stefan Nemanja, and consequently 
passing it to the whole dynasty, known as the sacrosanct dynasty.  
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In the Kosovo myth we discover the indicators that lead us to recognize Kosovo as the holy place of 
the Serbs and to acknowledge its mythic heroes (Saint Sava, Princ Lazar, Miloš Obilić, Kraljević 
Marko) as sacred figures of the Serbian nation. (Gavrilović, 2003:727) 
The historical defeat of Prince Lazar‘s forces at the hands of the advancing Ottomans at the Battle 
of Kosovo serves as one of the most significant historical pillars for Serbian ethnic identity and the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. 
The basis of the Serbian nation is in the ethnic community of the Serbs whose identification was 
completed before the enslavement and this identification was preserved through many years of 
slavery. If we are to use the words of Anthony D. Smith, we would say that "an ethnic core" was 
organized in the Serbian community. Names, religion, language, customs, the myth of common 
origin, of a holy dynasty, of the holy land are the things that make the borders of the ethnic 
community more recognizable. A combination of these attributes and their emphases in social 
interaction is what makes ethnic identity. In the period of slavery all major elements that comprise 
the identity corpus were created – Kosovo as the mythic homeland above all, as well as the cult of 
Prince Lazar, Miloš Obilić, and the motive of Vuk Branković's betrayal. Myths and memories of the 
homeland of an "imaginary" ethnic community carry ethnic title-deeds with them. (Gavrilović, 
2003:729) 
The internal Serbian name, built on the medieval tradition related to the Serbian Orthodox religion 
based on the cult of St. Sava and the Serbian saints, as well as on a mythological collective memory 
related to the importance of the Serbian rulers, to the development and then the suffering of the 
Serbian state in Kosovo, was preserved primarily through the customs related to daily life. Under 
the centuries-old slavery, the Serbian name was cultivated mainly, and in longer intervals 
exclusively, through popular culture.  
The external ―Vlach‖ name imposed by the Turks expressed the status of a disempowered mass, 
with unrecognized importance of any right to its own ethnic name and the possibility to develop its 
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own culture in a larger society. For Serbs, however, the military ―Vlach‖ status in the Croatian 
Military Frontier was meant exactly to preserve the identity of the Serbian Orthodox religion. The 
loss of military status led to the loss of ethnic identity and religion, and the loss of ethnic identity 
and religion meant in practical terms to be exposed to exploitation by either side. (Sekulić, 1999:16) 
As a consequence, the Vlach military status became essential for the formation of ethnic identity of 
Serbs in the Croatian border. Being a soldier and being a Serb became the same thing: "The longest 
held name was the name border guards. This name almost became part of our character. It 
virtually precluded any other name, and it became identical with our popular Serbian name. " 
(Begovic, 1986: 9). 
For the Krajina Serbs, the military status had already been largely identified with their ethnic 
identity. In many ways, the elements of the military lifestyle were incorporated in the consciousness 
of border guards as their ethnic symbols, becoming an integral part of their social organization and 
community, social consciousness, valued orientations, ways of doing business, character, and even 
costumes (military elements can be recognized even in the women's traditional costumes). 
(Sekulić,1999:19) 
In socialist Yugoslavia, ethnic identity was seen as politically irrelevant, and partly for this reason, 
the use of various languages and the practice of different religions were tolerated in civil society. It 
is true that the merging of Serbian and Croatian into one language, Serbo-Croatian, in the 1950s 
signaled an attempt at building a unitary Yugoslav identity, but the two languages were so closely 
related that few, except Croat intellectuals reacting against the relegation of specific Croat variants 
as "dialect", seem to have taken offence. (Eriksen, 2001) 
Although the ruling Communist party seems to have believed that a common Yugoslav identity 
would eventually supersede the national identities based on ethnic membership, ethnic identity 
remained strong in most parts of the country throughout the postwar era.  
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Ethnic identities did, in other words, not disappear during the existence of Yugoslavia. In some 
urban areas they were arguably weakened, but it could be — and has been — argued that the non-
ethnic character of Yugoslav politics actually led to its strengthening as a vehicle for the political 
opposition and made it possible for Serbs to gain control over the armed forces and state 
bureaucracy: since political ethnicity officially did not exist (only cultural ethnicity did), there were 
no institutionalized ways of preventing one group from dominating the public sector. 
The organization  of political  access  along  ethnic  lines  can also promote  ethnic  identification  
and ethnic  political mobilization.  Much  ethnic  conflict around  the  world  arises out  of 
competition  among  ethnic  contenders  to control  territories and central governments.  The civil 
war in the former republic of Yugoslavia is a clear example of ethnic  political  competition  
(Hodson, Sekulic, Massey, 1994).  The result was an armed scramble for territory based on a fear of 
domination or exclusion by larger, more powerful ethnic groups. (Nagel, 1994:167) 
 
 
4.1.7. Religious identity 
 
While class identity comes from the sphere of economic power, religious identity derives from the 
sphere of beliefs, values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in the customs and rituals.  
Differently from class identity, religious identity is a very strong form of collective identity. (Bazić, 
2009:35-36)  
According to Smith, religious identities derive from the spheres of communication and 
socialization. They are based on alignments of culture and its elements — values, symbols, myths 
and traditions, often codified in custom and ritual. They have therefore tended to join in a single 
community of the faithful all those who feel they share certain symbolic codes, value systems and 
National Identity 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
132 
 
traditions of belief and ritual, including references to a supra-empirical reality, however impersonal, 
and imprints of specialized organizations, however tenuous. (Smith 1991:6) 
Religious communities are often closely related to ethnic identities. While the 'world religions' 
sought to overstep, and abolish, ethnic boundaries, most religious communities coincided with 
ethnic groups. In his book, Smith enlists the Serbs and the Croats among ethnic minorities who 
retain strong religious bonds and emblems whose identity is based on religious criteria of 
differentiation. (Smith, 1991:7) 
According to Smith, for a long time religious cleavages prevented the emergence of a strong and 
enduring ethnic consciousness among these populations - until the era of nationalism succeeded in 
uniting the community on a new, political basis. 
It is important to state that both religious and ethnic identity stem from similar cultural criteria of 
classification. They frequently overlap and reinforce one another and singly or together, they can 
mobilize and sustain strong communities. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, Serbs confess the Christian Orthodox faith, while Croats 
are Catholics. They are both Christians, but the differences caused form opposing influences 
(Byzantine for the Serbs and Western for the Croats), as well as the centuries long animosities 
between the two Churches can hardly be overcome.  
The religious confession includes a series of peculiar costumes deeply rooted to it, which further 
differentiate the Serbs from any other nation. For example, of all Slavs and Orthodox Christians, 
only Serbs have the custom of ―slava”, which is the celebration of a family's patron saint, a 
protector, which is inherited mostly, though not exclusively, paternally. Another particularity is that 
the Serbian Orthodox Church uses the Julian calendar, so Christmas currently falls on 7 January of 
the Gregorian calendar.  
During the century long occupation by the Ottoman Empire the Serbian Orthodox Church has been 
the only pillar of a somehow national identity and hence it has had a significant influence as far as 
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culture, customs and religious beliefs, which, according to Max Weber, play a certain role when it 
comes to the creation of national identity. (Ristić, 2007:191) 
The Serb Orthodox Church was, and still is, an important cohesive factor for the Serb communities 
scattered around the world. Thanks to the Serb monasteries and churches present in contemporary 
Croatia it was possible to trace the first Serb settlements in these territories as well as their 
migrations. One of the main reasons that attracted the Serbs in moving to the Military Border was 
the freedom of faith offered by the Austrian rule. However, Serbs were forced to fight against the 
numerous attempts of Uniatism
80
 by the Catholic Church in Croatia. This struggle represents the 
strong connection between their Orthodox religion and their identity.  
During World War II the Serbs in Croatia were forcibly converted into Catholics, because religious 
confession was seen as the main trait of their Serbian identity, opposed to the Croatian one.  
All the Churches were suppressed in Yugoslavia by the Socialist government of Josip Broz Tito. 
However, the gradual demise of Yugoslav socialism and the rise of rival nationalist movements 
during the 1980s also led to a marked religious revival throughout Yugoslavia.  
In recent studies about national identity in Serbia
81
, religion resulted to be the most important 
element of national identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 Uniatism is the union of an Eastern Rite church with the Roman Church in which the authority of the papacy is 
accepted without loss of separate liturgies or government by local patriarchs. 
81
 See Milošević-ĐorĊević J. (2008): Ĉovek o naciji- shvatanje nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji, Institut za Politiĉke 
studije, Beograd. 
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4.1.8. Cultural identity 
 
Cultural identity can be understood as the belonging of an individual to a given culture, with which 
he/she identifies. The formation of cultural identity influences all important spheres of life of the 
individual. One of the important areas of cultural identity are the cultural values that make up the 
main frame of reference by the overall behavior of the individual. (Bazić, 2009:36)  
Although cultural identity encompasses a very broad range of human characteristics, it is still 
narrower compared to the national identity which emerges as the most comprehensive form of 
collective identity. (Bazić, 2009:37) 
Serbian cultural identity differs from the Croat one, due to the different historical influences. Not 
only the Serbs brought with them in the Croatian territories their cultural heritage, but they 
developed also another peculiar culture related to their status as servicemen. Their status of 
frontiersmen differentiated them further more form the Croats living outside the Military Frontier.  
The language is a theme of dispute: the language defined as ―Serbian‖ and the one defined as 
―Croatian‖ are strictly correlated. They can be defined as variances of the same language, and most 
foreigners couldn‘t identify the differences between the two languages. However, each language has 
its own peculiarities, and it was necessary to create a reform in order to bring near the two 
languages and create a standard ―Serbo-Croatian‖ language, the official language in use in both 
Yugoslav states. Several attempts have been made throughout history to assimilate different Serbian 
and/or Croatian-speaking groups on the means of language. 
82
 
Today we have a paradox situation; a same language is called by different names (Croatian, 
Serbian, Bosnian and Montenegrin) with the purpose of giving it a national character, which serves 
to reinforce the individuality of small states, because language is a very important feature of 
                                                 
82
 For example, Vuk Stefanović Karadţić (1787- 1864), reformator of the Serbian literary language, claimed that all 
Štokavian dialect speakers are Serbs.  
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national sovereignty. Although language can‘t be seen as a strict cultural peculiarity in the case of 
the Serbs in Croatia, due to the fact that most of them speak the variations of the language used in 
Croatia (the Ijekavica, differently from the Ekavica used in Serbia proper). However, the alphabet is 
a matter of distinction between the two groups: Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet, while Croats use the 
Latin alphabet. Actually Serbs use both the alphabets, while Croats use exclusively the Latin one. 
Only during the war in Croatia, Serbs started to insist on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet as their 
official mean of communication. According to the Croatian constitution law on the rights of 
minorities, Serbs (and other minorities) have the right to use their own language and alphabet 
publicly where they represent a significant portion of the overall population. However, the several 
attempts to include the Cyrillic alphabet on the official signs in the area of Vukovar, where the 
Serbs represent a significant portion of population, were interrupted by the protest of the local Croat 
population.  
Other elements of Serb cultural identity are: the names, both personal and family, that differ from 
the ones used among Croats and others; literature, with specific focus on the Serbian epic poetry, 
which became the only integrating factor for the Serbian people and a means of spiritual survival 
and resistance to assimilation after the demise of the Serbian medieval state; traditions and customs, 
most strictly related to the Orthodox faith; folklore, music and art in general; cuisine, etc.  
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4.2. National identity 
 
National identity is the most comprehensive form of collective identity. Smith‘s definition of 
national identity is the following: 
“…„National‟ identity involves some sort of political community, however tenuous. A political 
community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties 
for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well 
demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they 
belong.” (Smith, 1991, p. 9) 
According to Smith, national identity has a strong impact on the individual and it is characterized 
by the following:   
a) it satisfies all personal answers of the individual oblivion fear by the identification 
with a nation;   
b) the individuals can feel personal dignity and renewal by being part of a ―political 
super-family‖;   
c) the consolidation of the feelings of fraternity, by using ceremonies and symbols 
(Smith 1991: 160-161). 
According to A. Smith, national identity includes the following five elements: 1) historical territory; 
2) common myths and historical memory; 3) common mass and civil culture; 4) common juridical 
rights and duties of citizens; 5) common economy with opportunities to move within the national 
territory.  
There is an apparent confusion in the literature, when it comes to defining of national identity 
(Connor, 1994). Several intersecting and not clearly delineated definitions and terms are in use: 
nation, race, ethnicity, national bonding, national identity, nationalism, national attitude, 
ethnocentrism, patriotism; even such notions as authoritarianism and patriarchalism.   
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One of the key dilemmas in the literature relates to the origins of national identity: whether national 
identity is something that we secure at birth or something that we arrive at during maturation and 
therefore is a subject of an individual choice. 
Primordialism states that national identity is fixed and durable, remaining unchanged during the 
lifetime. According to this view, national identity is hard and essential, a basic human category 
given by birth (Cornell & Hartman, 1998), connecting people with shared ancestral origin (Putinja 
& Ţoslin-Fenar, 1997), colored with irrational and unutterable feelings. National sentiments are not 
related to concrete and rational facts; instead, they are quite independent from real social 
relationships and individual needs. As an extreme perspective, primordialism is easily criticized. 
Basic shortcomings of this approach are highlighted by common findings such as: individuals with 
dual national identity (Waters, 1990), individual differences in importance given to national 
identity, and changes of national identity over a lifetime of an individual.    
As a theoretical reaction to primordialism there has been a whole string of theoretical concepts 
rivaling this account of national identity. According to instrumentalism, national identity is fluid 
and changeable. People emphasize their national belonging functionally: only in those situations 
where they can make a certain gain by professing it. As situation changes, so will the identification 
with one‘s nation or, at least, the level of its intensity. National groups are based on interest, set up 
for pragmatic reasons and maintained by man-made means.  Needless to say, instrumentalism has 
its own problems explaining the phenomenon of national identity. It postulates existence of national 
identity outside of an individual, and it has problems explaining the strong mobilizing nature of 
national identities.   
Instead of primordialism - instrumentalism dichotomy, some authors discuss the difference between 
objective and subjective designations of national identity.  Thus, Smith (1991) differentiates 
between Western and non-Western model of national identity. These two concepts of national 
identity somewhat correspond to primordialism - instrumentalism dualism. The Western concept of 
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national identity is based on a definition of a nation untied in a political community on a given 
territory, sharing of common political institutions and equality of all citizens. Thus, territory and 
formal citizenship define national belonging and consequently the very national identity. Non-
Western concept of national identity is primarily based on subjective feeling relating to genetic 
lineage and common ancestors. Nation is defined as a collective identity transmitted through myths, 
archetypes, shared history, culture and language.   
National identity can be specified through: language (Anderson, 1991), visible physical indicators 
such as height, facial appearance, color of the skin, etc. and behavioral signs - clothing, general 
appearance; but also by invisible indicators of culture (Horowitz, 2000; Kecmanovic, 1996); 
existence of the state, shared historical development and religion. 
Keillor et al. (1996) define the dimensions of national identity as belief structure, national heritage, 
cultural homogeneity and ethnocentrism. These categories were developed following "Huntington's 
(1993) four elements of civilization: 1) religion, 2) history, 3) customs, and 4) social institutions" 
(Huntington 1993, in Keillor et al. 1996, p. 59). The belief structure refers to the degree to which 
religion or supernational beliefs influence cultural participation and solidarity. National heritage 
stands for the importance that a nation accords historical figures and events in history and focuses 
therefore on the nation's opinion of its historical uniqueness. Cultural homogeneity is defined as 
"the number of subcultures [that exist] within a given set of national boundaries" (p. 68). The last 
influencing dimension is ethnocentrism and suggests a tendency of judging other cultures by the 
standards of the own culture which is believed to be superior. 
According to Cipek (Cipek, 2001) nation and national identity have been defined as a social 
construct in whose development a prominent role is played by the past, the course of history and 
cognitive schemes which are being acquired by processes of socialization, whereby an important 
role is played by inter- subjective exchange and processes of understanding.  
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National identity may refer to the subjective feelings people have about a national group. This is the 
degree to which they identify themselves with a particular nominal category, using ―cultural 
markers‖ and ―family resemblance‖ rules, rather than substantive content to create the boundaries of 
the category (Barth, 1969). 
According to Milošević ĐorĊević (2003), a distinction between "us" and "them" leads to the 
strengthening of a national identity, which is constantly changing, and is a result of an interaction 
and national identity also implies self-determination of a person as member of a national group 
(Ĉorkalo and  Kamenov, 1998) of drawing boundaries toward other groups. 
 
4.2.1  The Serb national identity 
 
Serbian national identity was predominantly formed in a secular form, as a local, Balkan 
combination of the two most widely used models of national integration: the French, which 
equalized the nation and the state, and the German, which takes the criterion of ethnic kinship, 
language, tradition and unity. While the French model was applied in Serbia proper, where all 
citizens were considered Serbs, the German model imposed itself in the definition of ethnic 
widespread and in the criteria for ethnic belonging outside Serbia proper.  
According to Milošević-ĐorĊević (Milošević-ĐorĊević, 2007) the Serb national identity is 
dominated by primordial concepts such as birth, history, tradition, territory and religion, while 
suppressing the importance of the state, culture and politics. National identity in Serbia is best 
described as primordial or pre-political. Such concept of national identity limits importance of the 
state, culture and politics and may indeed result from their lack of power. The old social identities 
have waned and were deserted (due to decay of the middle class and pauperization of the most), and 
new social identities have not emerged yet. Under such circumstances, national identity is primarily 
tied to ethnic and personal characteristics. 
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There are probably many reasons for the prevalence of the primordial concept and they can be 
broadly classified as social and personal. Possible social reasons are: general distrust in the state and 
its institutions; recently and frequently redefined state symbols such as the flag, the coat of arms, 
the national anthem and the like; recently and frequently redefined Croatian statehood, and general 
negative perception of the state. 
For some 40-50 years following World War II, Serbian population was led to think in terms of 
belonging primarily to Yugoslav rather than belonging to Serbian nation. Attachment to Yugoslav 
identity and the accompanying emotions are still strong and prevailing in some. For many citizens 
of Serbia, identification with Yugoslav nation was one among many social identities that were lost 
and have not been adequately replaced, so far. During the last decades names of states and national 
symbols changed frequently. Not well defined and not deeply rooted national symbols lead to 
confusion about national identity by making it harder to identify with the state, favoring primordial 
concept of national identity. 
 
The narratives of Serbian identity are, according to the so called Eastern ethnic model, based on 
epics, myths and even the prophecies of ―folk‖ origin, or, on the political ethno-myth. (Marković, 
2007) 
According to prof. Milorad Pupovac (Pupovac, 1999), Serbian identity in Croatia relies around their 
religious faith (Orthodoxy), their culture, their alphabet, their language and their consciousness of 
belonging to a Serbian nation.  
He makes a distinction between traditional and modern Serb identity in Croatia that resembles the 
ethnic and civic division, as well as the one between primordialism and instrumentalism. The main 
elements of traditional Serb identity in Croatia, according to Pupovac, are the Cyrillic alphabet, the 
Orthodox Church and the military service. Although the first two elements have a longer tradition, 
according to prof. Pupovac, it is necessary to include the military service because it represents, as 
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we have previously seen, a specificity of Serb identity in Croatia since it represented the basis of 
their life over several pre-modern centuries.  
The main elements of Serb modern identity in Croatia don‘t differ much from most modern 
European nations: language and literature, civil social and political values, nationality status and 
national institutions, supranational and international identification, and antifascism.  
According to Ignatieff, in Croatia and Serbia there is a desire for a separate identity between the two 
nations. The fear of losing one's national identity has caused ethnic hatred. A terror so strong and 
historically persistent, it has driven people to a desperate state to do anything. This is a large 
contributor to the reasons for the extreme violence present there in the past decade. The author 
states, "A Croat, thus, is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is someone who is not a Croat." This 
quotation profoundly expresses the short-sighted mentality present in their conflict. 
 
 
4.3 Nationalism 
 
Smith defines nationalism as ―an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, 
unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by someone of its members to constitute an 
actual or potential nation‖ (Smith 1991: 14, 73). While nationalism "invents nations where they do 
not exist" (Smith, p. 71) and is therefore an artificially built construct, national identity cannot be 
"easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means" (Smith, p. 14). 
According to Smith, nationalism, the ideology and movement must be closely related to national 
identity, a multidimensional concept, and extended to include a specific language, sentiments and 
symbolism.  
Being primarily defined in confrontation to "others", nationalism excludes a number of the subjects 
of the new nation-states and deprives them of their full status of citizens because the latter is limited 
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to the ethnically dominant community. Hence, the subjects of the other nationalities become 
"second-class citizens". In that case one may speak of a "nationalist fundamentalism" as the trend of 
the new collectivist identity in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. (Golubović, 1999) 
Kecmanović (Kecmanović, 1995) defined the border-line between a natural national feeling and 
nationalism by attributing to the latter the following characteristics: (a) a tendency to possess certain 
territory; (b) a conception that every nation is to be separated and independent; (c) a belief in the 
existence of common history and common origin; (d) a sense of a common pride thanks to the 
achievements of one‘s own nation; (e) animosity towards the similar (ethnic) groups; (f) a dogma 
that individuals live exclusively for the nation; (g) a doctrine that one‘s own nation is superior; and 
(h) a belief in the basic link between an individual destiny and the destiny of the nation. This means 
that nationalism exists whenever the affective ties with, and loyalty to, the nation dominate over all 
the other forms of belonging, i.e. when the nation becomes a value over all the other values. 
(Golubović,1999) 
Nationalism is closely linked with ethnocentrism which overvalues one‘s own nation and, at the 
same time, underestimates the others‘. In view of these characteristics it is not difficult to conclude 
that national identity in the sense of an exclusive nationalism, belongs to the same type as an 
authoritarian/collectivist model, that is, that its substance has not been changed essentially but only 
in form. Therefore one may accept the following conclusion that a communist totalitarianism was 
successfully replaced by a nationalist totalitarianism. 
The former Yugoslav state never succeeded in constituting itself as a political community (Pešić, 
1996:3), but remained an ideological construct. As such it has not succeeded in substantially linking 
the constituent nations to its ideological project, which means that the ideological/political 
identification remained superficial. Therefore, it was rather easy for the power elites of the new 
nation-states to use nationalism as a weapon for a new division of power and as a new means of 
legitimization. 
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According to Claus Offe, the collapse of communism awakened and restored a tendency to 
rediscover national identity; when citizens are confronted with uncertainties and ambiguities in a 
society in which democratic values are not widely spread, and with the economic costs of the 
transition, it seems that only a "golden past" provides certainty. This holds true for the Yugoslav 
states which emerged as a result of a sudden and unprepared events, intensifying the problems of 
national minorities when the borders of the former Yugoslav state were changed. Therefore, as Offe 
warns, people feel no longer part of the state, but of the nation (Offe, 1996: 31). 
When frustrated people become aggressive and find refuge behind the authority of the nation to 
express their aggressiveness, without feeling their own responsibility because they act in the name 
of the nation with which they identify, when the lifeworld is fragmented and people are unrooted, 
then nationalism offers security and stability. This is because it helps create a feeling of wholeness 
and continuity with the past (Eriksen, 1993:105). 
Nationalism can be generally thought of as an ideology that uses national identity as the basis for 
social and political action. The ultimate goal of a nationalist movement is the achievement or 
maintenance of power in the form of the nation state. Gellner perhaps puts it best when he defines 
nationalism as:   
“primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this 
principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or 
the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment‖. (Gellner 1983:1).  
Although there are many types of nationalism, for this research is interesting in the contrast between 
two specific types of nationalism: official (Croat) nationalism and (Serb) minority nationalism. 
Official nationalism is promoted by the state (e.g., an official language, and other state-sanctioned 
symbols) to cultivate and maintain the dominance of a specific nation (Kellas 1991:52); minority 
nationalisms evolve in reaction to official nationalisms. This is especially true for the Serb 
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nationalism in Croatia, which was a reaction on the official Croatian nationalism propagated by the 
new party in power, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and the new Croatian President, 
Franjo TuĊman. 
Minority nationalism works on two levels: it has to adopt a political agenda vis-à-vis the state, in 
order to formulate its demands, but at the same time it has to sustain a certain vision of that state as 
a threatening one - otherwise the rationale behind the mobilisation is less credible. If the state does 
not respond to demands from minorities, the perception of mutual threat increases: minority comes 
to view the state as not worth the emotional commitment, confirmed in its not belonging, whilst the 
majority is vindicated in its view of the minority as not committed to the state which it invariably 
views as its own. (Harris, 2003:6) 
 
 
4.3.1 Serbian and Croatian nationalism 
 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism evolved side by side, but on different grounds. Unlike the Serbs, 
whose nationalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a combination of religious and 
ethnic identities with a linguistic model of the nation; Croatian nationalism began as an artificial 
creation, with the terminology and argumentation practically taken over by the Hungarians, and 
relies on the historical rights of the apocryphal Triune Kingdom. (Bataković, 2000:201) 
Nationalism was used in the post-socialist Yugoslavia as a means to mobilise a population for war, 
both during wars and often in preparation for war (Hardin, 1995, p. 150; 156-163). In Yugoslavia in 
the 1980s and 1990s, nationalism was overtly ethnic, or ethno-nationalism, based on the subjective 
belief of the people of an ethnic group in their common descent (Allen, 2000, p.491). 
According to Smith, myths of national identity typically refer to territory or ancestry (or both) as the 
basis of political community, and these differences furnish import- ant, if often neglected, sources 
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of instability and conflict in many parts of the world. It is no accident that many of the most bitter 
and protracted 'inter-national' conflicts derive from competing claims and conceptions of national 
identity. It is no accident that many of the most bitter and protracted 'inter-national' conflicts derive 
from competing claims and conceptions of national identity.  
The Balkan nations had not attained independence up to the beginning of the 19th century. Since 
they are therefore new nations with strong primordial roots, and since national affiliation was not 
historically synonymous with a sense of belonging to a state, relatively objective pre-state attributes 
such as language, ethnicity, tradition and culture functioned as common denominators for social 
cohesion or inclusive/exclusive criteria. The sense of a common destiny for the Balkans‘ ethnic and 
ethno-national groups was strengthened even further by oppressive empires. As a result, nationalism 
was (in the case of all Balkan states) and often still is (in Serbia and Macedonia, for example) 
typically an instrument for building statehood. 
The Serbian national programme - Načertanije – was put together in 1844 by Ilija Garašanin, a 
proponent of a Greater Serbia - a Serbian state whose borders were extended to include all Serbs in 
the Balkan region. Planning the unification of the Serbian lands under Ottoman rule (Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Northwestern Macedonia), Garašanin did not 
exclude the possibility of the creation of a common state of South Slavs with the Croats and the 
Bulgarians. Bosnia and Herzegovina were considered as Serbian lands inhabited by Serbs of the 
Orthodox and Islamic faith, with a small Catholic minority, who much later emerged as Croats. The 
national aspirations expressed in the Načertanije, were based on the concept of the sovereignty of 
the people, and they were used for the formulation of the state programme of the Principality of 
Serbia. This programme accorded with the model of l'Etat-nation, thus there was no difference 
between the state and the nation. The basic idea of Serbian union in the Načertanije, based as it was 
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on the l'Etat-nation model, was imbued to a certain degree with historicism (the renewal of the 
medieval Serbian Empire of Stefan Dušan).83 
The Serbian linguist Vuk Stefanović Karadţić is commonly considered the father of Serbian 
nationalism. Karadţić created a linguistic definition of the Serbs that included all speakers of the 
Štokavian dialect regardless of their religious affiliation or geographical origin. As this definition 
implied that large areas of continental Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including 
areas inhabited by Roman Catholics. Vuk Karadţić is considered by some to be the progenitor of 
the Greater Serbia
84
 program. 
The Communist regime in Yugoslavia repressed nationalism of any culture that was deemed to be a 
threat to the state. However, Serbian nationalism escalated following the death of Tito in 1980. 
Serbian intellectuals began breaking a number of taboos: the highly controversial Memorandum of 
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was produced by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts in 1986. The Memorandum claimed to promote solutions to restore Yugoslav unity, but it 
focused on fiercely condemning Titoist Yugoslavia of having economically subjugated Serbia to 
Croatia and Slovenia and accused ethnic Albanians of committing genocide against Serbs in 
Kosovo. The Memorandum was harshly condemned by the ruling League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia.  
Among Serb nationalists, this culminated on the idea that a revised "Greater Serbia" would be the 
new aim for Belgrade once each republic declares independence. This movement's main ideology is 
to unite all Serbs (or all historically ruled or Serb populated lands) into one state, claiming, 
depending on the version, different areas of many surrounding countries. 
                                                 
83
 Bataković D. T. (1994), The national integration of the Serbs and the Croats: a comparative analysis, Dialogue, N° 
7/8, septembre-décembre 1994, Paris, pp. 5-13. 
 
 
84
 The Greater Serbian ideology included claims to territories of modern day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Macedonia. 
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During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the concept of a Greater Serbia was widely seen outside of 
Serbia as the motivating force for the military campaigns undertaken to form and sustain Serbian 
states on the territories of the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia (the Republic of Serbian 
Krajina) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republika Srpska). From the Serb point of view, the 
objective of this policy was to assure Serbs' rights by ensuring that they could never be subjected to 
potentially hostile rule, particularly by their historic Croatian enemies (the Ustaše). 
In contrast to Serb nationalism, which mainly relate to people, Croat nationalism principally relates 
to territory, a policy which has over time become the root of competing claims between the two 
nations that inhabit present-day Croatia – the Croats and the Serbs:  
While Serbian nationalism was fashioned so as to appeal to the minds and hearts of all Serbian 
people, regardless of where they lived, Croatian nationalism, largely legalistic, was predicated on 
territorial claims, without taking account of who lived in these territories. 
85
 
As in the case of the Serbs, language and literature became the building blocks of Croat national 
consciousness in the nineteenth century. From the supra-national, linguistic (Illyrian and Yugoslav), 
through which a framework had been made for Croatian national integration, based on opposition to 
the Imperial Austrian and the feudal-national Hungarian ideology, it moved towards the narrower, 
exclusively national model. 
Ljudevit Gaj (1809–72) led this language reform, modifying the Latin alphabet to partially conform 
to the rule ―one sound–one letter‖, established for the Cyrillic alphabet by Vuk Karadţić. Gaj also 
adopted the Štokavian dialect of the Serbian language as the Croat literary dialect. His reform was 
an essential part of the so-called Illyrian movement, resisting the attempts from Budapest to 
Magyarize the Croats and entertaining the idea of a common ―Illyrian‖ (that is, South Slav) state. 
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 See Ţarko Bilbija, ―The Serbs and Yugoslavia‖ in The Serbs and their National Interest, eds. Norma von Ragenfeld-
Feldman and Dusan T. Batakovic (San Francisco: Serbian Unity Congress, 1997), 96-97 
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Serbs, including Garašanin, mistrusted Ljudevit Gaj and therefore questioned the authenticity of the 
Illyrian movement. 
The Croats, after the first phase marked by Illyrian ideology, emulating the legitimistic organisation 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, found in the 'historical rights': the theory about the legal continuity of 
their medieval state, later known as the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia the 
model for their Volkgeist. From the Hungarians, Croatian political thought borrowed the theory of 
one political nation in the whole historic space of the Triune Kingdom, regardless of ethnic origin. 
That theory directly threatened the national identity of the Serbs, who in Croatia and Slavonia 
constituted about one third of the population, concentrated mostly in the Military Frontier (Vojna 
Krajina or simply Krajina), which was directly ruled by Vienna (up until 1881). 
Ante Starĉević (referred to as Father of the Fatherland by Croats.), founder of the Party of Rights 
in Croatia in 1861, regarded Croatia to include not only present-day Croatia but also Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia —all people in this Greater Croatia whether Catholic, Muslim, or 
Orthodox were defined as Croats. 
During the 19th to mid-20th century Croatian nationalists competed with the increasingly Pan-
Slavic Illyrian movement and Yugoslavists over the identity of Croats. The founder of 
Yugoslavism, Croatian Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer advocated the unification of Croat lands into 
a Yugoslav monarchical federal state alongside other Yugoslavs. 
Croatian nationalism reached a critical point in its development during World War II, when the 
Croatian extreme nationalist and fascist Ustaše movement took to governing the Independent State 
of Croatia (NDH). In the Second World War, Croatian nationalism, while hardly very articulate or 
aggressive in the nineteenth century, burst forth with hitherto unequaled fury. It found its strongest 
and most effective ally in the Croatian Roman Catholic clergy which brought to the secular national 
movement in the homeland their own brand of religious exclusionism, intolerance, and a militant 
proselytizing thrust that were deemed necessary to create a religiously and racially pure Croatian 
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state within "historical boundaries". Both Hitler's Berlin and Vatican Rome gave their blessing to 
Ante Pavelić's Independent State of Croatia (NDH) that was set up in 1941 and Pavelić's Ustaše 
conducted genocidal campaigns against the Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies until 1945. The most 
appalling crimes in the name of religious and racial purity in which the Croatian Roman Catholic 
clergy and Pavelić's Ustaše collaborated were directed against the Serbian Orthodox population. 
(Bataković, 1997) 
After the defeat of the Axis Powers in 1945 and the rise of communist Josip Broz Tito as leader of a 
new communist-led Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalism along with other nationalisms were 
suppressed by state authorities. Croatian nationalism did not disappear but remained dormant until 
the late 1960s to early 1970s with the outbreak of the Croatian Spring movement calling for a 
decentralized Yugoslavia and greater autonomy for Croatia and the other republics from federal 
government control. The Yugoslav leadership interpreted the whole affair as a restoration of 
Croatian nationalism, dismissed the movement as chauvinistic and had the police suppress the 
demonstrators. Many student activists were detained and some were even sentenced to years of 
prison. Some estimate that up to two thousand people were criminally prosecuted for participation 
in these events. Among those arrested at this time were future president of Croatia Franjo TuĊman. 
Eventually the Croatian demands were effectively implemented by Tito's regime in the new federal 
Constitution of 1974, which gave more autonomy to the individual republics, thereby basically 
fulfilling the main goals of the 1971 movement. 
 
Croatian nationalism revived in both radical, independentist, and extremist forms in the late 1980s 
in response to the perceived threat of the Serbian nationalist agenda of Slobodan Milošević who 
sought a strongly centralized Yugoslavia. 
The most recent expression of a Greater Croatia arose in the aftermath of the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, and the subsequent partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The policies of Croatia and 
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Franjo TuĊman towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were never totally transparent and always 
included TuĊman's aim of expanding Croatia's borders. 
 
The concepts of ‘nation‘ and ‘ethnic identity‘ were over simplified and then exploited by nationalist 
leaders in ex-Yugoslavia. Milošević reinforced Serbian nationalism by rekindling memories of the 
Croatian underground organisation, the Ustaše.  In Croatia on the other hand, once TuĊman was in 
power, Serbs were defined as second-class citizens and they were fired from positions in the police 
and military. He also placed the red-and-white "checkerboard" of the Nazi-era Ustaša flag in the 
new Croatian banner (Bowen, 2002:335; 339).  
What can be said with certainty in the case of Yugoslavia is that popular past events have been 
reinterpreted by nationalist leaders as a means to retain political leadership in grim times. In the 
disintegrated post-scialist Yugoslavia, it was not the past that dictated to the present but the present 
that manipulated the past (Hardin, 1995, p.161). 
Separatist politics in Yugoslavia formed borders which enclosed a ―We‖ and excluded, often 
violently, others (Bowen, 2002, p.335). Nationalistic politics, aided by the international community 
and the mass media, contributed to creating negative stereotyping and fear of another group. This 
means that the violent conflicts in Yugoslavia were the makings of political leaders who 
reinterpreted the popular past of the Second World War to manipulate ethnic tensions for the 
purpose of ensuring their political boundaries at the expense of minority groups. 
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4.4 Nation, state and nation-state 
 
The terms ―nation‖ and ―state‖ are often used interchangeably, in an indiscriminate fashion (such as 
the "United Nations", which is actually an association of states, not of nations). In laymen's minds, 
the difference between the two concepts is vague - to such an extent that the term nation-state is 
sometimes used. Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between the three terms in order to 
make some clarity and avoid possible misconceptions.  
 
The nation, in most theories, is characterized by three elements: spatial – the territory; social – the 
population of a nation which is sharing the same memories, traditions, myths, beliefs and 
aspirations; and politic – represented by the state.  
The ‗great debate‘ in nationalism studies is between the so-called ‗primordialists‘ and ‗modernists‘: 
primordialists argue that the nation derives directly from a priori ethnic groups and is based on 
kinship ties and ancient heritage. For their part, modernists insist that the nation is an entirely novel 
form of identity and political organisation, which owes nothing to ethnic heritage and everything to 
the modern dynamics of industrial capitalism. (Bellamy, 2003:7)  
Three classic statements regarding the definition of the concept of ―nation‖ are those of Renan, 
Stalin, and Weber. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:15) 
In the words of Ernest Renan, ―a heroic past, of great men, of glory, that is the social principle on 
which the national idea rests. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to 
have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for 
being a nation.” Renan defines the nation as “a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of 
sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it 
renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly 
expressed, to continue the communal life.” (Renan, 1887) 
National Identity 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
152 
 
According to Stalin, “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on 
the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up
86
 manifested 
in common culture”. (Stalin, 1994:8) 
 
Max Weber examines the nation as a ―prestige community‖, endowed with a sense of cultural 
mission. Nations, he claims, are too various to be defined in terms of any one criterion, but the 
affiliates nations to ethnic communities as populations unified by a myth of common descent. What 
distinguishes the nation is a commitment to a political project. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:15) 
 
According to Smith, a nation can be defined as ―a named human population sharing a historic 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members”. (Smith, 1991:14)  
 
According to E.J. Hosbawm, “two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same 
culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of 
behaving and communicating; two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each 
other as belonging to the same nation. A mere category of persons becomes a nation if and when 
the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in 
virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind 
which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which 
separate that category from non-members.” (Hosbawm, 1992:7) 
 
                                                 
86
 Or otherwise called ―national character‖, is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests itself in 
a distinctive culture common to the nation it is something tangible and cannot be ignored, since it leaves its impress on 
the physiognomy of the nation. 
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Krejĉi and Velímský identify five objective factors which can contribute to the identification of a 
group as a nation: territory, state (or similar political status), language, culture and history. Usually 
the sixth subjective criterion, national consciousness, is also present. (Krejĉi and Velímský, 1981) 
 
The nation can be defined as a community of descent (Weber, Connor), but it differs from the 
notion of ethnic community by its degree of self-consciousness; whereas an ethnic group may be 
other-defined, a nation must be self-defined. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994:16) 
Nations are not eternally defined entities, but they are in fact created. They are ―imagined 
communities‖, in the words of Benedict Anderson. They will be replaced, in all probability, by a 
European confederation as Renan has predicted 125 years ago.  
 
Discussion of the state may begin with Max Weber‘s definition of it, as the agency within society 
which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. (Hosbawm, 1992:3) 
The state is almost universally considered an institution of social service. Some theorists venerate 
the state as the apotheosis of society; others regard it as an amiable though often inefficient 
organisation for achieving social ends; but almost all regard it as a necessary means for achieving 
the goals of mankind. (Rothbard, 2009:1) 
Briefly, the state is that organisation in society which attempts to maintain a monopoly of the use of 
force and violence in a given territorial area; in particular, it is the only organisation in society that 
obtains its revenue not by voluntary contribution or payment for services rendered, but by coercion. 
(Rothbard, 2009:2) 
According to Smith, the concept of ―state‖ refers exclusively to public institutions, differentiated 
from, and autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a monopoly of coercion and 
extraction within a given territory. (Smith, 1991:14) 
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Thus, the following attributes can be considered the characteristics of a state: 
 Monopoly on exercise of force. 
 Legitimacy, as perceived by the governed. 
 Institutional structures established to handle governmental tasks, including, but not limited 
to, the exercise of force. 
 Control over a territory - absolute or partial. (Rasmussen, 2001) 
 
The term ―nation-state‖ was designated to describe a territorial political unit (a state) whose borders 
coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of a national group. More concisely, it 
described a situation in which a nation had its own state. (Connor, 1994) 
The nation-state is a type of politico-military rule that, first, has a distinct geographically defined 
territory over which it exercises jurisdiction; second, has sovereignty over its territory, which means 
that its jurisdiction is theoretically exclusive of outside interference by other nation-states or 
entities; third, it has a government made up of public offices and roles that control and administer 
the territory and population subject to the state‘s jurisdiction; fourth, it has fixed boundaries marked 
on the ground by entry and exit points and, in some cases, by fences patrolled by border guards and 
armies; fifth, its government claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical coercion over its 
population; sixth, its population manifests, to a greater or lesser degree, a sense of national identity; 
and, seventh, it can rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on the obedience and loyalty of its 
inhabitants. (Opello and Rosow, 2004:3) 
Smith notes, "We may term a state a „nation-state‟ only if and when a single ethnic and cultural 
population inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with 
the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population." (Smith, 1995:86). 
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The way the Balkan nations emerged — simultaneously with the nation-states or even preceding 
them — resulted, however, in the overlapping of two processes: nation-building and state-building. 
First, this overlap made the new nationalist identities more suspicious and aggressive. Second, the 
rebirth of independent states often preceded the accumulation of administrative experience by a 
significant part of the nation's elite, so that those engaged in policymaking were often incompetent 
and state bureaucracies were extremely corrupt (a ―phenomenon‖ also present in the experience of 
post-colonial countries). 
According to Michael Howard (Howard, 1994), it is hard to think of any nation-state that came into 
existence before the middle of the twentieth century which was not created, and had its boundaries 
defined, by wars, by internal violence, or by a combination of the two. States have either 
disappeared or as the result of unsuccessful wars or have never succeeded in coming into being. 
Briefly, up till our own century, war has been a principal determinant in the shaping of nation-
states.  
This is especially true for all the states that emerged from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, 
whose process of state-building coincided with the ongoing bloody wars. These states can be 
considered as ethnic states which aimed at becoming nation-states through severe use of the 
methods of ethnic cleansing. Although the demographic distribution of the population in all the new 
ex-Yugoslav states was seriously changed, none of them managed in creating an ethnically 
homogenized nation-state. They all incorporate several groups of ―historical‖ national or ethnic 
minorities, but also a series of ―new‖ national minorities that emerged after the dissolution of ex-
Yugoslavia and the shifting of its internal borders. This scenario perfectly reflects the theories of 
Walker Connor (Connor, 1994) who claimed that the greatest barrier to state unity has been the fact 
that the states each contain more than one nation, and sometimes hundreds.   
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4.4.1 Nationality and citizenship 
 
There is much terminological confusion in the study of citizenship statuses and laws. While public 
international law uses the term nationality to refer to the legal bond between an individual and a 
sovereign state, several domestic laws use the term citizenship or its equivalent. In some states, a 
distinction is made between nationality as a status independent of residence and citizenship as a 
bundle of rights granted only to nationals residing in the territory. 
In most European languages, the term nationality can also refer to individual membership in a 
nation as a cultural, ethnic and historic community rather than a legal entity. Sometimes, nationality 
is also contrasted with nation when distinguishing dominant national groups from national 
minorities. 
The concept of citizenship, too, has a broad range of meanings that stretch beyond its core as a legal 
status. In various academic literatures, citizenship presupposes the existence of democratic 
institutions of government and refers to a bundle of legal or moral rights and obligations or to 
individual and collective forms of participation in the public realm. While we acknowledge the 
importance of linking the literatures on citizenship as a legal status to these broader sociological and 
normative debates, we limit our use of the concept to its legal core meaning. 
In Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, drţavljanstvo (citizenship) is a neutral 
term designating an individual‘s link with a state (drţava) without any reference to ethnicity and is 
used in all legal documents. Nacionalnost (nationality) or narodnost (from narod, people) refers 
primarily to someone‘s ethnic background. Therefore it is safer to use the term citizenship when one 
refers to someone‘s legal status as citizen of a state instead of the ambiguous term nationality 
because of its clear ethnic connotations. Citizen could be translated both as drţavljanin and 
graĎanin and citizenship as drţavljanstvo but also as graĎanstvo.  Very often drţavljanin and 
graĎanin are used as synonyms, although drţavljanin is primarily legal status whereas graĎanin has 
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additional civic and political connotations. The same word also describes a resident of a city (grad). 
When it comes to citizenship, drţavljanstvo refers only to legal status; graĎanstvo is again related 
more to a civic and political status to and activities of citizens. Additionally, the term graĎanstvo 
could also, in a different context, refer to urban population or, nowadays rarely, to the upper urban 
classes.
87
 
The Serbs in Croatia are considered a national minority (nacionalna manjina) but also Croatian 
citizens (graĎani) in possession of Croatian citizenship (hrvatski drţavljani) as well. They consider 
themselves as a nation (narod), regardless of state boundaries. It is important to note that the word 
"nation" (narod) in the context of former Yugoslavian states has an ethnic connotation ; narod is 
cognate to the verb roditi (to give birth) . When preceded by the ethnic adjective (Croatian, Serbian, 
etc.), the construction excludes those not of the specified ethnicity. (Hayden, 1994:12) 
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CHAPTER 5: FIELDWORK 
 
 
 
5.1 The questionnaire  
 
 
The instrument utilized to measure the elements of national identity among the Serbs in Croatia is a 
closed ended questionnaire, combined with dichotomous yes/no questions, as well as multiple 
choice and categorical questions, open ended questions and importance questions that rate the 
importance of a particular issue. There are 35 total questions, which are structured in 4 sections. 
The time needed in order to fill out the questionnaire is about 5-7 minutes 
The first section (questions n. 1-7, 30)
88
 includes general information about the respondents: offers 
information about the respondents‘ background, such as age, gender, citizenships, level of 
education, participation to Serb minority institutions and war experience (whether tragic or not). 
This section is important because it gives us some general aspects about the respondents.  These 
characteristic also represent the independent variables that were used in the correlation with other 
variables in order to determine the factors that influence certain attitudes.  
The second section includes questions (n. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27) about 
national, ethnic, cultural and religious identity, which helps us to understand the respondents‘ 
attitudes toward the importance of these elements in their auto-reflection of national identity. As a 
result, 4-scale importance questions were used (1-very important, 2-moderately, 3- little, 4- not at 
all) rather than 5-scale Likert questions, because it was more appropriate for the purpose of the 
research. One of the hypotheses of this research is that all the traditional elements of national 
identity (religion, tradition, myths, etc.) are still predominant in the Serb perception of their national 
identity, but we don‘t know to what extent they are important. So it was decided to formulate the 
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questions in such a way that it was possible to quantify the importance of these elements among the 
respondents.  
The third section includes questions (n. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31) about the 
importance of civic or modern elements in Serb national identity (sense of belonging to Serbia, 
attachment to state national symbols, civic discrimination, special status, etc.). Since the third 
hypothesis of the research is that the ethnic/traditional elements of Serb national identity will 
prevail over the modern/civic elements, it was necessary to include and therefore measure also the 
importance of these aspects in order to compare the results. 
The fourth section of the questionnaire includes questions (n. 32, 33, 34 and 35) about ethnic 
distance, in order to have some insight on the levels of integration and ethnic tolerance present 
among the Serb community in Croatia.  
The questionnaire was structured in standard Croatian language, understood by all the respondents 
and the questions were formulated in such a way to be as much explanatory as possible, in order to 
avoid misinterpretations.  
The questionnaires were always submitted by the aid of an interviewer in each region who was 
acquainted with the aim of the research. This was very helpful, especially when dealing with 
illiterate or half literate respondents. Furthermore, since the research involved several dispersed 
regions within Croatia, the questionnaires were sent by e mail to the interviewers and once 
completed, were returned whether personally or by post to the researcher.  
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5.2 The sample 
 
As already seen, the Serbs of Croatia make up a population of 201, 631 people, which is 4, 5% of 
the total population
89
. This is a very broad segment of population, dispersed not only internally, but 
also outside the country. In order to simplify the sampling, it has been decided to divide the Serbs 
into 4 categories based on territorial distinction: 1) Serbs from the Croatian region of Istria;  2) 
Serbs from the capital city of Zagreb; 3) Serbs from war-affected areas; 4)  Serbs from areas of 
peaceful integration. These areas not only differ geographically from each other, but they also 
represent some individual peculiarities that will help to understand better the subject and the theme 
of the research.  
The Serbs that reside in Istria (6 180
90
 in total) are not autochthonous to the region or the country in 
general, most of them inhabited the region after World War II for several reasons: some for better 
life conditions, while others were servicemen settled by the Yugoslav People‘s Army in this area. 
Most of them are from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is also a significant portion of 
Serbs from other Croatian counties (mostly war affected areas). Of course, today there is the second 
generation of Serbs born and raised in Istria, who are the successors of the before mentioned 
―immigrants‖. 91 In the context of the research, the region of Istria represents a neutral area, 
untouched by warfare and also an urban multiethnic environment where the Serbs are relatively 
well integrated.  
The second area, the city of Zagreb (with 18 221 Serbs), represents the urban center par excellence, 
characterized by a historic Serb upper class and center of most Serb institutions and organizations. 
Apart from few individual incidents, Zagreb wasn‘t directly affected by the war. The Serbs living in 
Zagreb are of miscellaneous origin: some are native of Zagreb, while others moved from other parts 
                                                 
89
 According to the 2001 Census  
90
 According to the Croatian 2001 census of the population. 
91
 Serbs can't be considered as immigrants in none of the former Yugoslav republics, due to their previous constitutive 
status. They had the right to move internally within Yugoslavia, like any othe citizen, without losing their status.  
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of Croatia for different reasons: education, better job opportunities or to find shelter from the war 
events. Zagreb, as Istria, is a multiethnic environment where the Serbs represent the most numerous 
national minority.   
The war affected area was divided among 4 counties (Karlovaĉka, Liĉko-Senjska, Šibensko-
Kninska and Zadarska, with a total number of 35 848 Serbs) in order to cover the whole territory of 
the former SAO Krajina. As seen in the historic preview, this area overlaps with the historic 
Military Frontier, bordering with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this area Serbs have been 
autochthonous for centuries, and their special status was granted to them since 1690. All the 
counties covered by this mostly rural area were constituent part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
(1991-1995) and highly devastated during the last war. The military operation ―Storm‖ in august 
1995 caused most of the Serbs to leave and find shelter in the neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina 
or Serbia.  
The area of peaceful reintegration encompasses 2 counties bordering with Serbia (Vukovarsko-
Srijemska and Osjeĉko-Baranjska, with a total of 53 512 Serbs), where lives the highest number of 
Serbs in Croatia. This area was also very affected by the war, it was among the first to experience 
war tragedies, but it wasn‘t the scenario of massive Serb expatriation. After the liberation of all Serb 
occupied territories in 1995 (with the operations ―Flash‖ and ―Storm‖), this area was put under UN 
protection (United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia – UNTAES) for few years 
(1995 -1998) until its peaceful reintegration into Croatian territory. This area was also part of the 
former Republic of Serbian Krajina (1991-1995). The population of this area was ethnically mixed, 
with a relatively high percentage of Serbs (32% before the war). Today, Serbs in this area live 
separated from the Croats, in ethnically Serb villages, and in separated parts of town. They have 
their own self-government and several institutions.  
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Figure 1: Map of territorial distribution of the sample 
 
 
Aside from this social, historical and territorial categorization of the sample, a further selection was 
made by encompassing only adults (from 18 to 70 years old), divided by level of education and 
gender. The partitions were made on the basis of the 2001 Census of the population in Croatia.  
In each area, 100 questionnaires were handed to the respondents, for a total of 400 respondents 
which represent the sampling population of this research. The respondents come from different 
backgrounds, and were carefully chosen in order to include as many segments of the population as 
possible. 
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5.3 Data analysis 
 
 
As already explained in chapter 1, one of the objectives of this research is to explore the differences 
and/or similarities among the Serb population in Croatia regarding their attitudes toward some 
elements of their national identity. Since the method used to study the phenomenon is quantitative, 
it was necessary to set some variables that will help to understand and quantify the obtained data.  
The first set variables are general demographic (independent) variables such as gender, level of 
education, age, profession, area of residence (among the 4 previously explained areas) and country 
of birth. Along these ―typical‖ demographic variables, two additional independent variables were 
set: membership in Serb organizations and experience of the war.  
Among these independent variables, five were chosen (age category, gender, level of education, 
tragic war experience and membership in Serb organization) to be correlated with 19 dependent 
variables in order to obtain cross tabulations (or contingency tables) that will be expressed in charts. 
The dependent variables are the ones that determine the elements of traditional Serb national 
identity (importance of religion, importance of the Serbian Orthodox Church, importance of Serb 
tradition, importance of Serb history in Croatia, importance of Serb culture in Croatia, importance 
of Serbian language and script), and the elements of modern Serb national identity (sense of 
belonging to Serbia, attachment to Serbian state symbols, attachment to Croatian state symbols, 
importance of Serbian language and script, familiarity with Serb organizations in Croatia), in 
addition the variable of self-identification (Serb, Serb from Croatia or other) and the variable of 
ethnic tolerance
92
 (marriage with a Croat, Croat as a neighbor, Croat as a friend).  
                                                 
92
 Tha variable „ethnic tolerance― consists of the sum of the responses „Yes―(1) to the vairables of „marriage to a 
Croat―, „Croat as a neighbour―, „Croat as employer―, and „Croat as a friend―. 0= none of the respondents answered 
„Yes―; 1= respondents wih one „Yes― reponse; 2=respondents with two „Yes― responses; 3=respondents with three 
„Yes― responses; 4=respondents with all four „Yes― responses 
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The method of analysis chosen for this research was a cross-territorial comparison of the obtained 
data among the 4 territorial areas, and subsequently to analyze the correlations
93
 on a wider scale 
that can be applied to the whole Serb population in Croatia.  
First of all, a statistical review
94
 expressed in bar charts using SPSS will follow for each of the 
independent variables by areas in order to understand some characteristics of the sample and their 
general attitudes. Then a comparison
95
 between the obtained results among areas will follow, in 
order to identify the differences and/or similarities of the respondents‘ attitudes. 
Since a large set of variables (most of which are correlated to each other) was gathered, in order to 
help clarify the obtained results, a factor analysis scaling technique has been used, for purposes of 
evidence of reliability and validity.  
 
In order to verify one of the hypothesis (H3)
96
, it was necessary to calculate, respectively,  the  
index of modernity and the index of traditionalism of Serb national identity in Croatia (lower value 
= higher intensity) expressed in charts, and the correlation between the two indexes for the purpose 
of obtaining the predominant aspect of their national identity.   
Before the presenting the final results, the attitudes of a focus group will be analyzed to further 
understand the theme of the research from a qualitative point of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 Using Phi (f) correlation and Cramer's V 
94
 Only the valid percent was used and expressed in the graphic representations, excluding the missing values.  
95
 By using the  COMPARE MEANS tools (T-test and ANOVA) 
96
 ―(…)the respondents will show a higher degree of traditionalism than modernity (expressed in indexes that will be 
subsequently calculated)”. See chapter 1.  
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a) Istria 
The respondents were divided into the following age categories: 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 
70+. In the region of Istria, according to the variable of age, the results showed a slighter 
predominance of the 51-60 age category (25% of the total).  
Figure 1 
 
The division between genders was done on an equal basis, so in every area the percentage of 
females and males is the same (50 female and 50 male respondents).  
The professions of the respondents were very broad, so it was decided to categorize the professions 
as well. (See figure 2). The most numerous category is the one represented by the retirees, which 
makes sense considering the predominant age category of the respondents. The second and third 
most represented category of profession, i.e. metal industry and tourism industry, are the leading 
sectors in Istria.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
The level of education (see figure 3) was divided among those without any school degree (―none‖), 
those who have an elementary school degree or finished only few classes
97
 of elementary school 
(―elementary school‖), those who have a secondary or high school degree (―secondary‖), those who 
have a University degree of Bachelor‘s or Master of Arts (―Bacc. or MA‖), and those who have a 
degree of Master of Science or PhD (―M.Sc. or PhD‖).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97
 It is very common in Croatia, especially within the older generation, to have completed only few classes of 
elementary school. It has been decided to include all these cases in the category of „elementary school―, rather than in 
„none―, because they are literate, differently from those without any level of education.  
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Figure 3 
 
The level of education for the Serbs in Istria is in line with the state‘s average, where most of the 
population possesses a secondary school degree. As it has been mentioned earlier, the sample was 
chosen and stratified according to the level of education, based on the 2001 Census of the 
population. 
When looking at the graphical representation of the respondents‘ country of birth (See figure 4), it 
is immediately visible the high percentage (47%) of respondents born outside Croatia (mainly 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Although the percentage of respondents born in Croatia is 
slightly higher (53%), the obtained results confirm that Istria was mainly settled by Serbs coming 
from Serbia and/or Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
The participation of Serbs from Istria in the activities offered by the Serbian organizations in 
Croatia is a little disappointing (See Fig. 5), because only 18,4% of the respondents claim to be 
active members of some Serbian organization, while the majority is whether not a member (64,3%) 
or only a formal member (17,3%). 
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 Figure 5 
 
 
Since the region of Istria wasn‘t directly affected by the war in Croatia, it is not surprising the fact 
that most of the respondents from Istria (69,7%) claimed that they didn‘t experience any war 
correlated tragedy (See Fig. 6) The remaining percentage of those respondents who did experience a 
war tragedy can be ascribed to the fact that Istria hosted many refugees from the War affected area 
who chose to stay here even after the conflicts ended.  
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
b) City of Zagreb 
 
Differently from Istria, where the most predominant age category was 51-60, the respondents from 
Zagreb represent a younger population, making the age category 18-30 the most numerous one. 
This is logic due to the fact that Zagreb is the most important university center in Croatia, attracting 
young students from all over the country, but is also a big city that offers more job opportunities for 
graduates.  
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Fig. 7 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the profession of the respondents from Zagreb (See Fig. 8), the predominant category of 
profession is Socio-humanistic activities, which encompasses professions such as lawyers, 
economists and accountants. Aside from being the most important university center in the country, 
Zagreb also offers a broad range of job opportunities due to the presence of several administrative 
headquarters of private and public sector. This explains the highest number of employees in the 
category of Socio-humanistic activities rather than students, if we consider that the most 
predominant age category among the respondents was 18-30. Another reason for such a trend is also 
the fact that it is very common in Croatia for young people to study ―part-time‖ and work full time 
at the same time.   
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Fig. 8 
 
 
 
Concerning the respondents‘ level of education (See Fig. 9), it doesn‘t differ much from the results 
obtained in Istria. The most numerous category is the one representing secondary school graduates, 
followed by university graduates. The higher number and percentage of university graduates rather 
than elementary graduates (as was the case in Istria) reflects what has been previously said about 
the importance of Zagreb as an academic center.  
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Fig. 9 
 
 
 
Looking at the country of birth of the respondents from Zagreb (See Fig. 10), it is immediately 
visible that most of them were born in Croatia, while only a smaller part indicated Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Serbia as their country of birth. This proves that most of the Serbs residing in 
Zagreb are not immigrants, but rather autochtonus, differenty from their Istrian co-nationals, where 
almost half of the respondants stated a neighboring country of birth (whether Serbia or Bosnia and 
Herzegovina).  It will be interesting to analyze whether there is a correlation between their country 
of birth and their national self-identification as we have seen in the previous case of Istria. 
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Fig. 10 
 
 
 
Looking at the chart concerning the respondents‘ membership in Serbian organizations (See Fig. 
11), it is immediately visible the higher percentage of those who claimed to be active members 
(41,1%) in comparison to the trend registered among the respondents from Istria. This can be 
attributed to the fact that Zagreb not only hosts a much larger Serbian community than Istria, but 
Zagreb is also the center of the major Serbian organizations present in Croatia, while Istria has only 
a few available.  
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Fig. 11 
 
 
 
 
Another difference so far noted between the respondents from Istria and Zagreb is regarding their 
tragic war experience. As we have previously seen in Istria, the majority didn‘t experience any war-
related tragedy, while in Zagreb 57,8% of the respondents had such an experience. Although Zagreb 
wasn‘t a badly affected by the war (it was lightly bombed during 2 occasions), the Serbs from 
Zagreb were violentely harassed during the war by special paramilitary formations known as 
―Merĉepovci― (after the name of their leader, Tomislav Merĉep). They would usually take Serb 
civilians out their home during night to allegedy interrogate them, but they would never return 
home and usually would be found dead. If we add to this scenario also those Serbs who moved to 
Zagreb as refugees from war affected areas, then we can find the explanation of such a high 
percentage of respondents from Zagreb with a tragic war experience. 
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Fig. 12 
 
 
 
 
c) War affected area 
 
Looking at the age categories of the respondents from the War affected areas (See Fig. 13), the most 
predominant is the one including 18-30 (22%), immediately followed (21%) by the category 70+. 
This can be explained by the fact that most of the population left in these areas is elderly people, 
while the young generations are returnees from neighboring countries, who chose to return to their 
country of origin due to its better economic status, as well as due to the incentives offered by the 
Croatian state to the returnees.  
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Fig. 13 
 
 
 
When looking at the professions of the respondents from the War affected area (See fig. 14), the 
category of retirees is the most numerous one, which is a logic result of the previous graph where 
the elderly age categories are more represented than the younger and middle-age ones. 
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Fig. 14 
 
 
 
 
The level of education of the respondents from the War affected area (See Fig. 15) is lower than the 
one registered in Istria and Zagreb, which is associated to the numerically significant older 
population living here and to the fact that this is a predominantly rural area, with a high ―brain 
drain‖. Since this area was widely affected also during World War II, most of the children at that 
time weren‘t able to attend school and didn‘t continue their education. Still today this area is the 
most precarious concerning level of education, development in general and infrastructure. This 
partly explains the differences between the War affected area, Zagreb and Istria. 
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Fig. 15 
 
 
Most of the respondents from the War affected area indicated Crotia as their country of birth (See 
Fig. 16), and only in smaller share Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia. This reflects the 
characteristic of the Serb population living here, being this the area of their first settlment 500 years 
ago, making them the most numerous and autochthonous minority living in Croatia.  
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Fig. 16 
 
 
 
Curiosly, a very similar trend to the one observed in Istria was also registered in the War affected 
area concerning membership in Serbian organizations (See Fig. 17): 61,4% of the respondents 
claimed not to be members of any Serbian organization in Croatia, 20,8% are active members and 
17,8% are only formal members. It is difficult to find an explanation for such a trend, but one of the 
reasons could be the high percentage of elderly people registered among the respondents from both 
the areas, who are not able or not willing to partecipate in such activities.  
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Fig. 17 
 
 
 
 
Since the War affected area was the scenario of violent and severe crimes against humanity during 
the war in Croatia, it is not surprising that the vast majority of the respondents from the War 
affected area (92,1%) indicated to have experienced a war-related tragedy (See Fig. 18).  
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Fig. 18 
 
 
 
 
 
d) Area of peaceful reintegration 
 
In the Area of peaceful reintegration, the most represented age category of the respondents is the 
18-30, followed by the category of 31-40 (See Fig.19). This trend is similar to the one registered in 
Zagreb, which can be attributed to the similar conditions offered in this area: presence of urban 
centers with good educational and professional opportunities (the city of Osijek is the fourth largest 
city in Croatia).  
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Fig. 19 
 
 
The professions of the respondents form the Area of peaceful reintegration (See Fig. 20) are very 
broad, with a slighter predominance of employees in the Administrative sector. As it has been seen 
so far among all the territories included in the research, the respondants‘ professions are various and 
there is not an apsolute predominance of any category. This could be the result of the current world 
wide economic crisis and lack of available jobs, where people are compelled to accept any offered 
job on the market.  
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Fig. 20 
 
The level of education of the respondents from the Area of peaceful reintegration (See Fig. 21) is 
similar to the one registered among the respondents from Istria and Zagreb, who are predominantly 
secondary school graduates. However, the percentage of respondents without any education is quite 
significant (15%), as already seen in the previous section concerning the War affected area (11%).  
Fig. 21 
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As registered so far among the respondents from all the territories, the majority of them indicated 
Croatia as their country of birth. The same trend is registered also in the Area of peaceful 
reintegration (See Fig. 22), where 71% of the respondents were born in Croatia, while only a 
smaller percentage in Bosnia and Herzegovina (14%) or Serbia (9%). This is curious if we consider 
that this area is a borderland adjacent both to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. But due to the 
fact that it encompasses urban centers such as Osijek and Vukovar with good hospital facilities, it 
makes it uneccessary to give birth in a neighboring country.  
 
Fig. 22 
 
 
 
The respondents from the Area of peaceful reintegration are similar to the ones from Zagreb if 
looking at their membership in Serbian organizations (See Fig. 23): a total of 55,6% are engaged in 
such activities (out of which 29,3% actively and  26,3% only formally). This can be explained, as in 
the case of Zagreb, by the large number of Serbian organizations present on the territory and also by 
the numerically strong Serbian community living there.  
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Fig. 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the Area of peaceful reintegration was directly affected by the war, with severe violence 
and losses, the majority of the respondents from this territory (64,6%) didn‘t experience a war-
related tragedy. This is very similar to the trend registered among the respondents from Zagreb, 
probably because the Serbs from the Area of peaceful reintegration also experienced rather isolated 
and almost hidden violences during the war, contrary to what happened in the War affected areas 
where the Croatian military and para military formations commited organized actions of ethnic 
cleansing on behalf of the Serb population. Additionaly, the Area of peaceful reintegration was 
conquered at the beginning of the war in Croatia by the Yugoslav People‘s Army who supported the 
local Serb rebels and successively passed them the authority over this area until when the area was 
peacefully reintegrated into Croatia‘s territory. These events made it possible to avoid a large-scale 
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persecution of the local Serbs in this area and as a consequence to decrease the possibility of a 
tragic war experience, which isn‘t the case for the Croatian population living here during the war. 
 
Fig. 24 
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5.3.1 Cross-territorial comparison of the respondents’ attitudes 
 
 
 
In the previous section a statistical description of some general characteristic (demographic and 
social) of the respondents per territory has been made, which served as an introduction to the 
characteristics of the population sample used in the research. As seen so far, each territory has its 
own peculiarities and shares differences and similarities with the other chosen territories. This 
section will analyze the respondents‘ attitudes toward the questions (from the  questionnaire) that 
are relevant to the objectives of the research. The previous section represented the independent set 
variables, while the attitudes studied in this section represent the set dependent variables in this 
research that will be used for ulterior analysis and comparison in the following sections. The 
analysis of the respondents‘ attitudes will also help to verify the set hypotheses in this research, as 
well as to provide answers to the set research questions. 
One of the key questions present in the questionnaire is definitely the one interrogating the 
respondents about their national self-identification: ―Which of the following categories describe you 
best?” and the offered possibilities were  a)  Serb; b) Croat; c) Croatian Serb; d) Other (indicate 
which). It was decided to ask the question in such a way to avoid any reference to concepts of 
―national‖, ―nationality‖, ―identity‖, ―ethnic‖, ―minority‖ and any other that might influence the 
attitudes of the respondents or mislead them in any way. Although all the respondents belong to the 
Serb minority in Croatia, it doesn‘t automatically mean that they identify as Serbs: as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, one‘s sense of belonging to a certain nation and therefore one‘s national 
identity is an extremely personal and individual choice.       
In the following chart (See Fig. 25) are expressed the respondents‘ answers regarding their national 
self-identification, divided by territories.  
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Fig. 25 
 
As it is visible, the category of ―Serb‖ was chosen by most of the respondents (62,5% of the total) 
and it was the dominant category in all the studied territories, with the only exception of Zagreb. 
The category of ―Croatian Serb‖ was chosen by the 34,4% of the respondents, 2,3% opted for 
―Other‖, and only 0,8% self-identify as ―Croats‖.98 
 
In Istria, 60%
99
 of the respondents have identified themselves as ―Serbs‖ rather than ―Serbs from 
Croatia‖(40%), while none of the respondents chose the given category of ―Croat‖ or ―Other‖. 
 
Looking at the bar representing the answers from Zagreb, it is immediately visible the 
predominance of those who identify themselves as ―Croatian Serbs‖ (56,2%) rather than 
                                                 
98
 These percentages refer to the total of responses. 
99
 These percentages refer within the territory, not of the total. 
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―Serbs‖(39,3%), as well as the presence of the category ―Croat‖ (2,2%), which was chosen only by 
the respondents from Zagreb and the Area of peaceful reintegration.  
They highest percentage of ―Serbs‖(75,2%) was registered among the respondents from the War 
affected area, followed by 24,8% of ―Croatian Serbs‖, while the categories of ―Croat‖ and ―Other‖ 
are absent. This result is very similar to the one obtained in Istria while it is opposite to the trend 
registered in Zagreb. This is curious, if we consider that the Serbs from the War affected area share 
more similar characteristics to their co-nationals from Zagreb rather than to the ones in Istria. This 
trend can be explained to the fact that the Serbs from Zagreb assimilated over time due to the 
geographic distance from any ―Serbian lands‖ or due to their personal choice (whether to avoid 
possible discrimination or to ―fit in‖ easier); while the Serbs from War affected area are a historical, 
compact and numerous community with a highly enunciated national identity; and the Serbs from 
Istria still keep alive the heritage brought from their country of birth (Serbia or Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), or the ones of their parents. 
 
The most predominant category in the national self-identification of the respondents from the Area 
of peaceful reintegration is ―Serb‖ (73,2%), similarly to the result obtained in the War affected area 
(75,2%), and 18,6% of them opted for ―Croatian Serb‖. However, it‘s curious the presence of a 
small percentage of ―Croats‖ (1%), just like it has been registered in Zagreb (2,2%). These are the 
only 2 territories where this category of national self-identification was chosen by the respondents, 
as well as the category of ―Other‖(7,2% in the Area of peaceful reintegration and 2,2% of in 
Zagreb), which encompasses Yugoslavians, Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Slovenes (these were the 
categories listed by the respondents under the section ―Other‖). 
 
The following chart (See Fig. 26) will illustrate the religious identification of the respondents by 
territories. Although it is a common belief that the Serbs are exclusively of Christian Orthodox 
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faith, which is the major factor that differentiate them from the Croats (who are Catholics), this 
important part of one‘s identity couldn‘t only be a priori assumed without a confirmation from the 
respondents. So following the question “What is your religion?”, 4 possibilities were given:           
a) Christian Orthodox; b) Catholic; c) Atheist; d) Other (indicate which). 
 
Fig. 26 
 
As it can be easily noted, in every territory the category of ―Christian Orthodox‖ is the most 
represented, counting 89,4% of the total on the whole sample, followed by 8,8% of Atheists, 1,3% 
of Catholics and 0,5% of Others.   
 
The vast majority of Serbs living in Istria consider themselves to be Christian Orthodox (89,9%), 
while only 10,1% of respondents identify as Atheists. It is surprising that the given category of 
Catholic wasn‘t chosen by anyone, which means that the Serbs in Istria didn‘t assimilate and kept 
their original religious confession. 
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Among the respondents from Zagreb, the predominant category is the one of Christian Orthodox 
faith (81,1%). The result is very close to the one obtained for Istria (89%), which is very interesting 
if we consider the differences noted so far (especially regarding national self-identification and 
country of birth). Differently from Istria, where the category of ―Catholic‖ wasn‘t chosen by 
anyone, a minor percentage (3,3%) of respondents from Zagreb  indicated it as their religious 
confession. This can be related to the previously seen low percentage (2,2%) of respondents from 
Zagreb who self-identified as ―Croats‖. Zagreb has also the highest percentage of Atheists (15,6%) 
among its respondents.  
 
The War affected area has the highest percentage of Christian Orthodox (98%), with only a smaller 
percentage of Atheists (2%), and not any Catholics. This trend is also very similar to the one 
registered among the respondents from Istria, rather than the ones from Zagreb. 
 
The Area of peaceful reintegration also registered a high percentage of Christian Orthodox (87,9%) 
8,1% of Atheists, 2% of Catholics and 2% of Other. Only the respondents from Zagreb and from the 
Area of peaceful reintegration chose the category of ―Catholic‖, which is absent among the 
respondents of the other 2 territories (Istria and War affected area). The category of ―Other‖ was 
chosen only in this area, but the answer was missing (the respondents didn‘t provide an alternative 
answer) so it is difficult to foresee what it could be. But since the percentage is quite insignificant 
(2% within the territory, and 0,5% of total), it can‘t influence the overall results. 
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After the analysis of these two aspects of Serb identity in Croatia (the national and the religious), 
which are treated as dependent variables
100
, the next chart (See Fig. 27) will illustrate the 
importance of religion for the respondents on an individual level. 
101
 
 
Fig. 27 
 
 
 
 
The majority of the respondents (45,9% of the total) feel that religion is very important for them, 
36,1% feel that is moderately important, 10,8% find it little important, and 7,2% thinks it‘s not 
important at all. The respondents from all the territories, with the only exception of those from 
Zagreb, found religion to be very important.  
 
                                                 
100
 In the next sections a correlation between different variables will follow in order to identify which factors influence 
the variables of national self-identification and the variable of religious identification.   
101
 The question was “How important is religion for you?”, and the offered scale consisted in ―Very important‖, 
―Moderately important‖, ―Little important‖ and ―Not important at all‖. 
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In Istria 42,4% of the respondents feel that religion is very important, 34,3% find it moderately 
important, 15,2% find it little important and 8,1% think that it is not important at all. 
Zagreb registered a different trend: the majority of the respondents (41,6%) find religion to be 
moderately important rather than very important (32,6%); 16,9% find it little important and 9% 
don‘t find it important at all. 
The War affected area registered the highest percentage of respondents who find religion to be very 
important (58,4%), while 30,7% find it moderately important, 6,9% think it is little important, and 
4% find it not important at all. 
The Area of peaceful reintegration registered the second highest percentage of those who claim 
religion is very important (48,5%), followed by 38,4% of those who find it moderately important, 
the least registered percentage (5,1%) of those who think it‘s a little important and 8,1% of the 
respondents think just like the ones in Istria, that religion for them is not important at all.  
 
As already explained in the previous chapters, Serbs have their national church called Serbian 
Orthodox Church, whose jurisdiction reaches wherever there are significantly numerous Serb 
communities. Differently from the universality of the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church has a 
rather national character
102
 due to variations in style depending on country of origin, or local 
custom, or both. The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in preserving Serb national identity 
during the centuries is indisputable, but it is uncertain how its role is seen today. In order to 
understand the respondents‘ attitudes toward the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia and its 
present importance, the following question was addressed in the questionnaire: “How important for 
you is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in preserving Serbian national identity in 
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 Beside the Serbian Orthodox Church, there are also the Albanian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 
the Georgian Orthodox Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Romanian Orthodox 
Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the self-proclaimed Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Churches. 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
195 
 
Croatia?”. The respondents‘ answers can be seen in the following chart (See Fig. 28), where they 
have been divided per territories and values. 
Fig. 28 
 
 
Half of the respondents (50,5%) find very important the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
preserving Serbian national identity in Croatia, 36,1% find it moderately important, 9% think its 
role is little important, while 4,4% doesn‘t find it important at all. Zagreb is the only territory with a 
slighter predominance of those who find it moderately important (46,7%) rather than very important 
(43,3%). The War affected area has shown once again the highest percentage of those who find the 
Serbian Orthodox Church to be very important (56,4%), followed by the Area of peaceful 
reintegration with 54,1%. 
 
Although now Croatia is the homeland of the Serbs living here, taking the place of Yugoslavia after 
its dissolution, it is also a matter of fact that Serbia is their country of origin (whether they were 
born in Croatia or emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia). In order to find out if there is 
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any kind of attachment to Serbia 20 years after the end of the conflicts, and how the Serbs of 
Croatia perceive their country of origin, the following question was addressed in the questionnaire: 
“Do you feel any sense of belonging to the Republic of Serbia?” (See Fig. 29). 
Fig. 29 
 
Surprisingly, 59,9% of the overall respondents feel a sense of belonging to Serbia, especially in the 
Area of peaceful reintegration (70,7%), while 61,8% of the respondents from Zagreb don‘t feel any 
connection to Serbia.  
 
Additionally to the asked question (see above), the respondents were also asked to justify their 
answer by indicating a reason (See Fig. 30). The most frequent given reason in all the territories for 
feeling a sense of belonging to Serbia was ―because Serbia is my/our country of origin” (68,2% of 
the total). This provides an interesting acknowledgement concerning also Serbian national self-
awareness in Croatia: Serbs are aware of their origin and consider Serbia to be their country of 
origin, regardless of their autochthony in the land they live now.  
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
197 
 
Fig. 30 
 
 
The given reasons for not belonging to Serbia (See Fig. 31) were more widely spread than the 
previous ones, resulting in lower percentage of the predominance of the most frequent given reason: 
26,2% of the total respondents indicated that they didn‘t feel any sense of belonging to Serbia 
“because nothing ties to me Serbia”. The answers given by the respondents are not territorially 
heterogeneous as the previous ones, resulting in different reasons predominating in each territory. 
The most visible and numerically significant reason is the one given in Zagreb: “It (Serbia) is not 
my homeland” (33,3% within territory). 
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Fig. 31 
 
 
Another useful information that needed to be gathered in order to further understand some aspects 
concerning the Serbs from Croatia is whether they spent or not a longer period of time in Serbia 
(See Fig. 32).  A little more than half of the total of the respondents, 56,5%, answered negatively. 
The only territory with the majority of respondents claiming to have spent longer periods of time in 
Serbia is the War affected area with 71,3%.  
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Fig. 32 
 
 
In order to further understand the nature of their stay in Serbia, the respondents were asked to give a 
reason (See Fig. 33). The majority of them, 60,5% indicated “refugee asylum” as the main reason 
for their stay in Serbia. This is not surprising if we look at the chart and see that 86,8% of the 
respondents from the War affected area found asylum in Serbia as refugees, as well as the majority 
of them from Zagreb and the Area of peaceful reintegration. Only in Istria the predominant given 
reason is “Part of life spent in Serbia”, which corresponds to the background of its respondents, 
being mainly immigrates from Serbia.  
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Fig. 33 
 
 
 
 
Since the Croatian state allows the possession of a dual citizenship, it is not uncommon among 
minority members to have also the citizenship of their country of origin. Among the sample of this 
research, the majority of the respondents (76,3%) do not possess Serbian citizenship (see Fig. 34) 
This trend has been registered in all the territories; among those who have Serbian citizenship, the 
Area of peaceful reintegration shows a slighter predominance (28,6%), most probably due to its 
geographic vicinity to Serbia.  
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Fig. 34 
 
 
 
Another aspect considered important in the process of understanding Serb national identity in 
Croatia is the degree of emotional attachment associated to state symbols, both Serbian and 
Croatian. The question asked in the questionnaire was “How strong is your emotional attachment to 
the official state symbols of Serbia (ex. national flag and national anthem)?” and four possible 
answers were offered: a) Very; b) Moderately; c) Little; and d) Not at all. 
Concerning the degree of emotional attachment to Serbian state symbols (see Fig. 35), 39,5% of the 
total respondents claimed to have a very strong emotional attachment to these symbols. The highest 
percentage among these respondents was registered in the Area of peaceful reintegration (51,5%), 
followed by Istria (43,3%). A different trend was registered in Zagreb and the War affected area 
where a higher percentage of respondents opted for a moderately strong emotional attachment to 
Serbian state symbols (33,3% in Zagreb and 29,3% in the War affected area).  
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Fig. 35 
 
 
Concerning the degree of emotional attachment to the Croatian state symbols (See Fig. 36) , 41,2% 
of the respondents opted for ―none at all‖, showing a general predominance of the absence of an 
emotional attachment toward Croatian state symbols, differently from the trend previously 
registered about the Serbian state symbols. Only in Istria (43,3% of the respondents) and in Zagreb 
(43,8%) a little emotional attachment was  registered among the respondents rather than none,  
while the War affected area (57,4%) and the Area of peaceful reintegration (58,6%) opted 
predominantly for none.  
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Fig. 36 
 
Language is an important aspect of one‘s identity, especially in the sphere of national identity, 
wherefore most nations identify themselves by the language they speak and hence their official 
language is named after their nation. After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia the language 
question became a political issue, resulting in the revival of new national languages: new words 
were re-invented or ―borrowed‖ in order to justify the language ―uniqueness‖ in comparison to the 
one spoken by the neighbours. The official language used in ex-Yugoslavia was Serbo-Croatian 
(with multiple standard forms, dialects and 2 writing systems), which lost its official status after the 
dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and was replaced by new
103
 official languages separated on ethnic and 
political lines: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin. The main difference between the 
Serbian and Croatian language is the type of pronunciation (or reflex) used: in Croatia the ijekavian 
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 This doesn‘t imply that the above mentioned languages didn‘t exist before the 1990‘s, but that they became official 
languages for the first time since 1850, when the term Serbo-Croatian was officially and jointly established. Since then, 
in both the Yugoslavian states (from 1918 to 1991) it had served as the official language, recognizing its regional 
variations (considered as standard forms of the language). 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
204 
 
and ikavian pronunciations are mainly used, while in Serbia the ekavian pronunciation is 
exclusively used. In order to acknowledge with which language the Serbs in Croatia identify, they 
respondents were asked to indicate the language and the pronunciation they use in their 
communication. Concerning the language (See Fig. 37), most of the respondents, 66,8%, consider 
their language as ―Serbo-Croatian‖. The same trend was registered among all the territories, without 
exceptions. Only in the Area of peaceful reintegration was registered a slightly higher percentage of 
those who speak Serbian (38,1%). Under the category ―Other‖ the respondents indicated ―Bosnian‖, 
―both Serbian and Croatian‖, and ―several other foreign languages‖. Since the category represents 
only a total of 1,8% it was decided not to express it in a chart. 
Fig. 37 
 
As previously mentioned, Serbo-Croatian had multiple standard forms, but it also allowed the use 
of 2 official pronunciations: the Croatian ijekavian and the Serbian ekavian. Since Serbo-Croatian is 
no longer the official language in these territories, the Croatian language spoken in Croatia uses the 
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official ijekavian and ikavian
104
 pronunciations, while the Serbian language spoken in Serbia uses 
the ekavian pronunciation as the official one (with some exceptions). As we have seen above, most 
of the respondents of this study identify their language as Serbo-Croatian, but since it is a wide 
concept due to its multiple standards, it was necessary to ask the respondents what pronunciation (or 
reflex) they use in their daily communication (See Fig. 38).   
 
 
 
Fig. 38 
 
 
 
The vast majority of the respondents, 79,6%, indicated that they use the Croatian ijekavian 
pronunciation. The only exception was registered in the Area of peaceful reintegration, where 
60,9% of the respondents use the Serbian ekavian pronunciation. The fact that although most the 
respondents use the Croatian ijekavian pronunciation but prefer to identify their language as Serbo-
Croatian rather than Croatian, is very interesting, and can be seen as an attempt of a passive 
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 The ikavian pronunciation is territorially confined: it is spoken only in some parts of Istria, in most of Dalmatia and 
the islands, in the county of Lika, parts of Slavonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.    
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resistance and also as an effort to keep alive the national language and therefore the Serbian 
national identity in Croatia.  
 
As mentioned before, Serbs use also another official alphabet, the Cyrillic, while the Croats use the 
Latin alphabet. Both of the alphabets were officially recognized in the use of the Serbo-Croatian 
language. Today in Croatia, according to the Constitutional law on the rights of national minorities, 
Serbs are allowed to use officially their language and script in the municipalities where they 
represent a significant share of the population. Since the Serbian language and Cyrillic script 
(alphabet) represent an indivisible and important part of their national identity, the respondents were 
asked in addition to the language they use also about the script (See Fig. 39).  
 
Fig. 39 
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The majority of the respondents, 63,0%, indicated that they use both the Latin and the Cyrillic 
script. Istria is the only region with a slighter predominance of those who use rather the Latin script 
(54,1%). 
After the aknowledgment of the language and script used by the respondents, in order to understand 
the value of the role given to the Serbian language and the Cyrillic script in the maintaince of Serb 
national identity in Croatia, the respondents were asked to answer such question and choosing 
between a) Very important; b) Moderately  important; c) Little important; d) Not at important at 
all. 
 
Fig. 40 
 
 
Most of the respondents, 70,6% in total, find very important the role of Serbian language and 
Cyrillic script in preserving Serb national identity in Croatia. This trend was registered in all the 
territories, with the Area of peaceful reintegration showing the higher percentage of 78,8%. 
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Interestingly, none of the respondents from Zagreb opted for ―Not important at all‖, although it was 
a seldom chosen category (1% of the total). 
 
 
Another important aspect of national identity is culture, so the next chart illustrates the importance 
given by the respondents to the role of Serbian culture in Croatia (See Fig. 41). Since culture is a 
broad concept, it was decided not to suggest any examples in the asked question, but leave to the 
respondents their individual perception of Serbian culture and what it means to them.   
 
Fig. 41 
 
 
 
One again we can see that most of the respondents, 74,0%, agree that Serbian culture in Croatia is 
very important to them. The same trend has been registered in all the territories, while Istria is the 
only territory where none of the respondents opted for ―not important at all‖.  
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In the previous chapter it was explained that according to A. Smith, national identity includes five 
elements, one of which is represented by common myths and historical memory (which is also one 
of the the main characteristics of ethnic groups). As we have seen, Serbs trace their myths of origin 
in the figure of the Sacrosaint Nemanjić dynasty and the first Serbian state, Raška. The loss of their 
statehood after the lost battle of Kosovo against the Turks, marked the beginning of a new period of 
their history and as well the beginning of a new epic tradition that caused new common myths. 
In order to verify the presence and importance of these national myths and epic in the present 
national identity of the Serbs in Croatia, the respondents were asked to give an individaul value of 
importance on the matter (See Fig. 42). Since the concept may be misleading and confusing, at the 
end of the question was put an example between parentheses indicating the Nemanjić‘s Dynasty and 
the Battle of Kosovo.  
Fig. 42 
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A little more than half of the respondents, 53,4% in total, find very important the Serbian national 
myths and the Serbian epic tradition. Zagreb was the only territory with the slighter predominance 
of those who find it moderately important (44,9%), rather than very important (38,2%). 
Since these aspects of Serbian history and identity are not studied in the schools in Croatia, the 
attitudes of the respondents on this matter are really surprising.  
 
The next chart illustrates the importance of a more private aspect of Serbian national identity, i.e. 
Serbian tradition and customs (See Fig. 43). Since Serbian tradition and customs are mostly 
influenced by religion, at the end of the question was put an example between parentheses 
indicating ―the ―Krsna slava‖, marriage and others‖ in order to better explain the question to the 
respondents. 
 
Fig. 43 
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The vast majority of the respondents, 81,6% of total, think that Serbian tradition and customs are 
very important for the preservation of Serb national identity in Croatia. The same trend was 
registered in all the territories, with the highest percentage (92,1%) registered in the War affected 
area. 
 
The following charts will explore the importance of national history as well as the degree of 
familiarity of the respondents about their own history and status in Croatia, their opinions about the 
new status they have in Croatia and the degree of familiarity with Serb organizations in Croatia. 
When asked how much they find important the history of Serbs in Croatia, most of the respondents 
(68,5% of total) answered ―very important‖, regardless of the territory (See Fig. 44). 
 
Fig. 44 
 
 
But when asked to indicate the degree of familiarity with the Serbian traditional privileged status in 
Croatia, which represents their peculiarity and the basis of their social rights in Croatia, most the 
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respondents (34,0%) claimed to be ―moderately familiar‖ with the notion (See Fig. 45). Istria 
registered the highest pecentage of those who are ―not familiar at all‖ with the Serbian traditional 
privileged status in Croatia (27,3%), while the Area of peaceful reintegration registered the highest 
percentage of respondents with ―little familiarity‖ with the concept (36,5%). Even the War affected 
area, whose territory mainly coincides with the Military Frontier and had directly benefited from the 
privileged status, registered the highest percentage of respondents with a moderate degree of 
familiarity with the concept (42,0%). Surprisingly, Zagreb registered the highest percentage of 
those who claim to be ―very familiar‖ (27,8%) with this part of their own history in Croatia. 
 
Fig. 45 
 
 
The respondents were also asked about a more recent event in their history in Croatia, i.e. the 
Serbian role in the anti-fascist movement in Croatia during World War II (See Fig. 46). Since it is a 
more recent historical event than the previous one, whose memory was solemnly celebrated by the 
regime during ex Yugoslavia, it was decided not to ask the degree of familiarity but to offer instead 
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only a choice of positive or negative answer. The majority of the respondents, 69,4% of total, gave 
a positive answer, indicating that they are familiar with the concept. The same trend was registered 
in all the territories, with only the Area of peaceful reintegration representing a relatively hight 
percentage of those who are not famliar with the Serbian role in the anti-fascist movement in 
Croatia (44,3% within territory and 11,1% of total).  
 
Fig. 46 
 
 
 
 
The next question deals with an even more recent event in Serb history in Croatia: the year 1991, 
when their constitutional status in Croatia was taken away by the newly elected government. The 
question was the following: “Do you think that Serbs in Croatia are discriminated since they 
became a minority in Croatia (from the year 1991)?”. The respondents were also asked to give a 
reason if their answer was positive.  
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As we can see in the following chart (See Fig. 47), the vast majority (91,5%) of the respondents feel 
that Serbs in Croatia as discriminated, regardless of the territory. However, the highest percentage 
of positive answers was registered in the War affected area (98,0%), most probably due to their 
private experience during and after the war.  
 
Fig. 47 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the reasons offered by the respondents to justify their positive answer regarding the 
discrimination of Serbs in Croatia (See Fig. 48), the majority thinks (36,0% of total) that it 
manifests in the ―Unequal / inconsistent application of laws‖. Although the given reasons were 
numerous and various, mainly influenced by personal experiences, all the territories were 
unanimous about the predominant reason.  
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Fig. 48 
 
 
 
 
The respondents were also asked if they think that the Serbs should be granted again the status of 
constitutive people, and also to explain their answer (whether positive or negative).  
The vast majority (86,6% of total) think that Serbs should be granted again the status of constitutive 
people (See Fig. 49). The highest percentage was registered in the War affected area (96,0% within 
territory), while Zagreb showed the highest percentage of respondents with negative answer (26,7% 
within territory and 6,0% of total). 
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Fig. 49 
 
 
 
Looking at the justification of their answers, the given reasons were very broad. Among the given 
reasons for the previously given positive answer (See Fig. 50), a slighter predominance was given 
to the fact that ―Serbs have always been constitutive people‖ (23,6% of total). Every territory 
showed a different trend: in Istria 26,8% of the respondents wrote ―Because Serbs have been living 
for a long time in these territories‖; in Zagreb 32,4% of the respondents and in the Area of peaceful 
reintegration 26,5% of them claim that Serbs should be granted constitutive status again in Croatia 
―Because Serbs have always been constitutive people‖; while in the War affected area 26,2% think 
that ―Serbs deserve it/it‘s their right‖. 
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Fig. 50 
 
 
 
The given reasons for not granting the constitutive status to Serbs in Croatia were also varied and 
numerous (See Fig. 51). Most of the respondents, 42,9% of total, agree that there are ―Too few 
Serbs now (in Croatia)‖ and therefore there is no need or possibility for a constitutive status. Istria 
was the only exception: it didn‘t register a predominant answer, but only 3 with the same 
percentage (33,3%). The remaining territories agreed that ―There are too few Serbs now‖, aware of 
the fact that the numerical strenght is an important preriquisite for obtaining certain particular 
rights.  
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Fig. 51 
 
 
In the previous section concerning the independent variables, the membership of the respondents in 
Serb organizations was shown. However, since the establishment of these organizations is an 
important part of minorities rights granted to Serbs in Croatia and these organizations are 
responsible, among others, for monitoring the execution of Serb minority rights, it was considered 
necessary to verify the degree of familiarity of the respondents with these organizations. This trend 
is a good indicator not only of Serbian familiarity with these organizations, but also of the 
familiarity with the acquired rights, being the Serb organizations the main intermediary between the 
Serb minority and the authorities.  
A little more than half of the total respondents (53,1%) are not members of any Serb organization in 
Croatia, which may be connected to the predominance (38,1% of total) of those who have a 
moderate degree of familiarity (See Fig. 52) with these organizations. Only in Istria was recorded a 
slighter predominance (37,4%) of the respondents with little familiarity with the Serb organizations 
in Croatia. Although the other territories showed a similar trend, Zagreb registered the highest 
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percentage (39,3% within territory and 9,1% of total) among those respondents who are very 
familiar with these organizations. This could be connected to the fact that all the main Serb 
organizations in Croatia are located in Zagreb, as well as all the state organs, thus facilitating the 
communication between the two sides.  
 
 
Fig. 52 
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5.3.2 Indicators of modernity 
 
While the previous section explored the correlation between dependent variables and the territory 
(considered an independent variable) in order to allow a cross-territorial comparison of the 
respondents‘ general attitudes gathered in the questionnaire, this section will be testing the 
significance of some of the variables (dependent vs. independent) considered important indicators 
of the Serb modern national identity, in order to obtain valuable results that can be applied to the 
whole population (i.e. the Serb minority in Croatia). 
The 4 chosen independent variables to be crossed with the dependent ones are age category, level of 
education, tragic war experience and membership in Serb organizations.  
The chosen dependent variables are the ones that indicate some aspects of current and modern Serb 
national identity in Croatia: national self-identification, sense of discrimination, positive grant of 
constitutive status to Serbs in Croatia, sense of belonging to Serbia and Serbian citizenship
105
. 
So far all the graphs have been expressed in percentages (the count on the Y axis), but the following 
ones will express the number of cases (respondents) because of the vast distribution
106
 of the 
categories that represent the independent variables. However, in order to better understand the 
proportions and their significance, the percentages within categories will be mentioned in the text.  
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 The remaining indicators of modernity were used to calculate the index of modernity in the next section.  
106
 The categories of age and level of education are very broad and vastly distributed among all the respondents, which 
will make it difficult to find strong associations between the studied variables. However, it will provide useful 
information about the studied population, regardless of the obtained results.  
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a) National self-identification  
 
In this research, the national self-identification of the respondents has been treated as a dependent 
variable. However, it is hard to say what it depends from and what influences it, beside a personal 
choice of the individual. By correlating this variable with other independent variables that are 
hypothesized to have an influence on it, new helpful data will be obtained in order to further 
understand the nature of national self-identification among the respondents its correlation to other 
elements. Cross tabulations expressed in graphs will be used to illustrate the correlations between 
variables, but also a Chi square test of independence and a Phi coefficient will be calculated to 
verify the existence of association and its strength. In addition to the already mentioned independent 
variables, two more will be used in this section: the country of birth, religious confession and longer 
period of stay in Serbia, since they might influence national self-identification.  
The following chart (See Fig. 53) represents the correlation between the variable of national self-
identification and the age categories of the respondents. It is visible that the youngest population 
(age 18-30) self-identifies mostly (25,6% within nationality) with the national category of ―Serb‖. It 
is hard to say why it is so, since the young population was born mainly in Croatia and wasn‘t 
directly affected by the war (being most of them born after the end of the conflicts). This could be 
the emergence of a new trend, a re-discovery of one‘s own origin without the fear of possible 
discrimination.  However, the age category of 70+ represents the highest percentage of ―Serbs‖ 
within the age category (79,1%) but also the least represented category (12,7% of the total) due to 
the small number of this category of respondents, making it numerically insignificant on a larger 
scale. Moreover, a gradual decrease of the category ―Serb‖ is visible up to the age category 51-60 
where we see a slightly increase as well as the highest percentage of ―Croat Serbs‖ (45,9% within 
age category), followed by another decrease in the age category 60-70 and ending with an increase 
in the last age category of 70+. 
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Fig. 53 
 
 
 
Since the obtained cross tabulation didn‘t offer enough data on the correlation between the 2 
variables, a symmetric measure using Phi correlation and Cramer‘s V was conducted to calculate 
the strength between the two variables. Phi varies between -1 and 1, while Cramer‘s V varies 
between 0 and 1; both show little association between variables if the obtained value is close to 0 it; 
close to 1, they indicate a strong positive association; if Phi is close to -1 it shows a strong negative 
correlation. In the chart below it is visible that the obtained value both for Phi and Cramer‘s V is 
0,196 which indicates a little association, very weak and therefore minimally acceptable.  
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi ,196 ,015 
Cramer's V ,196 ,015 
N of Valid Cases 367  
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The following chart (See Fig. 54) will explore the correlation between national self-identification 
and level of education. The highest number of ―Serbs‖ is represented by the category of secondary 
school graduates (39,8% within nationality), as well as the category of ―Croatian Serbs‖ (54,1% 
within nationality), which could be a result of the fact that these graduates are the most numerous 
category among the respondents. However, the number of self-declared ―Serbs‖ decreases with the 
increase of the level of education, which indicates a tendency of people with lower educational 
degree to self-identify as ―Serbs‖, while the number of ―Croatian Serbs‖ increases with the level of 
education. The only exception is the category of M.Sc. and PhD where a different tendency was 
registered: 72,7% within level of education have identified as ―Serbs‖ rather than ―Croatian Serbs‖ 
(27,3% within level of education). 
 
 
 
Fig. 54 
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In order to verify the strength of association
107
 between the two variables, a Cramer‘s V coefficient 
is calculated (because we have more categories that don‘t fit in a 2x2 table). Cramer's V varies 
between 0 and 1. Close to 0 it shows little association between variables. Close to 1, it indicates a 
strong association. Our obtained value is 0,150 which indicates a weak association between the 
variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following graph (See Fig. 55) illustrates the contingency between national self-identification 
and tragic war experience. It shows that the category of ―Serb‖ is almost equally distributed in both 
the categories of positive and negative tragic experience (51,2% and 48,8% within category), while 
the ―Croatian Serbs‖ are more numerous among the respondents who experienced a war related 
tragedy (61,4% within category), but the ―Croats‖ are most numerous among the respondents who 
didn‘t experience a war tragedy (88,9% within category).  
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 After chi-square has determined significance. 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi ,260 ,010 
Cramer's V ,150 ,010 
N of Valid Cases 386  
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Fig. 55 
 
 
In order to verify the possible correlation between the two variables, the Phi and Cramer‘s V 
methods were used again. The obtained value of -0,097
108
 indicates little or no association between 
the two variables, and therefore the differences obtained in the frequency distribution are purely 
random. However, a negative coefficient means that those who are lower on one variable are more 
likely to be higher on the other variable, which is especially true for the category of Croatian Serbs. 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -,097 ,060 
Cramer's V ,097 ,060 
N of Valid Cases 374  
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 Phi is used for 2X2 tables and Cramer‘s V for larger tables, and since we rejected the categories that were less than 
5%, we ended up with a 2X2 table and therefore can use Phi coefficient.  
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When looking at the following graph (See Fig. 56) we can see that there is a higher number of 
declared ―Serbs‖ among those who are not members of any Serb organization in Croatia, while the 
number of those who self-identified as ―Croatian Serbs‖ is equal in both the categories of 
membership. However, the percentage of ―Serbs‖ as members is higher (61,9% within membership) 
than the ones of ―Croatian Serbs‖ (35,9% within membership). 
Fig. 56 
 
 
 
Looking at the  table below indicating us both Phi and Cramer‘s V coefficient, -0,027109, we can see 
that there is a  very low associaton between the two variables. Once again a negative coefficient 
means that those who are lower on one variable are more likely to be higher on the other variable. 
 This indicates that neither the membership in Serb organizations influences significantly the 
national self-identification of the individual, having the two variables no or little association.  
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 We use the Phi coefficient because we have a 2x2 table, since the categories with less of 5% are not taken into 
account.  
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The cross-tabulation representing the contingency between national self-identification and religious 
confession showed that 94.2% of the Orthodox Christians declared themselves as Serbs, and 86.8% 
as Croatian Serbs. Regarding the category of Atheists, 5.8% of them considered as Serbs, while 
13.2% of them declared as Croatian Serbs. To check whether these two categorical variables are 
associated with each other, a chi-square test for independence was conducted. A Chi-square test will 
allow to test how likely it is that national self-identification and religious confession are completely 
independent; or in other words, how likely it is that the distribution of ―Serbs‖ and ―Croatian Serbs‖ 
in the categories of Christian Orthodox and Atheists is due to chance.
110
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5,944
a
 1 ,015   
Continuity Correction
b
 5,023 1 ,025   
Likelihood Ratio 5,647 1 ,017   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,018 ,014 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5,928 1 ,015   
N of Valid Cases 370     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10,81. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
The fact that the Pearson chi-square value under "Asymp. Sig (2-sided)" is 0,015, which is more 
than 0,005, indicates that the rows and columns of the contingency are independent, i.e. they are not 
related. Therefore, the research hypothesis that differences in national self-identification are related 
                                                 
110
 Since certain subcategories are under-represented (less than 5%) they couldn‘t be taken in the analysis, so only 
―Serbs‖, ―Croatian Serbs‖, ―Christian Orthodox‖ and ―Atheist‖ were used for the analysis. 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi -,027 ,609 
Cramer's V ,027 ,609 
N of Valid Cases 373  
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to differences in religious confession is rejected by this analysis, while the null hypothesis that 
differences in national self-identification are independent of differences in religious confession is 
supported. This means that there is no association between national self-identification and religious 
confession, thus one variable doesn‘t influence the other and vice versa. 
A possible reason for the results can be the consequence of the great similarities between the 
subcategories of national self-identification, or the fact that the understanding of the notion "Serb" 
and "Croatian Serb" among the respondents doesn‘t differ much from each other. 
 
Looking at the contingency table
111
 representing the correlation between national self-identification 
and country of birth, it is noted that for instance that 66.2% of the respondents born in Croatia 
declared as Serbs, while 87.9% as Croatian Serbs.  In order to check whether this difference is 
statistically significant, and if it refers to the entire population, a chi-square test was conducted. 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21,860
a
 2 ,000 
Likelihood Ratio 24,821 2 ,000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15,957 1 ,000 
N of Valid Cases 363   
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9,45. 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
  
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal Phi ,245 ,000 
Cramer's V ,245 ,000 
Contingency Coefficient ,238 ,000 
N of Valid Cases 363  
 
                                                 
111
 It is not shown in the text; its most important results are described in the text.  
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Both the chi square test and Phi and Cramer‘s V show a moderate strong correlation between the 
two variables, which indicates that national self-identification is associated to the country of birth. 
Therefore it is not a random coincidence that most the of the declared Serbs (63,6% of total) were 
born in Serbia (92,3% within category) and most of the declared Croatian Serbs (87,9% within 
category) were born in Croatia. The obtained result is significant enough to be applied to the whole 
population.   
When correlating national self-identification with longer period of stay in Serbia, it was noted for 
instance that 49.0% of the respondents who consider themselves Serbs stayed for a long time in 
Serbia, compared to 51.0% who did not. On the other hand, 66,2% of declared Croatian Serbs 
didn‘t stay in Serbia for a long time.  
In order to check whether this difference is statistically significant, and therefore it refers to the 
entire population, a chi-square test was conducted. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7,979
a
 3 ,046 
Likelihood Ratio 8,084 3 ,044 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6,833 1 ,009 
N of Valid Cases 383   
a. 3 cells (37,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,31. 
 
Since the Chi Square test shows no significant differences (Sig.> 0.005), the variables are 
independent and therefore are not correlated. This means that national self-identification isn‘t 
associated or influenced by longer periods of stay in Serbia. 
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b) Sense of discrimination 
 
 
The presence of an individual sense of discrimination towards the own minority group is a strong 
indicator of the perception of the minority group about the dominant group and the environment 
they both live in. It also offers an image of the current situation concerning Serb-Croat relations in 
Croatia.  
In the previous sections it was illustrated that among the Serbs in Croatia there is a high sense of 
discrimination since they lost their constitutive status and became a national minority in 1991. Even 
the reasons that justify such a feeling have been categorized and illustrated in the form of a graph, 
but we still don‘t know what influences such a trend, considered as a dependent variable. 
 
Looking at the graph representing the contingency sense of discrimination and age category (See 
Fig. 57), we can see that most of the respondents from each age category feel a sense of 
discrimination of their own minority group. However, it is surprising that the youngest generation 
(18-30) who was not even born when Serbs had the status of constitutive people is the most 
numerous (86,9% within age category) in feeling a sense of discrimination of the own minority 
group. This could be the result of their dissatisfaction with the current situation in Croatia and 
therefore they hope that the change of their status would improve things.  
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Fig. 57 
 
When looking at the association between sense of discrimination and level of education (See Fig. 
58), it is immediately visible that the respondents with a higher level of education feel a sense of 
discrimination in contrast to those who don‘t. If we look closely, none of the respondents with a 
M.Sc. or PhD feels that there is no discrimination, differently from those without a degree (3,2% 
within level of education) or from those having an elementary (9,1%) or secondary school degree 
(12,7%). Although the category of secondary school graduates seems to be the most represented in 
both categories (―Yes‖ and ―No‖), this is a result of its numerical superiority compared to the other 
categories, and therefore, doesn‘t interfere with the association between high level of education and 
sense of discrimination.  
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Fig. 58 
 
 
 
The following chart (See Fig. 59) illustrates the contingency between the sense of discrimination 
and tragic war experience. Although there is a slighter predominance of respondents with a tragic 
war experience who feel a sense of discrimination (95,7% within category of tragedy) rather than 
those without a tragic war experience (86,5% within category), and consequently a higher 
percentage of those without a tragic war experience who don‘t feel discriminated (13,5% within 
category) vs. the ones with a tragic war experience (4,3% within category). However, this doesn‘t 
prove that the sense of discrimination is influenced by a tragic war experience, but rather only that 
most of the respondents with a tragic war experience feel discriminated, as well as those who didn‘t 
have such an experience (although to a lesser extent). 
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Fig. 59 
 
 
Looking at the graph representing the contingency between sense of discrimination and membership 
in Serb organization in Croatia (See Fig. 60), once more we find no association between the two 
variables. It only shows us that most of the members
112
 (95,6% within category) and most of the 
non-members (87,8% within category) feel a sense of discrimination. However, non-members tend 
to not feel discriminated to a larger extent that members (75,8% within category vs. 24,2% within 
category). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112
 For convenience, the previously seen categories of ―Active member‖ and ―Only formal member‖ have been merged 
in a single category of positive membership.  
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Fig. 60 
 
 
 
c) Grant of constitutive status to Serbs in Croatia 
 
 
Another trend that has been registered in the previous section is the high number of respondents 
(86,6% of total) who think that Serbs should be granted again the status of constitutive people in 
Croatia. We have already illustrated the reasons justifying both a positive and a negative answer 
offered by the respondents, so we know the cause behind this trend. However, in order to verify if 
there is any association between this indicator of Serb modern national identity and other 
independent variables that might have influenced the respondents‘ attitudes, we need to proceed 
with an ulterior analysis of the indicator.   
When looking at the graph expressing the cross-tabulation between the grant of constitutive status 
to the Serbs in Croatia and the age category of the respondents (See Fig. 61), we can‘t see any 
association between the two variables since the age categories are almost equally distributed among 
both the categories of ―Yes‖ and ―No‖ on the X axis. The only visible data is the increase of the 
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respondents aged 31-40 in their wish not to grant constitutive status to the Serbs (18,8% within age 
category), as well as of those aged 61-70 (14,3% within age category). Interestingly, the highest 
registered percentage of respondents who would like the Serbs to be granted constitutive status 
again is of those aged 70+ (93,8% within age category). 
Fig. 61  
 
 
Neither the following graph illustrating the contingency between grant of constitutive status and 
level of education (See Fig. 62) offers any visible association between the two variables. However, 
in the following table that expresses the percentages within categories (and not the number of cases 
as in the graph), it is possible to see that the percentage of those respondents who think that Serbs 
should be granted constitutive status decreases proportionally with their level of education: the less 
educated they are, the more they think that Serbs should be granted constitutive status and vice 
versa. Another interesting fact that resulted as a consequence is that the respondents with the 
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highest level of education represent the highest percentage within category of those who opted for 
not granting constitutive status to the Serbs in Croatia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutiveness * Education Crosstabulation 
   
Education 
Total 
   
None Elementary Secondary  Bacc.or MA Mr.Sc.or PhD 
Grant of constitutive 
status 
Yes Count 28 96 147 51 7 329 
% within Education 90,3% 88,9% 86,0% 86,4% 63,6% 86,6% 
No Count 3 12 24 8 4 51 
% within Education 9,7% 11,1% 14,0% 13,6% 36,4% 13,4% 
Total Count 31 108 171 59 11 380 
% within Education 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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The following graph (See Fig. 63) illustrates the contingency between the grant of constitutive 
status and the tragic war experience. The number of the respondents who experienced a war tragedy 
is higher than the number of those who didn‘t experience a war correlated tragedy in both of the 
categories. However, the percentage of those who didn‘t experience a war tragedy is higher in the 
category of those who wouldn‘t grant constitutive status (66,7% within category) rather in the one 
who would (43% within category), which shows a preponderance of the respondents who suffered a 
tragic war experience to opt for the positive grant of constitutive status to Serbs in Croatia (57% 
within category). 
Fig. 63 
 
 
 
The last graph illustrates the cross-tabulation between the variables grant of constitutive status and 
membership in Serb organizations in Croatia (See Fig. 64). The very closed obtained percentages 
for members (47,3% within category) and not members (52,7% within category) who opted for the 
positive grant of constitutive status indicate that there is no association between the two variables, 
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and therefore the membership in a Serb organization doesn‘t influence the positive opinion of those 
who believe that Serbs should be granted constitutive status.   
 
 
Fig. 64 
 
 
 
d) Sense of belonging to Serbia 
 
 
Another aspect of modern Serb national identity in Croatia that was measured in the previous 
sections is the sense of belonging to Serbia, and more precisely a numerically significant percentage 
of respondents who feel a sense of belonging to Serbia (59,9% of total). As in the previous case 
with the grant of constitutive status, the respondents were also asked to offer a reason for their 
positive or negative answer. But aside from the given reasons which justify the given answers, it is 
unknown what influences this trend and what it is associated with.  Hopefully the following cross 
tabulations will offer some new information to better understand this trend. 
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The graph illustrating the contingency between the sense of belonging to Serbia and the age 
category of the respondents (See Fig. 65), shows that most of the respondents do feel a sense of 
belonging to Serbia regardless of their age. The age categories on both sides of the X axis (―Yes‖ 
and ―No‖) are equally distributed, not showing any significant change. The only significant data is 
that the most elderly respondents (61-70 and 70+) registered the highest percentages within age 
category of sense of belonging to Serbia (respectively 68,2% and 66,7%), while the youngest age 
category (18-30) registered the lowest percentage within age category (54,3%) but the highest 
percentage within sense of belonging (22,1%) due to the numerical predominance of the age 
category 18-30. 
 
 
Fig. 65 
 
 
The graph illustrating the contingency between the sense of belonging to Serbia and level of 
education of the respondents (See Fig. 66), shows a similar distribution in both the ―Yes‖ and ―No‖ 
categories, with the only exception of the respondents with a Bachelor‘s or MA degree who are 
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numerically equal in both the categories (50% within category). It has also been noticed that the 
percentage of those who feel a sense of belonging decreases with the increase of the level of 
education, with the only exception of the category of Mr. SC. or PhD where an additional increase 
has been recorded. The respondents with the highest level of education show a moderately strong 
sense of belonging to Serbia (63,6% within category). 
 
Fig. 66 
 
 
 
The following chart illustrates the relationship between the sense of belonging to Serbia and tragic 
war experience (See Fig. 67), in order to verify if the respondents who experienced a war related 
tragedy are more likely to feel a sense of belonging to Serbia rather than those who didn‘t.  
The count of the cases in represented on the Y axis, as well as the percentages within categories, 
show a similar trend among both the categories of respondents: 61,1% of the respondents with a 
tragic war experience feel a sense of belonging to Serbia as well as the 58,5% respondents who 
didn‘t experience a tragic war experience. However, the positive sense of belonging to Serbia is 
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slightly higher among those who experienced a tragic war experience (55,2% within category) but 
at the same time 52,6% of the respondents who experienced a war tragedy don‘t feel any sense of 
belonging to Serbia. These results may seem confusing because the data was acquainted from 2 
different cross-tabulations in order to obtain a further insight: tragic war experience by sense of 
belonging to Serbia and vice versa. 
Fig. 67 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the following graph representing the contingency between sense of belonging to Serbia 
and membership in Serb organizations in Croatia (See Fig. 68), we can see that we have almost the 
same amount of members (50,4% within category) and not members (49,6% within category ) with 
a sense of belonging to Serbia. However, the percentage of those who don‘t feel any sense of 
belonging to Serbia is higher among the not members (58,4%).   
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Fig. 68 
 
 
 
A further correlation that was decided to check and that resulted in being significant is the one 
between the sense of belonging to Serbia and a longer period of stay in Serbia. From the obtained 
contingency table
113
 it was noted that 77.4% of the respondents who stayed longer in Serbia feel a 
sense of belonging to Serbia in contrast to the 22.6% who feel no affiliation to it. On the other hand, 
53% of the respondents who don‘t feel any sense of belonging to Serbia haven‘t stayed a longer 
period of time in Serbia.  
 In order to check if this difference is statistically significant and whether it refers to the entire 
population, a chi-square test was conducted.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 Not showed in the text 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36,081
a
 1 ,000   
Continuity Correction
b
 34,823 1 ,000   
Likelihood Ratio 37,337 1 ,000   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,000 ,000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 35,986 1 ,000   
N of Valid Cases 381     
a. 0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 65,43. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Since the Chi Square test shows significant differences (Sig. <0.005), it is accepted the research 
hypothesis that the variables are not independent and thus there is an association between the sense 
of belonging to Serbia and the longer period spent in Serbia.  
 
e) Serbian citizenship 
 
 
The possession of a dual citizenship is a modern aspect of national identity, and although the 
percentage of the respondents who claimed to have Serbian citizenship is quiet low (23,7% of total),  
it can be an interesting source of new and useful information regarding the registered trend.  
As we have previously seen, the age categories of the respondents are very broad and therefore 
don‘t leave much possibility to significant correlation, but they can offer some interesting 
information. The graph representing the cross-tabulation of Serbian citizenship and age category 
(See Fig. 69), shows that the respondents aged between 31-40 represent the highest percentage of 
respondents in possession of a Serbian citizenship (33,8% within category). The age category 51-60 
follows (29,5% within category), while the  age category 41-50 (11,3% within category) represents 
the smallest percentage of respondents with a Serbian citizenship. 
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Fig. 69 
 
 
Concerning the correlation between Serbian citizenship and level of education of the respondents 
(See Fig. 70), the highest percentage within category has been registered among the highest levels 
of education: 37,7% of Bacc. or MA and 36,4% of M.Sc. or PhD are in possession of Serbian 
citizenship. This could be related to the fact that most of them gained their university degrees in 
Serbia (12,2% of the total reasons given for a longer period of stay included schooling). This trend 
can be confirmed by the fact that lower levels of education show a linear decrease in percentage of 
those in possession of a Serbian citizenship (only 16,1% within category of the respondents without 
any degree have Serbian citizenship). 
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Fig. 70 
 
 
 
The graph illustrating the results from the contingency table between possession of Serbian 
citizenship and tragic war experience (See Fig. 71) shows no correlation between the two variables. 
The category of ―Yes‖ on the X axis shows the same numerical distribution of cases who suffered a 
war related tragedy as well of those who didn‘t. Even the distribution among the category of ―No‖ 
is similar among the two groups of respondents: 78,1% within category  with a tragic war 
experience and 74,2% who didn‘t experience it. 
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Fig. 71 
 
 
When looking at the graph illustrating the contingency between Serbian citizenship and 
membership in Serb organizations in Croatia (See Fig. 72), there is a slighter predominance of 
members in Serb organization who possess Serbian citizenship (28% within category) in contrast of 
the 20% of not members who also possess it. On the other hand, among the respondents who don‘t 
have Serbian citizenship, the most numerous are the non members (80% within category). 
However the difference is too weak to claim that membership affects the possesion of Serbian 
citizenship, which is also due to the small percentage of respondents who claimed to have Serbian 
citizenship (23,8% of the total), as well as the almost equal distribution of members and non 
members among the respondents (47% vs. 53%). 
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Fig. 72 
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5.3.4 Index of modernity and traditionalism 
 
 
After analyzing in the previous section some of the indicators of modern national identity among 
the Serbs in Croatia, this section will deal with the main objective of this research: to verify the 
predominant character of Serb national identity character. It has been pre-assumed that Serb 
national identity is a typical example of Smith‘s (Smith, 1991) division between Western-civic 
model and Eastern-ethnic model of nation, whereas the non-Western concept of national identity is 
primarily based on subjective feeling relating to genetic lineage and common ancestors and nation 
is defined as a collective identity transmitted through myths, archetypes, shared history, culture and 
language.  
Also according to Milošević-ĐorĊević (Milošević-ĐorĊević, 2007), the Serb national identity is 
dominated by primordial concepts such as birth, history, tradition, territory and religion, while 
suppressing the importance of the state, culture and politics. National identity in Serbia is best 
described as primordial or pre-political. 
Since the Serb national identity in Croatia has never been studied closely before and its nature can 
only be assumed, this section will verify the predominant nature of Serb national identity: its 
modernity or rather its traditionalism.  
 
The indexes were created by calculating the averages for each respondent obtained from their 
answer (the number of each answer) on specific variables: on "traditional" variables for the index of 
traditionalism, and on "modern" ones for the index of modernity. The smaller the value (because 1 
= "very"), the greater the intensity of traditionalism (for example, ―we consider that Serbian oral 
tradition is very important (1)‖, etc.). The traditional variables include the respondents‘ attitudes 
dealing with the so called ethnic or primordial aspects of identity: importance of religion, 
importance of the Serbian Orthodox Church, importance of Serbian language and Cyrillic script, 
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importance of Serbian national myths and epic, importance of Serbian tradition and customs, 
importance of the history of Serbs in Croatia and familiarity with the Serb privileged status in 
Croatia. 
The modern variables include the following ones dealing with national institutions, supranational 
and international identification: emotional attachment to Croatian state symbols, emotional 
attachment to Serbian state symbols (reversed
114
), familiarity with Serbian organizations in Croatia 
(reversed), and importance of Serbian culture in Croatia
115
 (reversed). The index of modernity was 
more difficult to calculate due to the ambiguous concept of ―modernity‖ regarding Serb national 
identity in Croatia. Since Serbs in Croatia are mainly a traditional national minority with strong 
historical ties with their country of origin, it was necessary to identify some elements that would 
indicate a different, more modern attitude. Thus, modernity is represented by these elements that are 
not traditional and are linked to the state, but not the one of origin: it should represent Serb 
acceptance of Croatia as their own country and the acceptance of their new status in Croatia, i.e. as 
a national minority.  
 
The next chart (See Fig. 73) represents the value of the calculated index of traditionalism for the 
whole sample. The calculated average is 1,6578 which indicates a very high degree of 
traditionalism among the respondents (being 1 the highest value and 4 the lowest). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
 The given value was put in reversed order: 1=not at all, 2=little, 3=moderately, 4=very, because for these variables a 
higher value indicates modernity.  
115
 The notion of culture used here involves ―modern‖ achievements in the sphere of literature, folklore, music, arts, etc. 
and is therefore to be separated by the categories of Serbian language and Cyrillic script that rather belong among the 
indicators of traditional Serb national identity. Moreover, a common mass and civil culture is a characteristic of modern 
national identity, not the attachment to the own minority‘s culture. Therefore, a high attachment to Serbian culture 
implies a low or inexistent attachment to a common mass and civil culture in Croatia. 
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Fig. 73 
 
 
The next chart (See Fig. 74) represents the value of the calculated index of traditionalism per 
territories. As we can see, the War affected area has the highest index of traditionalism (1,56) which 
makes it the most traditional territory in terms of national identity, when compared to the other 
three studied territories. The least traditional among the four territories is Istria, with an average 
index of 1,77 that still indicates a high traditional national identity. All the territories however show 
a high index of traditionalism (Zagreb with a value of 1,68 and the Area of peaceful reintegration 
with 1,62), which means that the Serbs in Croatia have a predominantly traditional national identity 
regardless of the territorial distribution.  
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Fig. 74 
 
 
The following chart (See Fig. 75) shows a scale of the elements (variables) that form the index of 
traditionalism in order to understand what element prevailed.  The respondents opted most for the 
importance of Serbian customs and tradition (1,23) which is the most prevailing element of 
traditional Serb national identity in Croatia. The least ―traditional‖ element seems to be Serbian 
privileged status in Croatia (2,414) due to the scarce familiarity shown by the respondents about this 
aspect (34% of the total respondents have ―moderate‖ familiarity with its meaning).  
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Fig. 75 
 
 
The next chart (See Fig. 76) represents the value of the calculated index of modernity for the whole 
sample. The obtained average is 3,1412 which represents a low degree of modernity among the 
respondents (being 1 the highest value and 4 the lowest).  
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Fig. 76 
  
 
The next chart (See Fig. 77) represents the value of the calculated index of modernity per territories. 
Although all the territories show a low degree of modernity with minor difference among each 
other, the Area of peaceful reintegration proved to be the least modern (3,26) among the studied 
territories. The most modern territory is Istria with an average value of 3,02, followed by Zagreb 
(3,10) and the War affected area (3,18).  
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Fig. 77 
 
 
The following chart (See Fig. 78) illustrates a scale of the elements (variables) that form the index 
of modernity in order to see what element prevailed.  The respondents gave higher values to the 
importance of Serb organizations in Croatia (2,782), making it the most dominant element within 
the modernity index. Due to the fact that the value for the importance of Serbian culture in Croatia 
was reversed because its higher value represents rather a traditional aspect than a modern one, it 
proved to be the least modern element (3,684). This means that Serbs in Croatia find their culture 
very important, but this is an aspect of rather traditional identity than modern. This is why a higher 
value of importance given to this element resulted in a lower degree of modernity.  
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Fig. 78 
 
 
 
In conclusion, a correlation was done between the index of traditionalism and the index of 
modernity by using the Pearson‘s Correlation. Looking at the boxes that contain numbers that 
represent variable crossings, we are interested in the crossing between the ―modernity index‖ 
variable and the ―traditionalism index‖ variable. They will have the same information so we really 
only need to read from one. In these boxes, we will see a value for Pearson‘s r, a Sig. (2-tailed) 
value and a number (N) value.  
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The obtained correlation
116
 between the two indexes (-0,726) is high, negative and significant, 
which means that the variables are related. Since the Pearson correlation is negative, this means that 
as one variable increases in value, the second variable decreases in value. This is called a negative 
correlation. That means, increases or decreases in one variable do significantly relate to increases or 
decreases in our second variable. More specifically, when one increases in value, the value of the 
other decreases, thus they are inversely proportional. This means that the more traditional the 
respondents are, the least modern they are, and vice versa.  
 
The Sig. (2-tailed) value will tell us if there is a statistically significant correlation between our two 
variables. Since our Sig. value is lower than 0,05 (0,000), we can conclude that there is a 
statistically significant correlations between our two variables.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116
 The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1, with -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation, +1 indicating a 
perfect positive correlation, and 0 indicating no correlation at all. 
Correlations 
  
ModernityINDEX TraditionalismINDEX 
ModernityINDEX Pearson Correlation 1 -,726
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 377 366 
TraditionalismINDEX Pearson Correlation -,726
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 366 374 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5.3.4 Correlations between indexes and variables 
 
After we obtained the indexes that indicate the degree of traditionalism and modernity of Serb 
national identity in Croatia, it is possible to combine them with few of the most significant variables 
and assess whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each other by using the 
T-test. Since this study includes a fairly large group of respondents divided in several categories 
according to the studied aspect, the independent means t-test is the best choice to answer to this 
question: Is there any difference between the means of the two populations of which our data is a 
random sample? The t-test is also called a test of inference because we are trying to discover if 
populations are different by studying samples from the populations, i.e., what we find to be true 
about our samples we will assume to be true about the population. 
The T-test relies always on two hypotheses:  1. the means of the two groups are not significantly 
different (Null); and 2. The means of the two groups are significantly different (Alternate). The 
obtained value whether rejects or confirm one of the two hypotheses.  
But before we can interpret the results of the t-test, first we will need to look at the column labeled 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances which is a test that determines if the two conditions have 
about the same or different amounts of variability between scores. The Levene‘s Test tells us if we 
have met the assumption that the two groups have approximately equal variance on the dependent 
variable. If the Levene's Test is significant (the value under "Sig." is less than 0,05), the two 
variances are significantly different. If it is not significant (Sig. is greater than 0,05), the two 
variances are not significantly different; that is, the two variances are approximately equal. If the 
Levene's test is not significant, it means that the two groups are independent of one another.  
A value greater than 0,05 (Sig. >0,05) means that the variability in  two conditions is about the 
same, which  means that the variability in the two conditions is not significantly different. 
Therefore, if the Sig. value is greater than 0,05, we read from the top row (―Equal variances 
assumed‖). 
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The results of our T-test will tell us if the means for the two groups were statistically different 
(significantly different) or if they were relatively the same. We look at the value in the box ―Sig (2-
Tailed) value‖, which will tell us if the two condition means are statistically different.  
If the P value is small, then it is unlikely that the observed difference is due to a coincidence of 
random sampling. Thus, the difference is a not coincidence, and that the populations have different 
means.  
 
 
a) Modern and traditional identity vs. national self-identification 
 
As we have previously seen, the variable national self-identification had a very weak or none 
association with all the variables that we correlated by using the Chi square test and the Phi 
coefficient. In this section, the two most numerous national categories of the respondents, i.e. Serbs 
and Croatian Serbs, will be analyzed by using the T-test in order to identify differences in means of 
modernity and traditionalism between the two categories. The question that needs to be answered is 
the following: Is there any difference among the ―Serbs‖ and the ―Croatian Serbs‖ regarding 
modern and traditional identity?  
 
In the table below, ―Group Statistics‖, is shown the condition mean for each of the two groups in 
the section.  This output shows the magnitude of the difference between conditions and we can see 
which group has a higher mean. Here the variables being compared are identified, the Mean, N, 
Standard Deviation, and Standard Error of the Mean for each variable is given. 
We can see that the average value of the index of modernity expressed by the ―Serbs‖ is 3,2234, 
while the one expressed by the ―Croatian Serbs‖ is 3,0430. This obtained result indicates that the 
Serbs are less modern than Croatian Serbs (being 1 the highest value and 4 the lowest) and vice 
versa. 
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Group Statistics 
 
NationalityCorrelation N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ModernityINDEX Serb 235 3,2234 ,49741 ,03245 
Croatian Serb 128 3,0430 ,49317 ,04359 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
ModernityINDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
,188 ,665 3,312 361 ,001 ,18044 ,05448 ,07330 ,28757 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  3,320 262,920 ,001 ,18044 ,05434 ,07344 ,28744 
 
 
Since the Levene‘s test showed a value higher than 0,05 (Sig. 0,665), we look the results obtained 
in the first row (―Equal variances assumed‖).The p-value is 0,001 (Sig.) and, therefore, the 
difference between the two means is statistically and significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level of significance. The group means are significantly different as the value in the "Sig. (2-tailed)" 
row is less than 0.05. Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative is accepted. 
The larger the t-value the smaller the probability that the means of the two populations are the same.  
The result is significant t (361) = 3,312, p = 0,001. We reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative, and therefore affirm that the difference in modernity between Serbs and Croatian Serbs 
is significant enough to be applied to the whole population.  
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The next table show us that the mean for the Serbs is 1,58, while for the Croatian Serbs is 1,73, 
which means that the Serbs are more traditional than the Croatian Serbs (being 1 the maximum and 
4 the minimum value).  
 
Group Statistics 
 
NationalityCorrelation N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
TraditionalismINDEX Serb 232 1,58 ,517 ,034 
Croatian Serb 128 1,73 ,508 ,045 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
TraditionalismINDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
,443 ,506 -2,698 358 ,007 -,153 ,057 -,264 -,041 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -2,713 266,199 ,007 -,153 ,056 -,264 -,042 
 
The Levene‘s test shows a value higher than 0,05 (0,506), so we look at the results in the first row. 
The pi-value (Sig.) is 0,007 which is smaller than 0,05 and therefore there is a significant difference 
between the two groups. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative is accepted. 
The obtained result is t(358)=-2,698, pi=0,007. The t-value is negative because the first mean is 
smaller than the second. 
So we can say that there is a significant difference between the Serbs and the Croatian Serbs; the 
Serbs are more traditional than the Croatian Serbs, but we have previously seen that the Serbs are 
also less modern than the Croatian Serbs. 
 
 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
261 
 
b) Modern and traditional identity vs. age category  
 
 
Since the age categories of the respondents represent more than three groups, instead of the T-test, 
the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there are any significant 
differences between the means. Just like the T-test, ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that the means 
of all the groups being compared are equal, and produces a statistic called F which is equivalent to 
the t-statistic from a t-test. But if the result tells us to reject the null hypothesis, we still don't know 
which of the means differ. We solve this problem by performing what is known as a "post hoc" 
(after the event) test, the Tukey test. 
The following descriptive table (see below) provides some very useful descriptive statistics 
including the mean, standard deviation and 95% confidence intervals for the dependent variable 
(index of modernity) for each separate group (age categories) as well as when all groups are 
combined (Total). We can see that the respondents aged 18-30 are the most modern (3,0972), while 
the respondents aged 31-40 are the least modern (3,2210) in terms of national identity.  
 
Descriptives 
ModernityINDEX 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
18-30 90 3,0972 ,58624 ,06179 2,9744 3,2200 1,00 4,00 
31-40 69 3,2210 ,56480 ,06799 3,0853 3,3567 1,75 4,00 
41-50 53 3,1557 ,51475 ,07071 3,0138 3,2975 1,75 4,00 
51-60 70 3,1357 ,47527 ,05681 3,0224 3,2490 1,75 4,00 
61-70 43 3,1337 ,47355 ,07222 2,9880 3,2795 2,25 4,00 
70+ 44 3,1080 ,41902 ,06317 2,9806 3,2353 2,25 3,75 
Total 369 3,1416 ,51943 ,02704 3,0884 3,1948 1,00 4,00 
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The table Test of Homogeneity of Variances (see below) shows the result of Levene's Test of 
Homogeneity of Variance, which tests for similar variances. If the significance value is greater than 
0.05 (found in the Sig. column) then we have homogeneity of variances. The obtained value is 
0,293, therefore the assumption of homogeneity of variance is met. 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
ModernityINDEX 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1,232 5 363 ,293 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The obtained result is ANOVA (F(5,363) =0,499, p = 0,777, whereas 0,777 is higher than 0,05, 
therefore there are no statistically significant differences between the groups (age categories). We 
accept the null hypothesis and confirm that there is no difference in the mean of modernity index 
with the age categories of the respondents.  
 
Looking at the below descriptive table, we can see that the age category 61-70 has the least index of 
traditionalism (1,54), while the age category 18-30 has the highest index (1,79), which means that 
the age category 61-70 is more traditional than the others, while the age category 18-30 is the least 
traditional when compared to the others.   
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
ModernityINDEX 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups ,678 5 ,136 ,499 ,777 
Within Groups 98,611 363 ,272   
Total 99,289 368    
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Descriptives 
TraditionalismINDEX 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
18-30 88 1,79 ,599 ,064 1,66 1,91 1 4 
31-40 71 1,66 ,554 ,066 1,53 1,80 1 3 
41-50 50 1,65 ,518 ,073 1,50 1,79 1 3 
51-60 73 1,66 ,478 ,056 1,54 1,77 1 3 
61-70 41 1,54 ,499 ,078 1,39 1,70 1 3 
70+ 45 1,55 ,519 ,077 1,39 1,70 1 3 
Total 368 1,66 ,539 ,028 1,61 1,72 1 4 
 
The test of homogeneity of Variances shows a value greater than 0,05 (0,699) and therefore the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is met. We can continue with the ANOVA test.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
TraditionalismINDEX 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2,579 5 ,516 1,794 ,113 
Within Groups 104,068 362 ,287   
Total 106,648 367    
 
 
The obtained result is ANOVA (5,362)=1,794, p=0,113. The Sig. value is bigger than 0,05, 
therefore the null hypothesis is accepted that there are no significant differences in means between 
the given categories.  
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
TraditionalismINDEX 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
,602 5 362 ,699 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
264 
 
c) Modern and traditional identity vs. level of education  
 
Since the groups representing the level of education are more than three, we use once again the 
One-way ANOVA. 
The following descriptive table shows us that the respondents with an elementary level of education 
have the highest mean of modernity index (3,0718), while those with a Mr.Sc. or PhD have the 
lowest mean of modernity index (3,5227). This means that the respondents with an elementary 
degree are more modern than those with a Mr.Sc. or PhD degree. 
 
 
 
Before the One-way ANOVA can be performed, first we test whether the variances of means are 
similar (it is one of the assumptions that have to be met). The test of homogeneity of variances give 
us a value higher than 0,05 (0,258), therefore the assumption has been met and we may continue 
with the ANOVA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
ModernityNDEX 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
None 30 3,1167 ,54033 ,09865 2,9149 3,3184 2,25 4,00 
Elementary 108 3,0718 ,54263 ,05222 2,9682 3,1753 1,00 4,00 
Secondary 168 3,1220 ,51110 ,03943 3,0442 3,1999 1,75 4,00 
Bacc.or MA 59 3,2627 ,45822 ,05966 3,1433 3,3821 2,25 4,00 
Mr.Sc. or PhD 11 3,5227 ,28405 ,08564 3,3319 3,7136 3,25 4,00 
Total 376 3,1410 ,51550 ,02659 3,0887 3,1932 1,00 4,00 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
ModenitytINDEX 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1,330 4 371 ,258 
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ANOVA 
ModernityINDEX 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3,073 4 ,768 2,951 ,020 
Within Groups 96,581 371 ,260   
Total 99,654 375    
 
The obtained value is ANOVA (4,371)=2,951, pi=0,020. Since Sig. < 0,05 the null hypothesis is 
rejected, and we accept that there are significant differences between the groups as whole.  
 
In order to find out which groups differed from each other, we perform a Tukey post-hoc test (see 
below). We can see from the table below that there is a significant difference in modernity index 
between the respondents with an elementary school degree and those with a Mr.Sc. or PhD (P = 
0.043). However, there were no significant differences between the other groups. The obtained 
result tells us that the most significant difference in modernity index is between the group of those 
respondents with an elementary degree and those with a Mr.Sc. or PhD (as we have seen in the 
descriptive table).  
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Multiple Comparisons 
ModernityINDEX 
Tukey HSD 
(I) Level of education (J) Level of education 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
None Elementary ,04491 ,10530 ,993 -,2437 ,3336 
Secondary -,00536 ,10113 1,000 -,2826 ,2719 
Bacc.or MA -,14605 ,11441 ,706 -,4597 ,1676 
Mr.Sc.or PhD -,40606 ,17984 ,161 -,8991 ,0869 
Elementary None -,04491 ,10530 ,993 -,3336 ,2437 
Secondary -,05026 ,06293 ,931 -,2228 ,1222 
Bacc.or MA -,19095 ,08260 ,143 -,4174 ,0355 
Mr.Sc.or PhD -,45097
*
 ,16148 ,043 -,8936 -,0083 
Secondary None ,00536 ,10113 1,000 -,2719 ,2826 
Elementary ,05026 ,06293 ,931 -,1222 ,2228 
Bacc.or MA -,14069 ,07721 ,362 -,3523 ,0710 
Mr.Sc.or PhD -,40070 ,15879 ,088 -,8360 ,0346 
Bacc.or MA None ,14605 ,11441 ,706 -,1676 ,4597 
Elementary ,19095 ,08260 ,143 -,0355 ,4174 
Secondary ,14069 ,07721 ,362 -,0710 ,3523 
Mr.Sc.or PhD -,26002 ,16757 ,529 -,7194 ,1993 
Mr.Sc.or PhD None ,40606 ,17984 ,161 -,0869 ,8991 
Elementary ,45097
*
 ,16148 ,043 ,0083 ,8936 
Secondary ,40070 ,15879 ,088 -,0346 ,8360 
Bacc.or MA ,26002 ,16757 ,529 -,1993 ,7194 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
The below descriptive table for the index of traditionalism shows us that the group of respondents 
with a Mr.Sc. or PhD have the highest index of traditionalism (1,45), while those with a Bacc. or 
MA degree have the lowest index (1,69). 
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Descriptives 
TraditionalismINDEX 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
None 30 1,60 ,527 ,096 1,40 1,79 1 3 
Elementary 107 1,68 ,599 ,058 1,56 1,79 1 4 
Secondary 167 1,66 ,509 ,039 1,58 1,74 1 4 
Bacc.or MA 58 1,69 ,543 ,071 1,55 1,83 1 3 
Mr.Sc. or PhD 11 1,45 ,246 ,074 1,29 1,62 1 2 
Total 373 1,66 ,537 ,028 1,60 1,71 1 4 
 
 
The test of homogeneity of variances shows us that the obtained value is smaller than 0,05 and 
therefore that the assumption of homogeneity of variance hasn‘t be met (we do not have similar 
variances). Most probably, the ANOVA won‘t give us significant results. 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
TraditionalismINDEX 
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
2,492 4 368 ,043 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
TraditionalismINDEX 
 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups ,680 4 ,170 ,587 ,672 
Within Groups 106,440 368 ,289   
Total 107,119 372    
 
As assumed, the obtained Sig. value is higher than 0,05 (0,672) and therefore we accept the null 
hypothesis that the differences between the groups are not statistically significant.  
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d) Modern and traditional identity vs. country of birth  
 
In regard to the country of birth, it was decided to divide the respondents into two categories: those 
born in Croatia and those born outside Croatia. The following table shows us that the mean of those 
born in Croatia is higher than of those born outside Croatia, which means that the respondents born 
in Croatia are less modern (in terms of national identity) than those who were born outside Croatia. 
But to verify whether this difference is statistically significant, we must perform a T-test. 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Country of birth N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ModernityINDEX Born in Croatia 266 3,1814 ,49928 ,03061 
Born outside Croatia 109 3,0505 ,53983 ,05171 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
ModernityINDEX Equal variances assumed ,995 ,319 2,251 373 ,025 ,13093 ,05815 ,01658 ,24528 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2,179 187,592 ,031 ,13093 ,06009 ,01240 ,24947 
 
 
First we look at the Lavine‘s test to see if the two conditions have about the same or different 
amounts of variability between scores. Since its value is 0,319 (>0,05), the variability in our two 
conditions is not significantly different and therefore we look at the results in the first row (―Equal 
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variances assumed‖). The Sig. (2-tailed) value is 0,025, which means that there is a statistically 
significant difference between our two conditions. More precisely, the difference in mean of 
modernity index between the respondents born in and outside Croatia is statistically different. As 
seen in the group statistics box, the respondents born in Croatia have a higher modernity index than 
those born outside Croatia and therefore are less modern. 
Looking at the below group statistics box, we can see a slight difference in the index of 
traditionalism between the two categories: those born in Croatia have a lower index of 
traditionalism (therefore they are more traditional) than those born outside Croatia.  
 
Group Statistics 
 
Country of birth N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
TraditionalismINDEX Born in Croatia 265 1,62 ,493 ,030 
Born outside Croatia 107 1,75 ,624 ,060 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
TraditionalismNDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
9,408 ,002 -2,181 370 ,030 -,133 ,061 -,254 -,013 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1,976 161,959 ,050 -,133 ,067 -,267 ,000 
 
The Levene‘s test for equality of variances is 0,002 (<0,05), which means that the two variances are 
significantly different. Since the variances are not equal, we read the bottom row (―Equal variances 
not assumed‖). The Sig. (2-tailed) is 0,050 which indicates that the differences between the means 
are not statistically significant. As seen in the descriptive statistic box, the difference in 
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traditionalism index between those born in and outside Croatia is not big enough to be statistically 
significant.  
 
e) Modern and traditional identity vs. membership 
 
 
We have divided the membership in Serbian organizations in Croatia between members and not 
members, and as the following table indicates, the members have a higher modernity index 
(3,3666)
117
 than the not members (2,9407) and are therefore less modern. In order to verify the 
significance of this difference in means, we conduct a T-test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
ModernityINDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
15,251 ,000 8,779 374 ,000 ,42592 ,04851 ,33052 ,52131 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
8,917 361,214 ,000 ,42592 ,04777 ,33198 ,51985 
 
Since the Levene‘s test for equality of variances indicates that Sig. is 0,000 and therefore less than 
0,05, meaning that the two variances are significantly different, we look at the bottom row for the 
                                                 
117
 Since 1 equals ―very important‖, 2 ―moderately important‖, 3 ―little important‖ and 4 equals ―not important‖ at all, 
an index value closer to 4 indicates a very low degree of modernity.   
Group Statistics 
 
Membership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ModernityINDEX Members 178 3,3666 ,39250 ,02942 
Not members 198 2,9407 ,52953 ,03763 
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result. The Sig. (2-tailed) is 0,000 which is lower than 0,05, thus there is a significant difference 
between the two groups (members and not members). We reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternate that the differences of means between the two categories are statistically significant, which 
means that members in Serb organizations in Croatia are less modern than the not members.  
 
Regarding the means indicating the index of traditionalism between the two categories, the box 
below shows that the members have a lower index of traditionalism (1,48) and are therefore more 
traditional than the not members (1,82). Once again the T-test will tell us whether the means are 
significantly different or not. 
 
 
 
Since the Levene‘s test indicates a value less than 0,05, (the two variances are significantly 
different), we look at the bottom row. The Sig.(2-tailed) is 0,000 (<0,05), which confirms the 
Group Statistics 
 
Membership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
TraditionalismINDEX Member 175 1,48 ,408 ,031 
Not member 198 1,82 ,584 ,042 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
TraditionalismINDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
22,516 ,000 -6,461 371 ,000 -,341 ,053 -,445 -,237 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-6,600 352,786 ,000 -,341 ,052 -,443 -,240 
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alternate hypothesis that the means of the two groups are significantly different. Therefore, the 
difference between members and not members in the index of traditionalism is significant. 
 
f) Modern and traditional identity vs. tragic war experience 
 
 
If we look at the below group statistics box, we can see that the group of those respondents who 
experienced a war related tragedy has a higher modernity index (3,2122) of those who didn‘t 
experienced a war tragedy (3,0567), which means that the first group has a less modern national 
identity than the second one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
ModernityINDEX Equal variances assumed 12,169 ,001 2,951 375 ,003 ,15551 ,05270 ,05189 ,25913 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2,908 335,993 ,004 ,15551 ,05348 ,05031 ,26071 
 
Since the Leven‘s test for equality of variances is smaller than 0,05 (0,001), indicating that the two 
variances are significantly different, we look at the results in the second row. The obtained Sig. (2-
Group Statistics 
 
Tragedy N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
ModernityINDEX Yes 205 3,2122 ,46846 ,03272 
No 172 3,0567 ,55480 ,04230 
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tailed) value is 0,004, which confirms that there is a statistically significant difference between our 
two conditions.  
 
The table below shows us that the respondents who experienced a war related tragedy are more 
traditional (1,55) than those who didn‘t experience it (1,78). The T-test will show us whether this 
difference is statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
  
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
TraditionalismNDEX Equal variances 
assumed 
4,244 ,040 -4,263 372 ,000 -,232 ,054 -,339 -,125 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-4,225 345,866 ,000 -,232 ,055 -,340 -,124 
 
 
Since the Sig. in the Levene‘s test is smaller than 0,05 (0,040), indicating that the variability in the 
two conditions is significantly different, we read the result from the bottom row. The obtained Sig. 
(2-tailed) value is 0,000 which indicates a statistically significant difference between our two 
conditions. Therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternate is accepted. 
 
 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Tragedy N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
TraditionalismNDEX Yes 203 1,55 ,498 ,035 
No 171 1,78 ,553 ,042 
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5.3.5 Degree of ethnic tolerance 
 
 
Another set of questions asked to the respondents that were not analyzed in the previous sections, 
are the ones that can be considered as ―ethnic distance‖ questions. Their purpose was to measure the 
closeness or the distance of the individual in relation to another ethnic group, in this case to the 
Croats. The respondents were asked in the last part of the questionnaire to answer whether they 
accept or not the following relations: marriage with a Croat, Croat as friend, Croat as neighbor and 
Croat as employer. They were also asked to justify their negative answer by writing down a reason. 
The following graphs illustrate the respondents‘ attitudes by territories. 
  
Fig. 79 
 
Regarding the acceptance of a Croat as a spouse, most of the respondents (60,2% of total) would 
agree into marrying a Croat, while only in the Area of peaceful reintegration the registered trend is 
different (61,7% within territory won‘t agree into marrying a Croat). The territory with the highest 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
275 
 
percentage of pro marriages with Croats is the city of Zagreb, where 75,9% of the respondents 
would marry a Croat; Istria follows with 74,7% of respondents who would also marry a Croat. The 
War affected area shows a decrease, where only 52,5% would agree into marrying a Croat. The 
least willing to marry a Croat are the respondents of the Area of peaceful reintegration, with only 
38,3% in favour of such a marriage.  
The next graph (See Fig. 80) illustrates the reasons given by the respondents to justify their 
reluctance to accept a Croat as spouse. The most popular reason is ―Because of the differences in 
religious confession” (52,9%), followed by “Because of the difference in nationality” (9,2%) and 
“Negative experience with mixed marriage during the war”(9,2%). These reasons are associated 
with the fear of losing the own‘s religious and national identity, as well as to the fear of repeating a 
mistake that proved to be a negative experience. 
Fig. 80 
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Looking at the next graph (See Fig. 81) illustrating the respondents‘ attitutudes toward accepting a 
Croat as a neighbour, we can see that all the territories expressed the same positive trend (94,5% of 
the total respondents would accept a Croat as a neighbour).  
Zagreb recorded the highest percentage of respondents willing to have Croats as neighbours 
(98,9%), followed by Istria (95,9%), the War affected area (92,1%) and finally the Area of peaceful 
reintegration (91,8%). 
Fig. 81 
 
 
Among the reasons (See Fig. 82) of the few respondents (5,2%) who wouldn‘t accept a Croat as a 
neighbour, only two were given: “Because I don‟t trust them”(83,3%) and “Because they robbed 
us while we were gone” (16,7%). Both the reasons are related to personal negative experience 
suffered during the war.  
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Fig. 82  
 
 
When asked if they would accept a Croat as employer, 94,8% of the respondents answered 
positively. The following graph (See Fig. 83) illustrates the respondents‘ attitudes by territory, and 
we can see that the same positive trend was registered in all four the territories. Zagreb has the 
higher percentage of positive answers, 97,7%, Istria and the Area of peaceful reintegration follow 
with 94,9% both, and finally the War affected area with 92,1%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
278 
 
Fig. 83 
 
 
Among the given reasons for not accepting a Croat as employer (See Fig. 84), the most numerous 
was “Because they (the Croats) would exploit me” (40%), followed by “Because I don‟t trust them 
(the Croats)” (30%). Both are the result of fear and distrust due to negative personal experiences 
(10% claimed to have had “bad experience”), but also a result of prejudice (10% stated that the 
“Croats are born sick”).  
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Fig. 84  
 
 
When asked if they would accept a Croat for a friend, 95,8% of all the respondents answered 
positively. The following graph (See Fig. 85) shows us that all the territories registered the same 
positive trend. Zagreb once again showed the highest percentage of positive answers, 97,7%, 
followed by Istria (96,9%), the Area of peaceful reintegration (94,9%) and the War affected area 
(94,1%). 
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Fig. 85 
 
 
Among the given reasons to jusity their negative answers (See Fig. 86), the respondents mostly 
wrote down “Because I don‟t trust them (the Croats)” (42,9%), while 28,6% of the respondents 
feel that “The Croats hate us”. This reflects a feeling of distrust and even paranoia among those 
respondents who answered negatively to the above question. Answers such as“Because the Croats 
are egoistic” (14,3%) reflect also ethnic prejudice and stereotypes about the members of the other 
ethnic group, while statements such as “If we were friends we wouldn‟t have fought against each 
other”( 14,3%) express the impossibility to be friends due to the war and questions the  credibility 
of past friendships.  
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Fig. 86 
 
 
The variable of ―ethnic tolerance‖ was created by simply summing each answer "yes" that brought 
1 point, or "no" which brought zero points. The variable category of ―ethnic tolerance‖ grouped the 
respondents into categories (―high tolerant‖, ―middle tolerant‖, ―intolerant‖118) and depending on 
the number of points (of affirmative answers) the respondent was "located" in a category. The more 
points result in a higher index of tolerance and consequently in a higher level of tolerance.  
The obtained value of  ethnic tolerance index for the overall sample is 3,40 which is a high value 
indicating that the respondents are highly tolerant. 
The following graph (See Fig. 87) illustrates the distribution of the indexes among the whole 
sample. 
 
                                                 
118
 High tolerant are those with an average score between 3 and 4 points, middle tolerant those with an average between 
1,1 and 2,99, and intolerant those with an average score between 0 to 1 points. 
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Fig. 87 
 
As we can see, 58,5% of the respondents have answered positively to all the questions concerning 
ethnic distance, while 33,3% of the respondents answered positively to three out of four questions. 
 
The following graph will illustrate the obtained indexes per territories (See Fig. 88). The most 
tolerant territory is represented by Zagreb, whose index of ethnic tolerance is 3,61, followed by 
Istria (3,55) and the War affected area (3,30). The least tolerant territory is represented by the Area 
of peaceful reintegration (3,16). 
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Fig. 88 
 
 
The following bar chart illustrates the index of ethnic tolerance by degrees (See Fig. 89) on the 
overall sample. The vast majority of the respondents, 91,8%, are considered to be high tolerant 
(because their calculated index was between 3 and 4 points). 
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Fig. 89 
 
 
 
 
The following bar chart (See Fig. 90) illustrates the levels of ethnic tolerance by territories. We can 
see that all the territories are predominantly highly tolerant, with Zagreb showing the highest 
percentage (95,6%). Istria follows with 93% of high tolerant respondents, but also with the highest 
percentage of intolerant respondents (7%). The War affected area has 91,1% of high tolerant 
respondents, while the Area of peaceful reintegration has the lowest percentage of high tolerant 
(87,9%) and the highest of middle tolerant (7,1%).  
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Fig. 90 
 
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
This section will synthetize and explain the so far obtained results. It will begin with a general 
statistical overview, followed by the results of the focus group and ending with the verification of 
the hypotheses and the research questions. The last section (―Further interpretations‖) will explore 
and explain relevant or interesting results that emerged from the analysis of the data, but are not 
directly the theme of the research.   
First a presentation of the most significant statistical results that represent the respondents‘ 
characteristics and attitudes will follow, both on a general and on a territorial level.  Then the results 
of the correlation between variables will be presented, in order to find out what influences some of 
the respondents‘ attitudes.  
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As already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the gender was equally divided among all the 
territories, whereas we find 50% of men and 50% of women in each territory and in the overall 
calculation. Since the category of gender wasn‘t considered as an influential factor in the studied 
phenomenon, it was excluded from further analysis.   
 It was intended to include in this research as many age groups as possible, and therefore, as we 
have seen, the respondents were divided into 6 age categories: 18-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70 
and 70+. The most represented age category among the total number of respondents was the one 
between 18 and 30 (24,1%), which was also the most numerous one in three territories: Zagreb 
(27%), the War affected area (22,4%) and the Area of peaceful reintegration (33,7%). We can say 
that the youngest territory is the Area of peaceful reintegration, where 1/3 of the respondents are 
aged under 30. Istria can be considered as the oldest territory, since 25% of its respondents are aged 
between 51 and 60. 
Regarding the level of education, most of the respondents have a secondary school degree (44,5%), 
while only 2,8% of the respondents have whether a Mr.Sc. or a PhD degree. This trend was 
registered in three territories, while in the War affected area most of the respondents have an 
elementary school degree (44,6%), but also the highest percentage of Mr.Sc. or PhD‘s (4%) was 
registered in this territory. The territory with the highest percentage of respondents without a degree 
is the Area of peaceful reintegration (15,3%), while Zagreb has the highest percentage of university 
graduates (30%). 
Regarding the country of birth of the respondents, most of them (71,2%) were born in Croatia, 
followed by 18,1% of people born in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 7,8% born in Serbia. Istria 
recorded the highest percentage of respondents born in Serbia (17,3%) and BiH (28,6%), which is 
connected to the fact that Serbs living in Istria are mainly immigrates. The remaining three 
territories followed the general registered trend (mostly born in Croatia, little percentage of born in 
BiH and very low percentage of born in Serbia). Only the Area of peaceful reintegration registered 
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a similar trend to the one noted in Istria: 9,2% of its respondents were born in Serbia and 14,3% in 
BiH. 
Regarding membership in Serbian organizations in Croatia, 53,1% of the respondents declared not 
to be members, 27,1% are active members and 19,8% are only formal members. Zagreb has the 
highest percentage of active members (41,1%), while Istria has the highest percentage of not 
members (64,3%), followed by the War affected area (61,4%). The Area of peaceful reintegration 
follows the trend of Zagreb with 29,3% of active members. According to this, the respondents are 
moderately familiar (38,1%) with Serb organizations in Croatia, while Istria has the highest 
percentage of those who have little familiarity (37,4%). 
Concerning tragic war experience, 54% of all the respondents claimed to have suffered a war 
related tragedy. The highest percentage was registered in the War affected area, where 92,1% of the 
respondents experienced a war tragedy. Zagreb follows the trend with 57,8% of respondents with a 
tragic war experience, which is due to the fact that Zagreb is largely inhabited  by people who 
escaped from the ongoing conflicts. Istria recorded the highest percentage of respondents who 
didn‘t experience any war related tragedy (69,7%), followed by the Area of peaceful reintegration 
(64,6%). 
One of the most important data gathered in this research is the national self-identification of the 
respondents, i.e. how the Serbs in Croatia nationally identify themselves. The respondents were 
given the possibility to choose between four given categories (―Serb‖, ―Croatian Serb‖, ―Croat‖ 
―Other‖). Most of the respondents think of themselves as ―Serbs‖ (62,5%), while a significant 
percentage of them identify rather as ―Croatian Serbs‖ (34,4%). The War affected area registered 
the highest percentage of ―Serbs‖ (75,2%), while Zagreb registered the lowest percentage (39,3%), 
rather opting for the category of ―Croatian Serbs‖ (56,2%). The trend registered in Istria (60% of 
―Serbs‖ and 40% of ―Croatian Serbs‖) is more similar to the trend in the War affected area (75,2% 
of ―Serbs‖ and 24,8% of ―Croatian Serbs‖) rather than the one registered in the Area of peaceful 
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reintegration (73,2% of ―Serbs‖, 18,6% of ―Croatian Serbs‖ and 1 % of ―Others‖). It can be 
concluded that the Serbs from Istria still keep alive the national consciousness brought from their 
country of birth (Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina), or the ones of their parents. 
Religion is also an important aspect of one‘s identity, especially in the countries that emerged from 
the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia where religious confession is one of the main differentiating traits 
between a population who share similar characteristic (language, mentality, etc.).  Although Serbs 
are known for being exclusively of Christian Orthodox faith, opposite to the Catholic Croats, this 
important aspect of identity couldn‘t be just a priori assumed. The majority of the respondents 
(89,4%) indicated to be of Christian Orthodox faith, while 8,8% are Atheists and only 1,3% claimed 
to be Catholics. The most Orthodox territory resulted to be the War affected area, where 98% of the 
respondents are or Christian Orthodox faith. Zagreb has the highest percentage of Catholics (3,3%) 
and Atheists (15,6%) 
The majority of the respondents (45,9%) find that religion is very important to them, only the 
respondents from Zagreb find it mostly moderately important (41,6%).  
The results concerning the importance of the Serbian Orthodox Church as preserver of Serb national 
identity in Croatia follows the noted religious trend, whereas 50,5% of the respondents find it very 
important. Once again, Zagreb is the only exception with the majority (43,3%) of respondents who 
find it moderately important, rather than very important like the other territories. Zagreb proved to 
be the least religious territory, while the War affected area is the most religious one.  
Most of the respondents (59,9%) feel a sense of belonging to Serbia because it is their country of 
origin (68,2%). The Area of peaceful reintegration registered the highest percentage of respondents 
with a sense of belonging to Serbia (70,7%). Only Zagreb showed a different trend, where the 
majority of the respondents claimed not to have any sense of belonging to Serbia (61,8%) mostly 
because they feel that Serbia is not their homeland (33,3%).  
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A little less than half of the respondents spent a longer period of time in Serbia (43,5%), mostly 
because of exile (60,5%). So it is not surprising that the territory with the highest percentage of 
respondents who spent a longer period of time in Serbia is the War affected area (71,3%). However, 
the percentage of respondents with Serbian citizenship is quiet low (only 23,6% have it), regardless 
of the territorial distribution.  
On the other hand, the emotional attachment toward Serbian state symbols is very high (39,5% of 
the respondents find it very strong). But this time Zagreb is not the only exception (33,3% opted for 
moderately strong), the War affected area also showed a different trend (38,6% also opted for 
moderately strong). The Area of peaceful reintegration recorded the highest percentage of 
respondents with a very strong emotional attachment toward Serbian state symbols (51,5%), 
followed by Istria (with 43,3%). 
The opposite trend was registered regarding the emotional attachment to Croatian state symbols, 
regarding to which the majority of the respondents (41,2%) don‘t feel any attachment at all. 
However the respondents from Istria and Zagreb mostly feel a little emotional attachment 
(respectively 43,3% and 43,8%). Istria also registered the highest percentage of those respondents 
with a very strong emotional attachment (9,3%), while the Area of peaceful reintegration registered 
the highest percentage of those with a very strong emotional attachment (58,6%), followed by the 
War affected area (57,4%). 
Regarding their language identity, most of the respondents indicated that they speak the Serbo-
Croatian language (66,8%), rather than Croatian (16,5%) or Serbian (14,9%), although Serbo-
Croatian is no more in official use.  Serbo-Croatian is mostly spoken in the War affected area 
(84,5%),  while Croatian is mostly used in Zagreb (27,8%) and Serbian is spoken the most in the 
Area of peaceful reintegration (38,1%). 
The two pronunciations used in Serbo-Croatian are the main distinctive traits between the Serbian 
and Croatian language: the Ijekavian and the regionally confined Ikavian are exclusively used in the 
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Croatian language; while the Ekavian is used by the official Serbian language in Serbia (Serbs from 
Bosnia use the Ijekavian, as well as the Montenegrins). The Serbs in Croatia mainly use the 
Ijekavian pronunciation (79,6%), with the only exception of the Area of peaceful reintegration 
where most of the respondents use the Ekavian (60,9%). The Ikavian is mostly spoken in Istria 
(2%). 
In addition to Serbo-Croatian and the Ijekavian pronunciation, the Serbs of Croatia also use both the 
Latin and the Cyrillic script (63%), rather than only the Latin script (34,6%) or the Cyrillic one 
(2,3%). Only in Istria the respondents prefer to use only the Latin script (54,1%). The highest 
percentage of Cyrillic users was registered in the Area of peaceful reintegration (6,1%). 
The Serbs in Croatia find very important the role of Serbian language and Cyrillic script as 
preservers of their national identity (70,6%), regardless of the territorial distribution. They also feel 
that Serbian culture in Croatia is very important (74%), equally in all the territories.   
The respondents also found very important all the ethnic aspects of their identity, such as Serbian 
national myths and epic (53,4%), Serbian tradition and customs (81,6%) and Serb history in Croatia 
(68,5%). However they didn‘t show a high degree of familiarity with the basis of their social rights 
in Croatia, i.e. the Serbian traditional privileged status as frontiersmen, whereas most of the 
respondents indicated a moderate degree of familiarity with the notion (34%). Although most of the 
territories showed a similar trend, Zagreb represents an exception regarding the importance of 
Serbian national myths and epic since most of its respondents rather found it moderately important 
(44,9%), while on the other hand, its respondents were the best informed regarding the Serbian 
traditional privileged status in Croatia when compared to the other territories (27,8% claimed to be 
very familiar with the notion).  
Respondents resulted to be much more informed about a more recent historical role played by the 
Serbs, i.e. their contribution in the anti-fascist movement in Croatia that provided them Constitution 
equality with the Croats, whereas most of the respondents (69,4%) indicated to be familiar with this 
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notion. This is mainly due to the education system that during socialist Yugoslavia propagated the 
importance of the antifascist movement and the Partisans (54,8% of the respondents indicated that 
they learned about it in school). The respondents from Zagreb proved to have most familiarity with 
it (84,4%), while the Area of peaceful reintegration showed the be the least familiar with the 
Serbian role in the antifascist movement in Croatia (44,3%).  
A sense of discrimination of the Serb minority in Croatia since 1991 is the main attitude registered 
among the respondents (91,5%), mostly in all the territories but almost absolutely in the War 
affected area (98%). The main reason for such an attitude is mostly because due to the unequal or 
inconsistent application of laws (36%). As a consequence, most of the respondents feel that Serbs 
should be granted again the status of Constitutive people in Croatia (86,6%) because of the 
historical continuum of their status, i.e. Serbs have always been Constitutive people in Croatia 
(23,6%). Respondents from Istria mostly feel that Serbs should be granted again the Constitutive 
status because they have been living for a long time in these territories (26,8%), while most of the 
respondents from the War affected area think that Serbs deserve it since it‘s their right (26,2%). 
Among those who feel that Serbs shouldn‘t be granted again the Constitutive status in Croatia 
(13,4%), mostly think that currently there are too few Serbs in Croatia (42,9%), with the exception 
of Istria where the respondents are indecisive between three main reasons:  ―It is not important to 
secure rights in this way‖ (33,3%), ―In order not to cause war‖ (33,3%) and ―It wouldn‘t be any 
better‖ (33,3%). 
After a statistical overview of all the respondents‘ characteristics and attitudes was obtained, it was 
possible to correlate some of the variables in order to find out the associations between them.  
One of the most important variables is national self-identification, which was correlated with age, 
level of education, tragic war experience, membership in Serb organizations, country of birth, 
religious confession and longer period of stay in Serbia. The obtained results showed that the 
youngest population aged between 18 and 30 mostly identify themselves as ―Serbs‖ (25,6% within 
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nationality) while the oldest population 70+ showed the highest percentage of Serbs within age 
category (79,2%). The category of Croatian Serbs was mostly chosen by the respondents aged 51-
60 (26,4% within nationality). Although the category of Serbs was mostly chosen by all the age 
categories, it has been noted that the youngest and the oldest population have the tendency to self-
identify as Serbs to a greater extent than the middle aged respondents (41-50 and 50-60) who 
expressed high percentages of Croatian Serbs. However, the Phi correlation and Cramer‘s V used to 
measure the strength of association between national self-identification and age category showed a 
very weak association between the two variables.  
Regarding the association between national self-identification and level of education, it was 
recorded that the number of self-declared ―Serbs‖ decreases with the increase of the level of 
education, which indicates a tendency of people with lower educational degree to self-identify as 
―Serbs‖, while the number of ―Croatian Serbs‖ increases with the level of education. The only 
exception is the category of M.Sc. and PhD where a different tendency was registered: 72,7% 
within level of education have identified as ―Serbs‖ rather than ―Croatian Serbs‖ (27,3% within 
level of education). However, the Phi coefficient and the Cramer‘s V measured a weak association 
between the two variables. 
When national self-identification was correlated with tragic war experience, it showed that Serbs 
are almost equally distributed in both the categories of positive and negative tragic experience 
(51,2% and 48,8% within category), while the Croatian Serbs are more numerous among the 
respondents who experienced a war related tragedy (61,4% within category), but the Croats are 
most numerous among the respondents who didn‘t experience a war tragedy (88,9% within 
category). The Phi coefficient indicated a low negative value which shows little association but 
since the coefficient is negative it also means that those who are lower on one variable are more 
likely to be higher on the other variable. 
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Although all the national categories proved to be slightly more numerous among the not members, 
the Serbs resulted to be the most numerous category among the members (61,9% within 
membership). The obtained Phi coefficient was once again very low and negative, indicating a very 
weak association between national self-identification and membership in Serbian organizations in 
Croatia, as well as a negative coefficient meaning that those who are lower on one variable are more 
likely to be higher on the other variable. 
The correlation with religious confession measured with a Chi-square test also showed no 
association due to the fact that both the national categories of ―Serbs‖ and ―Croatian Serbs‖ are 
predominantly of the same religious confession. Therefore it can‘t be claimed that national self-
identification is influenced by religious confession and vice versa. The only useful obtained data is 
that Serbs are Christian Orthodox to a greater extent than Croatian Serbs (94.2% of the Orthodox 
Christians declared themselves as Serbs, and 86.8% as Croatian Serbs), who are more numerous in 
the category of Atheists (5.8% of Atheists are Serbs, while 13.2% of them declared as Croatian 
Serbs). 
The only valuable that measured an association was between national self-identification and country 
of birth, which confirmed that the fact that most the of the declared Serbs (63,6% of total) were 
born in Serbia (92,3% within category) and most of the declared Croatian Serbs (87,9% within 
category) were born in Croatia, was recorded to such an extent to be statistically significant.  
Not even a longer period of stay in Serbia influenced the national self-identification, since the Chi 
Square test shows no significant differences between the two categories, although the contingency 
table indicated that Serbs spent a longer period of time to a greater extent than Croatian Serbs.  
Since national self-identification was independent from all the variables it was correlated with, the 
initial assumption that it was a dependent variable influenced by something concretely more 
measurable than the individual‘s personal choice, it must be concluded that national self-
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identification must be treated rather as an independent variable. Thus, ethnic and national belonging 
is voluntary, mutable, and a reflection of belief, rather than based on tangible facts. 
 
A further analysis of the respondents who feel a sense of discrimination since Serbs became a 
national minority in 1991, showed that the youngest generation (18-30) who was not even born 
when Serbs had the status of constitutive people is the most numerous (86,9% within age category) 
in feeling a sense of discrimination of the own minority group. It was also registered that the 
respondents with a higher level of education feel a sense of discrimination in contrast to those who 
don‘t, as well none of the respondents with a M.Sc. or PhD feels that there is no discrimination. 
Additionally, most of the respondents with a tragic war experience feel discriminated to a larger 
extent than those who didn‘t have such an experience, although this doesn‘t confirm that the sense 
of discrimination is influenced by personal war related tragedy. Furthermore, it was noted no 
difference and therefore no association between members and not members regarding the feeling of 
discrimination, since both the categories mostly feel discriminated; however, not members tend to 
feel not discriminated to a larger extent than members.   
The analysis of the characteristics of the respondents, who would grant constitutive status to the 
Serbs in Croatia, showed that the respondents aged 70+ are the most numerous within age category 
among those who would grant Serbs constitutive status while those aged 18-30 are the most 
numerous within the other category to its predominance in the overall number of respondents. It 
was also registered that the percentage of those respondents who think that Serbs should be granted 
constitutive status decreases proportionally with their level of education: the less educated they are, 
the more they think that Serbs should be granted constitutive status and vice versa. Moreover, the 
number of the respondents who experienced a war tragedy is higher than the number of those who 
didn‘t experience a war correlated tragedy in both of the categories; as well it was noted a 
preponderance of the respondents who suffered a tragic war experience to opt for the positive grant 
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of constitutive status to Serbs in Croatia. The equal distribution of members and not members in 
Serb organizations who feel that Serbs should be granted constitutive status in Croatia shows that 
membership in a Serb organization doesn‘t influence the opinion of those who believe that Serbs 
should be granted constitutive status. 
The respondents who mostly feel a sense of belonging to Serbia are the most elderly ones (61-70 
and 70+) who registered the highest percentages within age category, while the youngest age 
category (18-30) registered the lowest percentage within age category but the highest percentage 
within sense of belonging due to the numerical predominance of the age category 18-30. Regarding 
the level of education of the respondents, it has been noticed that the percentage of those who feel a 
sense of belonging decreases with the increase of the level of education, with the only exception of 
the category of Mr. SC. or PhD where an additional increase has been recorded. Moreover, the 
positive sense of belonging to Serbia is slightly higher among those respondents who experienced a 
tragic war experience. Regarding membership in Serb organizations and sense of belonging to 
Serbia, it was noted that the percentage of those who don‘t feel any sense of belonging to Serbia is 
higher among the not members. Finally, the result of the Chi Square test showed there is a 
significant association between the sense of belonging to Serbia and the longer period spent in 
Serbia, whereas most of the respondents who stayed in Serbia for a longer period of time feel a 
sense of belonging to Serbia to a greater extent than those who didn‘t spend any time in Serbia. 
Regarding the analysis of the respondents in possession of Serbian citizenship, it turned out that the 
respondents aged between 31 and 40 represent the highest percentage of those in possession of 
Serbian citizenship. Concerning the level of education of the respondents, the highest percentage 
within category in possession of Serbian citizenship has been registered among the highest levels of 
education. Tragic war experience also didn‘t seem to have any influence whatsoever on the 
possession of Serbian citizenship since it was registered the same numerical distribution of cases 
who suffered a war related tragedy as well of those who didn‘t. Regarding the association between 
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membership in Serb organizations and possession of Serbian citizenship, it has been noticed a 
slighter predominance of members who possess Serbian citizenship over the not members.  
Another interesting aspect measured in this research is the degree of traditionalism and modernity 
of the respondents regarding their national identity. The indexes were created by calculating the 
averages for each respondent obtained from their answer (the number of each answer) on specific 
variables: on "traditional" variables for the index of traditionalism, and on "modern" ones for the 
index of modernity. The smaller the value (because 1 = "very"), the greater the intensity of 
traditionalism. The obtained value of the calculated index of traditionalism for the whole sample is 
1,6578,  which indicates a very high degree of traditionalism among the respondents (being 1 the 
highest value and 4 the lowest). The War affected area has the highest index of traditionalism (1,56) 
which makes it the most traditional territory in terms of national identity, while Istria is the least 
traditional territory (1,77). The most prevailing element of Serb national identity in Croatia is the 
importance of Serbian customs and tradition (1,23), while the least ―traditional‖ element seems to 
be Serbian privileged status in Croatia (2,414) due to the scarce familiarity shown by the 
respondents about this aspect.  
The obtained average for the modernity index is 3,1412 which represents a low degree of modernity 
among the respondents (being 1 the highest value and 4 the lowest). The Area of peaceful 
reintegration proved to be the least modern (3,26) among the studied territories, while the most 
modern territory is Istria (3,02). The most dominant aspect within the modernity index is the 
importance of Serb organizations in Croatia (2,782). . Due to the fact that the value for the 
importance of Serbian culture in Croatia was reversed because its higher value represents rather a 
traditional aspect than a modern one, it proved to be the least modern element (3,684).  
A correlation was done between the index of traditionalism and the index of modernity by using the 
Pearson‘s Correlation, which resulted to be high, negative and significant, meaning that the 
variables are related and that the correlation between the two variables is statistically significant. 
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The obtained negative correlation indicates that increases or decreases in one variable do 
significantly relate to increases or decreases in our second variable. This means that the more 
traditional the respondents are, the least modern they are, and vice versa.  
In order to verify which categories of respondents are more modern and which are rather more 
traditional, the obtained indexes were correlated with some of the categories by using the T-test or 
the ANOVA. The results showed that Serbs are less modern than Croatian Serbs and vice versa and 
the obtained value by the T-test confirmed that the difference in modernity between Serbs and 
Croatian Serbs is significant enough to be applied to the whole population. The Serbs also resulted 
to be significantly more traditional than the Croatian Serbs. 
Some minor difference were noted among the age categories of the respondents, where the 
respondents aged 18-30 are the most modern (3,0972), while the respondents aged 31-40 are the 
least modern (3,2210) in terms of national identity, while the age category 61-70 has the least index 
of traditionalism (1,54) and the age category 18-30 has the highest index of traditionalism (1,79). 
However, the results obtained by the ANOVA test showed no statistically significant differences 
between the groups, and therefore there is no difference in the means of modernity and 
traditionalism index with the age categories of the respondents. 
The One-way ANOVA also showed that there are significant differences in modernity index 
between the levels of education. A post-hoc Tukey test showed that the most significant difference 
in modernity index is between the respondents with an elementary school degree and those with a 
Mr.Sc. or PhD, being the respondents with an elementary degree are more modern than those with a 
Mr.Sc. or PhD degree. Additionally, the group of respondents with a Mr.Sc. or PhD have the 
highest index of traditionalism (1,45), while those with a Bacc. or MA degree have the lowest index 
(1,69), but since the assumption of homogeneity of variance hasn‘t be met the ANOVA showed that 
the differences between the groups are not statistically significant. 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
298 
 
The T-test also showed that the difference in mean of modernity index between the respondents 
born in and outside Croatia is statistically different. The respondents born in Croatia have a higher 
modernity index than those born outside Croatia and are therefore less modern. Regarding the index 
of traditionalism, those born in Croatia have a slightly lower index of traditionalism (therefore they 
are more traditional) than those born outside Croatia, but the difference of means between the two 
categories is not big enough to be statistically significant. 
The difference between members and not members in Serb organizations in Croatia also proved to 
be statistically significant. The T-test confirmed that the members have a higher modernity index 
(3,3666) and are therefore less modern, than the not members (2,9407). The members have also a 
lower index of traditionalism (1,48) and are therefore more traditional than the not members (1,82). 
The T-test confirmed that the means of the two groups are significantly different. 
Finally, the group of respondents who experienced a war related tragedy has a higher modernity 
index (3,2122) of those who didn‘t experienced a war tragedy (3,0567), which means that the first 
group has a less modern national identity than the second one. The T-test confirmed that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the two conditions. Moreover, the respondents who 
experienced a war related tragedy are more traditional (1,55) than those who didn‘t experience it 
(1,78). The obtained value from the T-test shows that the difference between the two groups is 
statistically significant. 
A further aspect concerning the Serbs in Croatia that was measured in this research is the degree of 
closeness or distance of the individual in relation to another ethnic group, in this case to the Croats. 
The last section of the questionnaire measures the degree of respondents‘ acceptance of the 
following relations: marriage with a Croat, Croat as friend, Croat as neighbor and Croat as 
employer. 
The variable of ―ethnic tolerance‖ was created by simply summing each answer "yes" that brought 
1 point or "no" which brought zero points. The variable category of ―ethnic tolerance‖ grouped the 
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respondents into categories (―high tolerant‖, ―middle tolerant‖, ―intolerant‖) and depending on the 
number of points (of affirmative answers) the respondent was "located" in a category. The more 
points result in a higher index of tolerance and consequently in a higher level of tolerance. The 
obtained value of ethnic tolerance index for the overall sample is 3,40 which is a high value 
indicating that the respondents are highly tolerant. The most tolerant territory is represented by 
Zagreb, whose index of ethnic tolerance is 3,61, followed by Istria (3,55) and the War affected area 
(3,30). The least tolerant territory is represented by the Area of peaceful reintegration (3,16). 
The vast majority of the respondents, 91,8%, are considered to be high tolerant. Zagreb showed the 
highest percentage of high tolerant respondents (95,6%),  Istria follows with 93% of high tolerant 
respondents, but also with the highest percentage of intolerant respondents (7%). The War affected 
area has 91,1% of high tolerant respondents, while the Area of peaceful reintegration has the lowest 
percentage of high tolerant (87,9%) and the highest of middle tolerant (7,1%). 
Looking at the attitudes expressed by the respondents regarding the acceptance of different degrees 
of relations with Croats, it was registered that most of the respondents (60,2% of total) would agree 
into marrying a Croat, while only in the Area of peaceful reintegration the registered trend is 
different (61,7% within territory won‘t agree into marrying a Croat). The territory with the highest 
percentage of pro marriages with Croats is the city of Zagreb, where 75,9% of the respondents 
would marry a Croat; Istria follows with 74,7% of respondents who would also marry a Croat. The 
War affected area shows a decrease, where only 52,5% would agree into marrying a Croat. The 
least willing to marry a Croat are the respondents of the Area of peaceful reintegration, with only 
38,3% in favour of such a marriage. The respondents‘ most popular reason for justifying their 
reluctance to marry a Croat is ―Because of the differences in religious confession‖ (52,9%), which 
confirms to the previously registered high degree of individual importance given by the 
respondents‘ to their religious confession.    
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The respondents‘ attitudes toward accepting a Croat as a neighbour showed a much higher 
willingness to accept such a relation (94,5%). Zagreb recorded the highest percentage of 
respondents willing to have Croats as neighbours (98,9%), followed by Istria (95,9%), the War 
affected area (92,1%) and finally the Area of peaceful reintegration (91,8%). Among the reasons of 
the few respondents (5,2%) who wouldn‘t accept a Croat as a neighbour, only two were given: 
―Because I don‘t trust them‖(83,3%) and ―Because they robbed us while we were gone‖ (16,7%). 
Both the reasons are related to personal negative experience suffered during the war. 
When asked if they would accept a Croat as employer, 94,8% of the respondents answered 
positively. Zagreb has the higher percentage of positive answers, 97,7%, Istria and the Area of 
peaceful reintegration follow with 94,9% both, and finally the War affected area with 92,1%. 
Among the given reasons for not accepting a Croat as employer, the most numerous was ―Because 
they (the Croats) would exploit me‖ (40%), followed by ―Because I don‘t trust them (the Croats)‖ 
(30%). Both are the result of fear and distrust due to negative personal experiences (10% claimed to 
have had ―bad experience‖), but also a result of prejudice (10% stated that the ―Croats are born 
sick‖). 
When asked if they would accept a Croat for a friend, 95,8% of all the respondents answered 
positively. Zagreb once again showed the highest percentage of positive answers, 97,7%, followed 
by Istria (96,9%), the Area of peaceful reintegration (94,9%) and the War affected area (94,1%). 
Among the given reasons to justify their negative answers, the respondents mostly wrote down 
―Because I don‘t trust them (the Croats)‖ (42,9%), while 28,6% of the respondents feel that ―The 
Croats hate us‖. This reflects a feeling of distrust and even paranoia among those respondents who 
answered negatively to the above question. Answers such as ―Because the Croats are egoistic‖ 
(14,3%) reflect also ethnic prejudice and stereotypes about the members of the other ethnic group, 
while statements such as ―If we were friends we wouldn‘t have fought against each other‖( 14,3%) 
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express the impossibility to be friends due to the war and questions the  credibility of past 
friendships. 
In conclusion it can be said that Serbs are more willing into accepting the dominant ethnic group, 
the Croats, in less intimate social interactions such as employers, neighbours and friends. But they 
tend to accept Croats as spouses to a much lesser extent, mostly for being afraid of losing their 
national and religious identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.1 Focus group 
 
 
It is well known that group discussion produces data and insights that would be less accessible 
without interaction found in a group setting—listening to others‘ verbalized experiences stimulates 
memories, ideas, and experiences in participants. Therefore, a focus group made of representative 
individuals for the theme of the research has been organized. Observing the interaction and the 
attitudes of individuals regarding the topic of the research will offer a deeper insight on the treated 
subject. The obtained information will be helpful for better understanding the theme in general, and 
to confirm the results obtained with the quantitative tools.  
The group was formed by 15 people, all ethnic Serbs from Croatia, coming from different 
backgrounds. The participants already knew each other, which helped to create a relaxed and 
intimate atmosphere where they could freely express their individual thoughts on a given topic. The 
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group had 7 women and 8 men, aged from 22 to 40 years old, mostly with a high level of education 
(Bachelor‘s or Master‘s degree), and all are members of a Serbian organization in Croatia.  
Although the sample of the quantitative research was broader and it included people from different 
backgrounds, starting from the premise that people with a higher level of education and active 
involvement in Serb organizations will be more willing to freely discuss about their national 
identity, it was decided to include in the focus group only people with such characteristics.  
The participants have been introduced with the topic of the discussion by presenting them a copy of 
the questionnaire used in the quantitative research. They were incited to fill out the questionnaire, 
but it wasn‘t mandatory. The purpose was that the participants get acquainted with the theme of the 
discussion and have some time to think about what they will say.    
The group had one moderator who directed the discussion on the right path and made sure that all 
the participants interacted, while one observer was recording (by camera) the whole discussion in 
order to analyze later all the non – verbal communication and group dynamics that could have been 
easily unnoticed. The discussion lasted 105 minutes, with a 15 minutes coffee break in between.  
The participants were first given an introduction about the theme of the discussion and were 
explained about the general rules of behavior. After the participants got acquainted with the theme 
of the discussion, they were motivated to answer the questions of the following topics: 
1) National self-identification 
How would you describe your national identity? How do you self-identify nationally? When did 
you start thinking about your national identity? How important is nationality to you? Does a 
national affiliation imply also a religious affiliation? 
2) Religion 
 How important is religion in your self-identification? Is it more important than national self-
identification? How do you feel about the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church as keeper of Serb 
national identity in Croatia?  
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4) Language 
Which language do you speak? Which pronunciation do you use? How important are language and 
scrip in preserving Serbian identity? 
5) Ethnic aspects of national identity 
What do you think are the ethnic aspects of Serb national identity in Croatia? How important are for 
you the ethnic aspects of Serb national identity such as tradition, history, national myths, language 
and script, etc.?  What do you find to be the most important element of Serbian ethnic identity in 
Croatia?  
 
6) Civic aspects of national identity 
Do you feel a sense of belonging to Serbia? How strong is your emotional attachment to Serbian 
and Croatian state symbols? Do you possess Serbian citizenship? What do you think are the modern 
aspects of Serb national identity in Croatia?  
7) Serb legal status in Croatia 
How familiar are you with the Serb privileged status in Croatia? Do you feel discriminated since the 
loss of the constitutive status? Do you think Serbs should be granted the constitutive status again? 
Explain why.  
8) Ethnic tolerance 
Would you agree into marrying a Croat? Explain why not. Would you agree to have a Croat as a 
friend/neighbor/employer? Explain why not.  
 
These were the main topics covered in the focus group, whose purpose was to obtain new 
information that would confirm the results obtained from the quantitative research. Even 
disagreement with the so far obtained results would give additional useful information about the 
research theme. The participants‘ most frequent and interesting responses will be cited in the 
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following text and will be treated as units of information (data) that will later become the basis for 
defining categories, in order to create a pattern of findings.  
 
National identity can be taken to mean affiliation to a nation and as such is subjective and self-
perceived. The concept of national identity should be treated as separate from both citizenship – 
which involves bureaucratic or legal statuses – and ethnicity. Although these concepts may be 
strongly associated, citizenship and ethnicity are not necessary conditions for holding a particular 
national identity. 
The discussion held in the focus group revealed similar interpretations of the term ―national 
identity‖ by the participants. Most equated it with their nationality, differently from their citizenship 
and country of birth, and some expressed only the ethnical understanding of belonging to a nation. 
However, they all identify mostly as Serbs, while only a smaller part as Croatian Serbs. The most 
frequent answers were the following: 
“I closely associate national identity with my nationality. National identity that‟s my nationality, 
that‟s how I see it.” 
“Being a Serb is both my national identity and my nationality; I see no difference between the two 
concepts.” 
“I was born in Croatia and I am a Croatian citizen, but my nationality is Serb because this is just 
who I am.” 
“Nationality should be the same as citizenship, which makes me a Croat, but my national identity is 
Serb, therefore I am a Croatian Serb.” 
“I am a Serb because I speak Serbian, I use the Cyrillic, I am of Orthodox faith, my ancestors came 
from Serbia, my family and I have the “Slava” and we cherish Serbian traditions. I think that this is 
all part of my national identity, but mostly I think that national identity is associated with 
nationality.” 
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Most of the participants started to think about their national identity during the war in ex-
Yugoslavia, especially from its beginning. Prior to the war, the participants were too young to care 
about such things, but the circumstances made them realize that it was something unavoidable and 
that they had to learn about their nationality and accept it. This indicates that the consciousness of 
one‘s nationality is built by a mere sequence of social and political events and very often by a 
mistaken usage of the term ―nation‖ by the political elite and without a clear effort to build an 
attitude toward the nation through a developed social strategy. On the other hand, this fact may 
point to the dominance of a situational formation of national awareness in this region, precisely 
because the events that originated in the last decades were so intense and related to national issues, 
as it is almost impossible to talk and think about the nation out of this context. 
“Before the war, I knew my family was of Serb heritage, but I really didn‟t care, as none of my 
friends did. I didn‟t know whether my friends or neighbors were Serbs or Croats, it was something 
nobody talked and cared about.” 
“When the first interethnic incidents started to take place in Croatia, at once nationality became a 
matter of death or life.” 
“I realized that my family and I were Serbs when people started to harass us and call us bad names 
such as “Chetniks”.  
“I have a typical Serbian name and last name which made it impossible for my family and me to try 
to hide our nationality, while other Serbs with less obvious names hid their real origin in order to 
avoid harassment.” 
“Before the war I only knew that my family and I had different religious costumes from some of the 
kids I went to school with. But I never knew it was a matter of nationality, I realized it was just 
religious affiliation. When the war broke out I learned that my family was of Serb heritage, mainly 
because of our religion.” 
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Most of the participants agreed that nationality is an important aspect of their identity, but it 
shouldn‘t be given the importance and significance it carries in ex-Yugoslavia, because it is mainly 
a mean of discrimination and it raises ethnic intolerance.  
“To me nationality is very important because it defines me, is something I was born with and can‟t 
escape from. It is part of my identity and it tells me who I am and where I come from.” 
“I think nationality is important especially for minority groups because it keeps alive the national 
consciousness and allows them to exist. Otherwise, they would be assimilated and lose their 
identity. This is why we, Serbs, must keep alive our name and our identity, in order not to 
disappear.” 
“Nationality shouldn‟t be important, but unfortunately here in ex-Yugoslavia it still is a major trait 
of distinction and discrimination. Only here (in ex-Yugoslavia) you are asked about your 
nationality in every public institution, being a citizen is still not enough.” 
“I think that nationality shouldn‟t matter, it is just a minor part of who we are. We should be judged 
based on how good or bad we are, not from our nationality.” 
 
The participants expressed a high connection between national identity and religion, almost as 
indissoluble. According to the participants, Serbian national identity and Christian Orthodoxy are so 
deeply related that one implies the other (but not vice versa, since not all the Orthodox Christians 
are Serbs). 
“I am a Serb and obviously I am a Christian Orthodox.” 
“All Serbs are Orthodox, it can‟t be otherwise.” 
“We are Serbs and therefore we are Orthodox.” 
“Being Christian Orthodox is just who we (the Serbs) are, is an essential part of our heritage.” 
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“The Serbs were able to preserve their national identity thanks to their religion which kept alive the 
memory of the Serbian nation even outside its borders. Therefore, religion and particularly 
Orthodox Christianity must be considered as an inseparable part of Serbian identity.” 
“Religion is what defines us Serbs and differentiates us from the others, especially the Croats.” 
 
When asked about the importance of religion in their identity, the participants agreed that religion is 
very important and religious affiliation is even more important than belonging to a nation. Religion 
is recognized as a necessity to believe in something, but also as a mean of preserving values and 
tradition. The religious affiliation is deeper and more permanent than the national self-identification 
and the other social identities in general.  
“I find my religion to be very important because it is part of my identity, it was transmitted to me 
from my parents and it has been cherished in the family for generations, like a family tradition.” 
“I think religion is essential for the Serbs because they fought the Turks in the name of Christianity, 
and considered themselves as the last guardians of Christianity in this part of the world.” 
“I don‟t remember whether I was nationally a Serb or a Yugoslavian, but I remember that my 
family and I have always been Orthodox Christians; it was very important for us and it still is.” 
“Religion is to me something more personal and deeper than national self-identification, because 
as we have seen, political affiliation and citizenship don‟t last forever, while religion has always 
been here and will remain here after we are gone. “ 
“I might change my nationality for several reasons, but I would never change my faith. It is just 
part of who I am.” 
 
When asked to discuss about the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church as keeper of Serb national 
identity in Croatia, most of the participants agreed about its importance in keeping alive the spirit of 
Serbdom outside the borders of Serbia and especially when the Serbian state ceased to exist as such. 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
308 
 
The Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as the main guardian of Serbian national identity and 
tradition, as well as the sole force that prevented assimilation.  
“If it wasn‟t for the Serbian Orthodox Church, our ancestors would get assimilated as soon as they 
came to the Military Frontier.” 
“The Serbian Orthodox Church is more than just an institution; it must be seen as a guardian of 
Serb tradition, costumes and history.” 
“Even when Serbia ceased to exist as a state entity during the Ottoman occupation, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church managed to gain its independence and functioned almost as a state.” 
 “The Church is the only point of reference for the Serbs living outside Serbia, the only thing that 
gathers them and keep alive the memory of their homeland.” 
“The Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries present in Croatia are the proof of our historical 
presence in these territories and the foundation stone of our identity.” 
 
The participants‘ attitudes toward language, script and its importance in preserving Serbian identity 
showed that most of them prefer to call their language Serbo-Croatian. Only a smaller part of the 
participants, mainly form the Area of peaceful reintegration, claimed to speak Serbian. Croatian was 
mainly chosen by younger participants from Istria and Zagreb. However, most of them agree that 
language and script are important elements of Serb identity in Croatia and they should be preserved.  
“I speak Serbo-Croatian with the ijekavian pronunciation and the shtokavian dialect. I could easily 
call the language only Croatian, but I refuse since I think Serbian and Croatian are one language 
with different standards and dialects. I can read the Cyrillic script but I prefer to use the Latin, it is 
simpler. I don‟t think this makes me any less Serbian, although I am aware that Cyrillic is an 
important element of our Serbian identity.” 
“I rather call my language Serbian because I use the ekavian pronunciation, and I use both the 
scripts to the same extent. I guess it would be different if I would live in another part of Croatia 
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where the Serb minority is not as numerous as here in the Area of peaceful reintegration where the 
right to communicate in our language is guaranteed to us by the state. I think that Serbian language 
and Cyrillic is an important aspect of our national identity and we must preserve it.” 
“For me it is the same whether I call it Serbian, Croatian or Serbo-Croatian, because it is the same 
language. But to be politically correct I call it Serbo-Croatian because I want to emphasize that we 
shouldn‟t be divided by language, because we share the same language. I personally use the 
ijekavian pronunciation which makes it more Croatian, but anyway I think that Serbian language 
and script should be maintained in Croatia.” 
“Since I was born and raised in Croatia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and I use the ijekavian, 
I would identify my language as Croatian. But I can perfectly understand Serbian, and I can read 
the Cyrillic script. I don‟t think language is the main element of preserving Serbian identity, I 
would rather say that Cyrillic is more important. “ 
 
When asked about the ethnic elements of Serbian national identity in Croatia, most of the 
participants were acquainted with what the notion implies. But they were undecided when asked to 
name the most important element because they felt that all the elements were equally important and 
hardly opted for one.  
“I think that Orthodox religion, our language and script, our traditions and our history define who 
we are and differentiate us from the others. I think that they are equally important, but I would 
rather opt for our tradition, because I think that is something we all cherish.”  
“I guess that language, Cyrillic script, Orthodox faith and culture are the main characteristics of 
Serbian identity in Croatia. The most important? For me it‟s the religious affiliation, that is, 
Orthodoxy.” 
“I agree with everything that has been said, but I would also add the privileged status we enjoyed 
as Krajišnici (Frontiersmen) as one of the main characteristics of the Serbs in Croatia. Although I 
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can‟t say that is the most important element of their identity. I rather think is maybe our history in 
general.” 
“Also their role in World War II should be mentioned, when they helped to liberate the country 
from Nazis. Unfortunately this is a black period of Serb history in Croatia; even I lost some 
relatives that were killed by the Ustaše. But I think that Serb identity is rather represented by 
Orthodoxy, script and tradition, being tradition the most important.”  
  
The discussion about the civic elements of identity showed among all the participants a positive 
sense of belonging to Serbia and a strong attachment to Serbian state symbols rather than to 
Croatian. The majority of them don‘t have a Serbian citizenship because they don‘t find it useful, 
showing that they perceive citizenship only from a functional point of view. When asked about the 
elements of modern Serb identity in Croatia, the participants weren‘t as sure as before when asked 
about the ethnic elements of Serb identity. However, most of the participants think that Serbs in 
Croatia should accept their legal status and participate in state politics through their organizations. 
They see their civic or modern identity directed to the future rather than to the past. 
“Yes, I feel a sense of belonging to Serbia because it is my country of origin. I don‟t have Serbian 
citizenship but I do feel a stronger attachment to Serbian state symbols rather than to Croatian. I 
don‟t know why… I just do. It‟s something difficult to explain. Although Croatia is my homeland, I 
can‟t help cheering up for Serbs during sport events (laughs). I think we should accept Croatia as 
our homeland and respect its laws and regulations, but never forget where we came from. “ 
“I don‟t have a Serbian citizenship because I don‟t need it. It is much better to have a Croatian 
passport because you can easily travel pretty much everywhere. But anyway I do feel a sense of 
belonging to Serbia and to its state symbols.” 
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“I have Serbian citizenship because I studied in Novi Sad (Serbia) and it was easier to handle 
bureaucracy as a Serbian citizen. Of course I feel a sense of belonging to Serbia and an attachment 
to its state symbols.” 
“The modern elements of our national identity should be oriented toward the future and should deal 
with our new political values, such as democracy and pro EU politics. We must forget the past and 
learn how to live in a new political environment and struggle for our rights.” 
“I think that the modern aspects of our identity in Croatia should revolve around the acceptance of 
our minority status and our new political strategy. What I mean is that we must be good citizens 
and use only the tools prescribed by the law to ensure our rights. We must accept Croatia as our 
homeland and distance ourselves from Serbia.”  
 
The discussion about Serb legal status in Croatia raised some discomfort among the participants of 
the focus group, because they all feel that a big injustice has been done to the Serbs in Croatia by 
degrading them to the status of simple national minority. All the participants agreed that Serbs are 
discriminated and that they are second-class citizens in Croatia. They all feel that due to the 
historical status they enjoyed since their settlement in these territories, Serbs should have a special 
status in Croatia. Most of the participants talked about personal negative experiences regarding 
discrimination and they all agreed that Serbs should be granted again the constitutive status in 
Croatia.  
“I am very familiar with the traditional status of the Serbian Frontiersmen, and I think that based 
alone on this historical fact we should hold a special status. We are an important part of Croatian 
history and society, we can‟t be judged only by what happened during the war. It‟s like we are all 
being punished because of our politicians. Definitely we are discriminated because the Croats look 
at us as we are monsters, the media constantly demean us and we are supposed to be grateful just 
because we are alive, without the possibility to seek or exercise our rights. I don‟t know if anything 
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would change with the grant of constitutive status, but I see it as a matter of principle: it belongs to 
us, it is our right.” 
“I thing that in theory we are not discriminated because the laws guarantee us many rights, but the 
implementation of these laws is problematic. I don‟t know if this is due to bureaucracy or if there is 
just unwillingness from the state organs to secure us our promised rights. I am saying this from 
personal experience, because I couldn‟t obtain from the state a compensation for my destroyed 
house. The Croatian government motivated us to return to Croatia by promising us a compensation 
for the destroyed houses, but I have been waiting for years and nothing happened. My Croatian 
neighbours all received a compensation for their houses. If this is not discrimination, I don‟t know 
what is.” 
“In my city, Vukovar (Area of peaceful reintegration) we have a perfect example of discrimination 
based on an inconsistent application of law. As you all know, Serbs in Vukovar represent a third of 
the population, and therefore have the right to demand for their language and script to be in official 
use on all the public inscriptions and so on. But since an extreme right wing party disagrees with it 
and raised a petition among the locals, we can‟t obtain our promised right to use officially our 
language and script. We don‟t ask for anything that hasn‟t been guaranteed to us by the Croatian 
state. Look at the case of other minorities whose language wasn‟t an issue, such as Italians in 
Istria. They are a much smaller community than we are, but bilingualism in Istria is seen as 
something valuable while Serbian language is seen as a shame. I think that if we were a constitutive 
people this couldn‟t happen to us, because we would be more protected.” 
 
The discussion about ethnic tolerance showed that the participants are relatively high tolerant and 
accept any type of relation with the Croats. The only relation that was contested by some of the 
participants is marriage, because they feared they would lose their national or religious identity in 
such a union.  
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“I already have Croatian friends, neighbours and I work for a Croatian employer. So I definitely 
accept them in any relation. I am not married yet, but I don‟t think of the nationality of my future 
wife. I really don‟t care, as long as she is a good person.” 
“I have no problem in interacting with Croats, I accept them as equals. I just would rather marry 
one of our own because I want to preserve our traditions and customs in the family.” 
“I think nationality shouldn‟t be an obstacle in any relation, so I accept Croats and any other 
nationality as my equals. I am married to a Croat, so I definitively don‟t mind getting close to them 
(laughs).” 
 
Once all the topics have been explored, the participants were offered the opportunity to add 
something in conclusion or to further talk about a topic but they all refused, so the moderator 
thanked the participants who were invited to stay and informally interact while offered 
refreshments. Since the participants already knew each other from before, the atmosphere in the 
focus group was really friendly and pleasant. Since they are all politically involved and with similar 
characteristics (such as level of education and age), they mostly agreed about all the topics covered 
in the discussion. However, some differences were noted among the participants coming from 
different regions: the participants from Istria and Zagreb showed a more open and tolerant attitude 
toward everything Croatian, expressing a higher degree of integration than the other participants. 
The participants that proved to be the most traditional are the ones from the Area of peaceful 
reintegration, where a stronger Serbian national consciousness was registered (in terms of usage of 
Serbian language and script, Serbian citizenship and so on). The participants from the War affected 
area showed the highest sense of resentment and frustration due to their war related experiences, 
and think of themselves as being mostly discriminated. 
There was large agreement in the group of participants in relation to particular issues, while there 
was present a certain confusion regarding the concepts of national identity. A small number of 
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participants had a clear idea on what is national identity and knew how to verbalize it. Qualitative 
analysis indicated certain confusion in thinking about national identity, especially about its ethnic 
and modern elements, expressed by a situation of silence, emotional absence or negative 
associations. The participants agreed that the elements of ethnic identity are difficult to separate 
since they all carry an important meaning and therefore they are all equally important. The elements 
of civic or modern identity were more difficult to distinguish, there was no universal understanding 
about it, but all the participants agreed that it must be oriented toward state politics and to the future 
of their legal status.  
The obtained information helped to further understand the nature of Serb national identity in Croatia 
and how its members perceive it. Most of the data coincide with the obtained results from the 
quantitative research; others don‘t because of the qualitative method used that allows the emergence 
of unknown and unexpected attitudes that weren‘t taken into account while formulating the 
questionnaire. However, there is no right or wrong answer regarding this topic since it deals with 
the individual‘s most private identity. Only the studied group can offer the most adequate and 
credible definitions about the aspects of their national identity, and they shouldn‘t be questioned. It 
must be accepted that very often the individual‘s perception about his/her national identity doesn‘t 
exactly reflect the theoretical framework. Individuals don‘t spend a plenty of time reasoning and 
explaining to themselves what national identity is, they rather ―feel‖ their national self-
identification without actually thinking how and why it appeared, and what is its meaning.  
Therefore, no obtained information on the matter can be confirmed or contested, but it must be 
accepted and taken into account for new acknowledgement and used as a base for future researches 
on the topic. 
 
 
5.4.2 Verification of the hypotheses and the research questions 
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This section will provide answers to the research questions asked at the beginning and as well 
explain whether the set hypotheses have been confirmed or rejected based on the obtained overall 
results.  
The first research question was about the current general identification of the Serbs in Croatia (How 
do the Serbs in Croatia identify themselves today?). Based on the obtained data, it is possible to say 
that Serbs in Croatia are very well aware of both their national and religious identity: they mostly 
identify nationally as Serbs and to a lesser extent as Croatian Serbs, while their religious affiliation 
is mostly Christian Orthodox.  
The second research question was about the nature of Serb identity and its universality or whether 
its differentiation based on a territorial subdivision (Does a common Serb identity in Croatia exist 
today? If not, how does it differ from region to region? What are the factors that influence this 
differentiation?). Although there have been noticed differences among the respondents‘ attitudes 
coming from different areas, it didn‘t influence much the general trend. They all mostly identify in 
the same way, i.e. as Serbs of Orthodox faith, with minor differences registered from territory to 
territory. The Serbs from Zagreb mostly identify nationally as Croatian Serbs rather than only 
Serbs, and at the same time a high trend of Croatian Serbs was registered in Istria (40%). It was pre-
assumed that Serb national identity in Croatia might be influenced by factors such as religious 
affiliation, age, level of education, membership in Serbian organizations, tragic war experience, 
country of birth and longer period of stay in Serbia. However, all the mentioned variables showed a 
very weak or an inexistent association with national self-identification. This brought to the 
conclusion that national belonging is voluntary, mutable, and a reflection of belief, rather than 
based on tangible facts. 
Concerning the research question about the respondents‘ attitudes toward the ethnic aspects of 
identity (Will most of the respondents, regardless of the territorial distribution, highly rate (“very 
important” or “moderately important”) all the questions about the importance of the ethnic aspects 
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(religion, tradition, costumes, language, alphabet, history, myths) of their national group for the 
preservation of their identity in Croatia?), it was registered both in the quantitative and in the 
qualitative research that  most of the respondents find these aspects to be very important. Only in 
the city of Zagreb the respondents opted rather for ―moderately important‖ when evaluating the 
importance of religion, church, national myths and epic.  
The calculated index of traditionalism and modernity, based on the responses about the ethnic and 
civic elements of national identity, made it possible to verify what trend is predominant among the 
Serbs in Croatia. So, the answer to the following research question (What will prevail among the 
Serb minority in Croatia: a modern/civic or rather a traditional/ethnic model of national identity?) 
is that a traditional model of national identity is stronger among the Serbs of Croatia. The measured 
index of traditionalism was 1,6578, which is very high considering that its value is between 1 and 4 
(1 indicating very important and 4 indicating no importance at all). The calculated modernity index 
is 3,1412 which indicates a low degree of modernity. Moreover, the correlation between the two 
indexes indicated the more traditional the respondents are, the least modern they are, and vice versa. 
The registered attitudes about traditionalism and modernity showed that Istria and Zagreb are the 
least traditional and consequently the most modern territories among the measured indexes. Istria‘s 
traditionalism index was 1,77, while the modernity index was 3,02. Zagreb followed with an index 
of traditionalism of 1,68 and a modernity index of 3,10. This answers the research questions about 
the supposed modernity of Istria and Zagreb (Will the chosen areas of Istria and Zagreb show more 
modern attitudes in despite of the more traditional responses offered by the War affected area and 
the Area of peaceful integration?). 
The vast majority of the Serbs feel a sense of discrimination (91,5%) since they became a national 
minority, mostly due to the inconsistent and unequal application of laws. As a consequence, most of 
the respondents think that Serbs should be granted again the status of constitutive people in Croatia 
(86,6%). This pretty much answers the research question whether the Serbs feel discriminated with 
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their new status (from constitutional people to minority) and if they wish to change their status and 
regain the previous one they enjoyed.  
Regarding the research question that deals with the sense of belonging to Serbia (Is there a sense of 
belonging to the state of origin (Serbia), and what is it influenced from?), most of the respondents 
(59,9%) indicated that they feel a sense of belonging to Serbia, mainly because it is their country of 
origin. The results obtained with statistical tests showed there is a significant association between 
the sense of belonging to Serbia and the longer period spent in Serbia, whereas most of the 
respondents who stayed in Serbia for a longer period of time feel a sense of belonging to Serbia to a 
greater extent than those who didn‘t spend any time in Serbia. But this is not the only factor that 
influences it, since less than half of the respondents spent a longer period of time in Serbia (43,5%). 
The participants of the focus group weren‘t able to verbalize why they feel a sense of belonging to 
Serbia; they only stated that “it‟s our country of origin”. Therefore, the sense of belonging to 
Serbia must be understood also as a singular choice of the individual, independent from any other 
measurable factor.  
The research question about the strength of attachment to state symbols (What is stronger: the 
attachment to the state symbols of the country of origin (Serbia), or to the symbols of the country of 
residence (Croatia)?) is easily answered by the statistical obtained data whereas most of the 
respondents (39,5%) stated to feel a very strong attachment to Serbian state symbols, while only 
5,7% of the respondents indicated a very strong attachment to Croatian state symbols. Most of the 
respondents rather didn‘t feel any sense of attachment to Croatian state symbols (41,2%). Only in 
Istria and Zagreb it was registered a predominance of the respondents who feel a little sense of 
attachment to the Croatian state symbols.  
The last research questions deals with ethnic distance and the perception the Serbs have about the 
dominant population, the Croats (How do the Serbs feel about the dominant population, the Croats? 
What trend is predominant: a high degree of ethnic tolerance or rather a discriminatory feeling 
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with elements of ethno nationalism?). The questions regarding ethnic distance and the calculated 
index of ethnic tolerance showed that Serbs in Croatia can be considered a very tolerant group. 
Most of the respondents would accept Croats in any kind of relation, whether marriage, or as 
friends, neighbors or employer. In the focus group it was said that they treat Croats as equals, and 
don‘t thing nationality should be important. Only marriage with a Croat was contested by some of 
the participants, as well by some of the respondents (39,8% wouldn‘t marry a Croat), mainly out of 
fear for losing their national and religious identity. 
 
Let‘s have a look at the stated hypotheses and verify whether they have been confirmed or rejected 
by the obtained results from both of the used methods (quantitative and qualitative). 
 
First hypothesis (H1): Serbian national identity in general is defined by a strong religious 
(Christian Orthodox) connotation. Therefore, a high percentage of respondents who will identify as 
Serbs or Croatian Serbs will mostly indicate Christian Orthodoxy as their religious confession. A 
correlation between national self-identification and religious confession will show a strong 
association between the two categories. Additionally, all the questions related to the role of religion 
in preserving the Serb national identity in Croatia will be highly rated (“very important) by most of 
the respondents.  
 
As we have seen, most of the respondents did identify religiously as Christian Orthodox, both the 
national categories of Serbs and Croatian Serbs, which were the most chosen by the respondents. As 
well, most of the respondents did rate ―very important‖ all the questions concerning the importance 
of religion and church. But the correlation between national self-identification and religious 
affiliation measured by a Chi-square test showed no association between the two categories, due to 
the fact that both the national categories of ―Serbs‖ and ―Croatian Serbs‖ are of predominantly of 
 Fieldwork 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
319 
 
the same religious confession. Therefore it can‘t be claimed that national self-identification is 
influenced by religious confession and vice versa, but the data obtained from the focus group 
indicate that the participants imply that Serbs and Croatian Serbs are exclusively Orthodox 
Christians, and that there is an unbreakable bond between the two concepts. Thus, the combination 
of the two methods used in the research allows us to accept the first hypothesis and confirm that 
Serbian national identity in general is defined by a strong religious (Christian Orthodox) 
connotation. 
 
Second hypothesis (H2): Assuming that national self-identification is a dependent variable, it will 
be influenced by elements (independent variables) such as age, level of education, negative war 
experiences, active membership in Serb organization, country of birth and longer period of stay in 
Serbia. The correlation between these variables will show that there is a relationship between them, 
expressed in a high strength of association.  
 
All the values obtained by correlation between national self-identification and the chosen variables 
showed no association between the categories or it was too weak to be statistically significant. The 
only valuable measured association was between national self-identification and country of birth, 
which confirmed that the fact that most the of the declared Serbs (63,6% of total) were born in 
Serbia (92,3% within category) and most of the declared Croatian Serbs (87,9% within category) 
were born in Croatia, proved to be statistically significant.  
Even the responses given by the participants in the focus group showed no correlation between 
national self-identification and other measurable factors, whereas nationality was perceived as a 
free choice of the individual, partly influenced by the choice of the parents (since it is not 
uncommon that parents and children differently identify nationally) and partly connected to the 
religious affiliation (as seen in H1). 
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Since national self-identification proved to be independent from any of the variables it was 
correlated to, it must be concluded that it is not a dependent variable as it was assumed. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis (H2) must be rejected in favour of an alternate one which wasn‘t taken in 
consideration: national self-identification isn‟t related to factors such as age, level of education, 
war tragedy, membership in Serbian organizations and longer periods of stay in Serbia; it is partly 
related to the country of birth and to religious affiliation (as seen in H1) and is mostly a result of 
the free will of the individuals. Therefore, it must be whether treated as an independent variable or 
must be related to variables that weren‟t taken in consideration in this research. 
 
Third hypothesis (H3): Since Serb national identity in general, as most of the eastern nations, can 
be considered mostly ethnic rather than civic, it is expected that the respondents will give higher 
importance to the ethnic/primordial elements rather than to the civic/modern ones. Moreover, the 
respondents will show a higher degree of traditionalism than modernity (expressed in indexes that 
will be subsequently calculated). 
 
According to the obtained indexes of modernity and traditionalism, calculated on the base of the 
respondents‘ attitudes toward the elements of ethnic and civic elements of their national identity, it 
has been shown that the Serb minority in Croatia is more traditional than modern. Most of the 
respondents highly rated (―very important‖) all the elements of traditional or ethnic identity, which 
resulted in a relatively high index of traditionalism (1,6578). On the other hand, most of the 
respondents didn‘t highly rate the elements of modern or civic identity, which brought to a low 
index of modernity (3,1412). Thus, hypothesis n. 3 (H3) can be fully accepted and can be claimed 
that both A. Smith‘s theory about the predominance of an ethnic model of national identity in 
eastern countries (Smith, 1991) and J. Milošević ĐorĊević‘s theory about the predominance of a 
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primordial model of national identity among the Serbs (Milošević ĐorĊević, 2007) confirmed to be 
true for the nation identity of the Serbs in Croatia.  
 
Fourth hypothesis (H4):  The respondents will show a high degree of ethnic tolerance toward the 
Croats, regardless of the territorial distribution, which will show that the Serbs of Croatia are 
mostly a high tolerant population.  
 
Based on the obtained data from the respondents‘ attitudes toward ethnic distance, both from the 
qualitative and quantitative tools, it can be concluded that Serbs in Croatia are highly tolerant 
toward the dominant population, i.e. the Croats. Most of the respondents answered positively to the 
questions about accepting different relations with Croats, which resulted in a high index of ethic 
tolerance (3,40). Even the vast majority of the participants of the focus group agreed about 
accepting Croats in any relation. Therefore, the last hypothesis of the research (H4) can be 
confirmed.  
 
 
5.5 Further interpretations 
 
 
 
As we have seen, Serbian national identity in Croatia is dominantly primordial, ethnic, and 
traditional. Conservative understanding of nation hinders redefining national identity towards 
primacy of state symbols and citizen interests over sentiment and ancestry. There are probably 
many reasons for the prevalence of the primordial concept and they can be broadly classified as 
social and personal. 
Possible social reasons are, according to Milošević ĐorĊević: general distrust in the state and its 
institutions; recently and frequently redefined state symbols such as the flag, the coat of arms, the 
national anthem and the like; recently and frequently redefined statehood, and general negative 
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perception of the state. In a nut shell, the states emerged from the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia are 
still not civil societies, countries that serve the best interests of their citizens. Consequently, they are 
not a suitable place for dominance of instrumentalistic and functional concepts of national identity. 
When and whether at all it will happen here, remains to be seen. Most probably, Croatian formal 
accession to the European Union (in July 2013) will bring some improvements in the functioning of 
the state, resulting in the citizens‘ belief in its values. But it is most probable that a common 
European identity won‘t be able to substitute the minority identities, especially in the case of the 
Serbs in Croatia, for the fear of losing a national identity that is still fragile due to the historical and 
social circumstances.  
Historical discontinuity and proven short life expectancy of states has been a regional rule rather 
than an exception for quite some time. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to conceive 
thorough social strategies of education and to develop continuous positive esteem of one‘s own 
nation for a longer period of time. 
If national identity is not formed early enough, then knowledge and sentiments related to the nation 
fail to get fully integrated into personality. An individual is left wandering in search of the true 
meaning of her/his national identity. This is especially obvious among the young. Almost by 
definition, the concept of national identity remains dominantly primordial, personal. For some 40-
50 years following World War II, Serbian population was led to think in terms of belonging 
primarily to Yugoslav rather than belonging to Serbian nation. Attachment to Yugoslav identity and 
the accompanying emotions are still strong and prevailing in some. For many citizens of ex-
Yugoslavia, identification with Yugoslav nation was one among many social identities that were 
lost and have not been adequately replaced, so far. During the last decades names of states and 
national symbols changed frequently. Not well defined and not deeply rooted national symbols lead 
to confusion about national identity by making it harder to identify with the state, favoring 
primordial concept of national identity. 
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At the end, it should be emphasized that there are neither right or wrong answers, nor good or bad 
concepts of national identity. Primordialism should not be rejected as retrograde, and 
instrumentalism should not be accepted as progressive. (Miloševiĉ ĐorĊević, 2007) 
In the case of Serb minority identity, the obtained results lead to the question whether minority 
identity is rather ethnic than national. The Serb minority are considered a nation, not an ethnic 
group, although they have also an ethnic identity. The Serbian Ministery for Diaspora does not even 
consider the Serbs living in the region of ex-Yugoslavia as members of a Serbian diaspora. Since 
the Serbs of Croatia are a political community with all the five elements determined by A. Smith 
(1991) (historical territory; common myths and historical memory; common mass and civil culture; 
common juridical rights and duties of citizens; and common economy with opportunities to move 
within the national territory), they are entitled to be a nation and therefore have their own national 
identity. The fact that their national identity is still pre-state and pre-political, and rather ethnic and 
traditional, can not question the nature of their identity. They are still developing their national 
identity and building their trust in the state, which may be a long process, not just for the Serbs but 
for all the citizens in ex-Yugoslavian countries, especially the minorities.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
After this long journey through Serb national identity in Croatia, we have learned that Serbs are an 
autochthonous population of these territories who enjoyed several legal privileges up to the recent 
conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia. Their loss of legal status and constitutive protection caused them to face 
on one hand the loss of their Yugoslav identity and the revival of a new one. Their new status of 
national minority in the Croatian Constitution (1990) was perceived as a humiliation and 
subsequently it proved to be also the basis for legal discrimination. Serbs were put under a difficult 
choice: deny their national and religious identity in order to avoid possible harassment and 
discrimination, or begin a political battle for the establishment of their legal rights that would allow 
them to freely express and therefor preserve their national identity.  
The set objectives of this research were to investigate the current national identity among the Serb 
minority in Croatia, its characteristics and predominant aspects;  compare the differences and find 
similarities in the attitudes toward elements of national identity on a territorial division of the 
sample; determine the basic concepts of national identity in theoretical approaches and among the 
respondents; and examine the presence of different understandings of the aspects of national 
identity , as well as experiences, emotions and individual constructs of national identity. Additional 
research questions and hypothesis were set in order to analyze and confirm some of the assumptions 
we learned about Serbian national identity from other studies.  
The use of different statistical methods in SPSS such as contingency tables, graphs, Chi square test, 
Phi coefficient and Cramer‘s V, T-test, ANOVA, Pearson‘s correlation, etc. allowed to acquire new 
information and verify the set hypotheses. The used cross-territorial comparison showed us that 
there are some minor differences between the four set territories, but in most cases they didn‘t 
influence the obtained overall results. In order to acquire further acknowledgement about the Serb 
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national identity in Croatia and how its members perceive it, a focus group was held with 
participants from all the four territories used in the quantitative research. 
The discussion in the focus group reflected the same trend registered from the quantitative 
approach: Serb national identity in Croatia is traditional, ethnic, oriented toward the past while its 
modern and civic aspects are still not well understood by its members. There are still stronger ties to 
the state of origin, Serbia, rather than to the state of residence, Croatia.  
However, among the participants of the focus group (who were mainly young people with a higher 
level of education), it was noted a willingness to distance from the past and to turn toward the 
future. Therefore, it is possible to predict that in future studies about Serb national identity in 
Croatia, a new trend will be registered where the importance and understanding about modern and 
civic aspects of national identity will increase.  
The four hypotheses set in the research were aimed to verify the correlation between factors that 
may influence national identity. Not all the test showed significant results, which brought to the 
rejection of some of the hypothesis, but all the obtained results were useful in understanding such a 
complex notion as national identity. 
The first hypothesis predicted a strong relation between Serb national identity and Orthodoxy, 
which was confirmed by the respondents‘ attitudes about the role of religion. However, the Chi 
square test used in the quantitative research to measure the correlation between the two categories 
showed no significant result due to the similarities of the two most predominant national categories: 
Serbs and Croatian Serbs. But when the participants in the focus group were asked about their 
religious affiliation and the role of religion in their national identity, they all agreed that Serbian 
national identity is inseparable from their Christian Orthodoxy, that religion is the main trait of their 
identity that differentiate from the others (particularly the Croats). 
The second hypothesis assumed that national self-identification can be treated as a dependent 
variable that will be influenced by other independent variables such as age, level of education, 
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country of birth, membership in Serbian organizations, tragic war experience and longer period of 
stay in Serbia. In most of the cases, the obtained values showed a very weak or inexistent 
association between the variables. The obtained result, in addition to the information gathered from 
the discussion in the focus group, led to the conclusion that national self-identification or nationality 
is something that can‘t be measured because is the result of an individual‘s interior choice. Thus, 
the second hypothesis has been rejected and it has been accepted that national self-identification is 
rather an independent variable. 
The third hypothesis concerning the predominant ethnic aspect of Serb national identity has been 
also accepted, as well as the last hypothesis that predicted a high degree of ethnic tolerance among 
the Serbs in Croatia. As we can see, the fact that Serb national identity is traditional and ethnic 
doesn‘t necessarily imply a return to ethno nationalism. Serbs are both traditional and tolerant, they 
feel a sense of belonging to Serbia and have a stronger emotional attachment to Serbian state 
symbols rather than Croatian, but they accept the Croats as equals. They also recognize the need to 
distance from Serbia and get more involved in Croatian state politics. Yugoslavia ceased to exist as 
well as Yugoslavian identity; Serbs are now Croatian citizens and must learn to function in these 
new circumstances. Very soon they will be European citizens and in a determinate time all the ex-
Yugoslavian countries will join the EU, resulting in all the Serbs living in the same supra-state 
entity. In such a multinational state union, even the dominant nations will become national 
minorities. Serbs from Croatia will be faced with the new European identity that maybe will 
succeed in replacing the lost Yugoslavian identity. Maybe they will self-identify as ―European 
Serbs‖ rather than ―Croatian Serbs‖, and replace their Serbo-Croatian language with the BSC 
standard (Bosnia, Serbian, and Croatian) or rather with English. What is sure is that the Serbs from 
Croatia will not lose their religious identity and will never repeat the same mistake as happened in 
Croatia. 
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1. Year of birth: 
 
2. Gender: 
 
a) Male  b) Female 
 
3. Profession: 
 
4. Level of education: 
 
a) None  b) Elementary  c) Secondary  c) Bacc. or Mr. SC.   
d) Master or PhD 
 
5. Country of birth: 
 
a) Croatia (indicate place and county): 
b) Serbia  c) Bosnia and Herzegovina   
d) Other (indicate which):  
 
6. Current place of living (city and county): 
 
 
7. Have you or any of your closest relatives experienced any personal tragedy (death, exile and 
similar) during the war in Croatia between the years 1991 and 1995? 
 
a) Yes     b) No 
 
 
8. Which of the following categories describe you best: 
 
a) Serb b) Croat c) Croatian Serb d) Other (indicate which):  
 
9. Have you ever changed your nationality (for example from ―Yugoslavian‖ to something 
else)? 
 
a) Yes (indicate which one and when):     b) No 
 
 
10. What is your religion? 
 
a) Christian Orthodox b) Catholic c) Atheist d) Other (indicate which): 
 
 
 
11. How important is religion for you? 
 
a) Very much   b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
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12. How important for you is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in preserving Serbian 
national identity in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much   b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
13. Do you feel any sense of belonging to the Republic of Serbia? 
 
a) Yes (indicate the reason):     b) No (indicate reason): 
 
 
14. Have you ever spent a longer period of time in the Republic of Serbia? 
 
a) Yes (indicate the reason):     b) No 
 
 
15. Do you have Serbian citizenship? 
 
a) Yes        b) No 
 
16. How strong is your emotional connection to the official state symbols of Serbia (ex. national 
flag and national anthem)? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
17. How strong is your emotional connection to the official state symbols of Croatia (ex. 
national flag and national anthem)? 
 
a) Very much   b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
 
18. Which language do you use? 
 
a) Serbian  b) Croatian c) Serbo-Croatian d) Other (indicate which): 
 
19. Which pronunciation do you use? 
 
a) Ijekavian  b) Ekavian  c) Ikavian 
 
20. Which script do you use? 
 
a) Cyrillic   b) Latin c) Both Cyrillic and Latin 
 
 
 
21. How important are for you Serbian language and Cyrillic script for the maintenance of the 
Serbian identity in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
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22. How important are for you Serbian national myths and epic (for ex. The Battle of Kosovo, 
the Nemanjić dynasty, etc)? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
 
23. How important are for you Serb tradition and Serb customs (for ex. ―Krsna slava‖, marriage 
and others) for the preservation of Serb national identity in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
24. How much familiar are you with the Serbian traditional privileged status in Croatia? 
 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
 
25. Are you familiar with the Serbian role in the anti-fascist movement in Croatia? 
 
a) Yes (indicate the source):      b) No 
 
 
26. How much important is for you the history of Serbs in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
27. How much important is for you the Serbian culture in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
 
28. Do you think that Serbs in Croatia are discriminated since they became a minority in Croatia 
(from the year 1991)? 
 
a) Yes (indicate why):       b) No 
 
 
29. Do you think that the Serbs in Croatia should be granted again the status of constitutive 
people? 
 
a) Yes (indicate why):      b) No (indicate why): 
 
 
 
 
30. Are you a member of any Serb organization in Croatia (for ex. Prosvjeta, SNV, SDSS, etc)? 
 
a) Yes, I am an active member b) I am only a former member c) No 
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31. How much familiar are you with Serb organizations/institutions in Croatia? 
 
a) Very much  b) Moderately  c) Little  d) Not at all 
 
32. Would you agree to have a Croatian spouse? 
 
a) Yes    b) No (indicate why): 
 
 
33. Would you agree to have a Croatian neighbor? 
 
a) Yes    b) No (indicate why): 
 
34. Would you agree to have a Croatian employer? 
 
a) Yes    b) No (indicate why): 
 
35. Would you agree to have a Croatian friend? 
 
a) Yes    b) No (indicate why): 
 
 
Appendixes – 2. The Croatian constitutional law on the rights of national minorities   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
353 
 
Please note that the translation provided below is only provisional translation and therefore does NOT 
represent an offical document of the Republic of Croatia. It confers no rights and imposes no 
obligations separate from does conferred or imposed by the legislation formally adopted and published 
in Croatian language. 
Please note that this translation is a final text version published in the Official Gazette no. 155/2002. 
 
(Official Gazette no. 155/2002) 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
ON THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 
ZAGREB, December 13, 2002 
 
I BASIC PROVISIONS 
Article 1 
The Republic of Croatia, pursuant to: 
• the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 
• the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 
• the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
• the Final Act of the Organisation for European Security and Co-operation, the Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe and other OSCE documents relating to human rights, especially the Document of the 
Copenhagen Meeting (OSCE) of the Conference on the Human Dimension and the Document of the 
Moscow Meeting (OSCE) on the Human Dimension, 
• the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, with the pertaining Protocols 
• the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 
• the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief 
• the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 
• the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, 
• the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
• the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
• the European Charter of Local Self-Government,  
• CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights. 
• the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities undertakes to 
respect and protect the rights of national minorities and other fundamental rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen, the rule of law and all other highest values enshrined in its own Constitution and in 
international law in relation to all its citizens. 
Article 2 
In addition to the human rights and freedoms recognised under its constitutional provisions, the 
Republic of Croatia shall recognise and protect all other rights envisaged in the international 
documents referred to in Article 1 of this Constitutional Law, subject to exceptions and limitations 
provided in these documents, without any discrimination based on gender, race, colour of skin, 
language, religion, political and other beliefs, national and social background, association with a 
national minority, property, status inherited by birth or on any other basis, in accordance with 
Articles 14 and 17, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. 
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Article 3 
(1) The rights and freedoms of the members of national minorities, being fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, shall constitute an inseparable part of the democratic system in the Republic of 
Croatia and shall enjoy necessary support and protection, including relevant measures taken in 
favour of national minorities. 
(2) Ethnic and multicultural diversity, the spirit of understanding, mutual respect and tolerance 
contribute to the enhanced development of the Republic of Croatia. 
Article 4 
(1) Every citizen of the Republic of Croatia shall have the right to freely express his/ her national 
affiliation, the right to exercise individually or jointly with other members of his/her respective 
national minority or jointly with members of other national minorities the rights and freedoms 
defined in this Constitutional Law and other minority rights and freedoms as defined in special 
laws. 
(2) Members of national minorities shall enjoy on an equal footing with other citizens of the 
Republic of Croatia the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia as well as the rights and freedoms defined by this Constitutional Law and special laws. 
(3) The rights and freedoms defined by this Constitutional Law as well as the rights and freedoms 
of the members of national minorities defined in special laws shall be exercised by the national 
minorities and their members pursuant to and under the conditions stipulated in this Constitutional 
Law and relevant special laws. 
(4) Any discrimination based on ethnic origin shall be prohibited. The members of national 
minorities shall be guaranteed equality before law and equal legal protection. 
(5) It shall be prohibited to take any measures designed to change the ethnic structure in areas 
populated by national minorities, with a view to undermining the exercise of or limiting the rights 
and freedoms defined by this Constitutional Law and special laws. 
(6) Under this Constitutional Law or a special law it shall be possible to exercise certain rights and 
freedoms depending on the share of population which members of national minorities enjoy in the 
Republic of Croatia or one of its areas, the already acquired rights and the international treaties, 
which in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia are part of the internal legal 
framework of the Republic of Croatia. 
Article 5 
A national minority within the terms of this Law shall be considered a group of Croatian citizens 
whose members have been traditionally inhabiting the territory of the Republic of Croatia and 
whose ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/ or religious characteristics differ from the rest of the 
population, and who are motivated to preserve these characteristics. 
Article 6 
(1) The Republic of Croatia may enter into international treaties with other States to regulate issues 
concerning the rights and freedoms of members of national minorities in the Republic of Croatia. 
(2) When entering into international treaties referred to in para. 1 of this article the Republic of 
Croatia shall seek thereby to create and upgrade conditions required for the preservation and 
development of minority cultures and the preservation of essential components of their identity, 
such as religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. 
Article 7 
The Republic of Croatia shall also ensure the exercise of special rights and freedoms of national 
minority members they enjoy individually or jointly with other members of the same national 
minority or, where so provided in this Constitutional Law or a special law, jointly with members of 
other national minorities, in particular with regard to: 
1. the use of their language and script, private and public, as well as official use; 
2. education in their language and script; 
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3. the use of their insignia and symbols; 
4. cultural autonomy through the preservation, development and expression of their own culture, 
preservation and protection of their cultural heritage and tradition; 
5. practising their religion and establishing their religious communities together withother members 
of the same religion; 
6. access to the media and public information services (receiving and disseminating information) in 
their language and script; 
7. self-organisation and association in pursuance of their common interests; 
8. representation in the Parliament and in local government bodies, in administrative and juridical 
bodies; 
9. participation of the members of national minorities in public life and local selfgovernment 
through the Council and representatives of national minorities; 
10. protection from any activity jeopardising or potentially jeopardising their continued existence 
and the exercise of their rights and freedoms. 
Article 8 
The provisions of this Constitutional Law and of special laws governing the rights and freedoms of 
national minority members shall be construed and applied with a view to ensuring respect for the 
members of national minorities and other citizens of the Republic of Croatia, to promoting 
understanding, solidarity, tolerance and dialogue among them. 
II RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Article 9 
(1) Members of national minorities shall have the right to use their family name and first name(s) in 
the language they use, and to have their name officially recognised to them and their children 
through entry in registers of vital statistics and other official documents, in accordance with current 
regulations of the Republic of Croatia. 
(2) Members of national minorities shall have the right to have their identity cards printed and 
completed also in the language and script of their use. 
Article 10 
Members of national minorities shall have the right to freely use their language and script, in private 
and in public, including the right to display signs, inscriptions and other information in the language 
and script of their use, in accordance to law. 
Article 11 
(1) Members of national minorities shall have the right to education in the language and script used 
by them. 
(2) Education of members of national minorities shall be provided in kindergartens, primary and 
secondary schools with instruction in the language and script of their use, under the conditions and 
as prescribed by a special law on education in the language and script of national minorities. 
(3) Schools with instruction in the language and script of a national minority can be established for 
a number of students smaller than the one prescribed for schools with instruction in the Croatian 
language and script. 
(4) The syllabus and curriculum of education in the language and script of a national minority shall 
along with its general part comprise minority-specific subjects (native language, literature, history, 
geography and cultural tradition). 
(5) Students being educated in the language and script of a national minority shall have the right 
and obligation to study in parallel the Croatian language and script according to the prescribed 
curriculum. 
(6) Teachers in schools with instruction in the language and script of a national minority shall be 
members of that national minority and fully proficient in the respective minority language and 
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script, or teachers who are not members of that national minority but are fully proficient in the 
language and script of the respective national minority. 
(7) Higher education institutions shall organise teacher training courses for instruction in the 
languages and script of national minorities in the part of the curriculum containing minority specific 
subjects (native language, literature, history, geography, cultural tradition). 
(8) Members of national minorities may for the purposes of minority education establish 
kindergartens, primary and secondary schools and higher education institutions, in the manner and 
under the conditions stipulated by law. 
(9) For pupils of a Croatian language school arrangements shall be made for instruction in the 
language and script of a national minority as defined in a special law, according to a curriculum 
defined by the competent central government body, with funds to be provided from the state budget 
and the budget of the local self-government unit concerned. 
Article 12 
(1) Equality in the official use of a minority language and script shall be exercised in the territory of 
a self-government unit where the members of a national minority make at least one third of the 
population. 
(2) Equality in the official use of a minority language and script shall also be practised when so 
envisaged in international treaties to which the Republic of Croatia is a party and when so stipulated 
in the statute of a local or regional self-government unit, pursuant to the provisions of the special 
Law on the Use of Minority Languages and Script in the Republic of Croatia. 
(3) Other conditions and modalities of the official use of minority languages and script in 
representative and executive bodies, in procedures before administrative bodies of local and 
regional self-government units, in first-instance procedures before government bodies, in first 
instance court proceedings, in procedures conducted by the Public Attorney's Office, notaries public 
and legal persons with public powers, shall be regulated by a special law on the use of minority 
languages and script. 
Article 13 
The law regulating the use of minority languages and script and/ or the statutes of self-government 
units shall define measures to facilitate the preservation of traditional names and signs and the 
naming of places, streets and squares after the persons or events important for the history and 
culture of the respective national minority in the Republic of Croatia, in the areas traditionally or in 
terms of numbers significantly populated by the national minority concerned. 
Article 14 
(1) The use of insignia and symbols as well as the celebration of national minority holidays shall be 
free. 
(2) In the official use of insignia and symbols of national minorities the corresponding insignia and 
symbols of the Republic of Croatia shall be displayed concurrently. When a national anthem and/ or 
ceremonial song of a national minority is played, the national anthem of the Republic of 
Croatia shall be played first. 
(3) Local and regional self-government units shall define in their statutes the official use and the 
manner of using the flag and symbols of a national minority. 
Article 15 
(1) Members of national minorities may for the purpose of preservation, development, promotion 
and manifestation of their national and cultural identity establish organisations, trusts and 
foundations, as well as institutions engaging in public information, cultural, publishing, museum, 
library or scientific activities. 
(2) The Republic of Croatia, the local and regional self-government units, according to their 
capacities, finance the functioning of the institutions from para 1. of this article. 
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(3) The names of organisations, trusts, foundations and institutions under para. 1 of this article may 
contain a reference to the particular national minority. 
Article 16 
(1) Members of national minorities, their organisations and minority self-governments may 
maintain contacts with people with whom they share the same ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/ or 
religious characteristics, as well as with legal entities having a seat in the country of that people, 
engaging in educational, scientific, cultural, publishing and humanitarian activities. 
 (2) National minority organisations and minority self-governments may receive from the bodies 
and legal entities of the country of the people with whom they share the same characteristics 
referred to in para. 1 of this article duty-exempted newspapers, magazines, books, films, 
videocassettes, sound carriers in a limited number of copies for their own use and may distribute 
them without charge to the members of the national minority concerned. 
(3) National minority organisations may arrange guest performances of professional and amateur 
cultural societies, as well as organise other cultural and artistic events and exhibitions contributing 
to the enrichment of culture and identity of a national minority. In such cases the visiting aliens 
need not be in possession of a labour permit. 
(4) National minority members shall be free to manifest and practise their religion and thereby 
express their allegiance to that religious community. 
Article 17 
(1) The laws regulating public information services, production and broadcasting of radio and TV 
programmes, education, museum and library activities, preservation and conservation of cultural 
heritage shall create conditions for better acquaintance of all citizens of the Republic of Croatia, 
particularly children and young people through educational programmes, mandatory and optional 
school curriculum subjects, with the history, culture and religion of the national minorities. 
(2) To this end steps will be taken to facilitate access by national minority members to the media. 
Article 18 
(1) Radio stations and TV studios at nation-wide, regional and local level shall be specifically 
tasked to promote understanding for members of national minorities, to produce and/ or broadcast 
programmes designed to inform national minority members in minority languages, to encourage 
and promote the preservation, development and manifestation of minority cultural, religious and 
other identity, preservation and conservation of national heritage and traditions, as well as to inform 
national minority members in the region about the work and tasks of the respective minority self-
government. 
Legal entities engaging in public information services (the press, radio and TV) shall enable the 
minority organisations and institutions to participate in the creation of programmes intended for 
national minorities 
(2) In the state budget and the budgets of the local and regional self-government units funds shall be 
assigned for co-financing minority programmes on radio and television stations owned by them, in 
accordance with available capacities and the criteria defined by the Croatian Government on the 
proposal of the Council for National Minorities or by the competent local and regional self-
government units on the proposal of the national minority councils. 
(3) In order to ensure the right of national minority members to information through the press, radio 
and TV in the minority language and script, national minority members, minority self-governments 
and minority organizations can engage in public information activities (publish newspapers, 
produce and broadcast radio and TV programmes and engage in news agencies) as provided for by 
the law. 
Article 19 
(1) National minorities shall have the right to representation in the Croatian Parliament. 
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(2) Members of national minorities can elect at least five and not more than eight MPs in special 
constituencies in accordance with the law regulating the election of MPs, which, however, shall not 
derogate the already acquired rights of national minorities. 
 (3) A national minority with a share of more than 1.5% in the total population of the Republic of 
Croatia shall be guaranteed at least one and not more than three parliament seats in accordance with 
the law regulating the election of MPs. 
(4) National minorities with a share of less than 1.5% in the total population of the Republic of 
Croatia shall have the right to elect at least four MPs from among the members of national 
minorities in accordance with the law regulating the election of MPs. 
Article 20 
(1) The Republic of Croatia guarantees national minority members the right to representation in the 
representative bodies of local and regional self-government units. 
(2) Unless at least one member of a national minority having a share in the population of a self-
government unit above 5% and below 15% is elected by universal suffrage to the representational 
body of the self-government unit, the number of members of the representational body shall be 
increased by one member and as elected shall be considered a minority member who has not been 
elected as the first in the order of proportional success of each electoral list, unless otherwise 
provided in the law governing the election of members of the representational body of the self-
government unit. 
(3) Unless an election by universal suffrage fails to result in as many minority members in the 
representational body of a local self-government unit as pertaining to the respective national 
minority having at least 15% share in the local population, the number of members of the 
representational body of that unit shall be increased to a number required to achieve that 
representation and as elected shall be considered minority members who have not been elected in 
the order of proportional success of each electoral list, unless otherwise provided in the law 
governing the election of members of the representational body of the local self-government unit. 
(4) Unless an election by universal suffrage fails to result in as many minority members in the 
representational body of a regional self-government unit as pertaining to the respective national 
minority having more than 5% share in the population of the regional self-government unit, the 
number of members of the representational body of that unit shall be increased to a number required 
to achieve that representation and as elected shall be considered minority members who have not 
been elected in the order of proportional success of each electoral list, unless otherwise provided in 
the law governing the election of members of the representational body of the regional self-
government unit. 
(5) Should even the application of the provisions of paras. 2 and 3 of this article fail to result in the 
desired representation of minority members in the representational body of a local self-government 
unit, or a regional self-government body under para. 4 of this article, in compliance with these 
provisions, a by-election shall be announced in the self-government unit concerned. 
(6) Candidacy and the election of members of the representational bodies of local and regional self-
government units pursuant to the provisions of paras. 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this article shall be regulated 
under the law governing the election of members of the representational bodies of local and 
regional self-government units. 
(7) Official census results shall be a basis for determining the number of minority members required 
for the implementation of the provisions of this article. Prior to any election, the official census 
results in respect of the number of minority members in a local or regional self-government unit 
shall be adjusted to changes which may have been recorded in the latest confirmed polling list of 
that unit. 
 
 
Appendixes – 2. The Croatian constitutional law on the rights of national minorities   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
359 
 
Article 21 
The local and regional self-government units where minority members do not constitute a majority 
can stipulate in their statutes that minority members are to be elected to the representational body in 
or above their proportional share in the total population of that unit. 
Article 22 
(1) In a local or regional self-government unit (hereinafter: self-government unit) where a 
proportional representation of minority members is required under the provisions of this 
Constitutional Law, such minority representation shall also be secured in the unit‘s executive body. 
(2) Minority representation shall be ensured in government and judiciary bodies in compliance with 
a special law, with allowance to be made for the share of a national minority in the total population 
in the area where a government or a judiciary body has been formed, as well as for the acquired 
rights. 
(3) The members of national minorities shall be granted the right to representation in the 
administrative bodies of self-government units in compliance with the provisions of a special law 
regulating local and regional self-government and with the acquired rights. 
(4) In filling the vacancies referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, preference under the 
same conditions shall be given to the representatives of national minorities. 
III MINORITY SELF-GOVERNMENT IN SELF-GOVERNMENT UNITS 
Article 23 
For promotion, preservation and protection of the position of national minorities in the society, the 
members of national minorities can elect, in the manner and under the conditions defined in this 
Constitutional law, their minority self-governments or minority representatives in the self-
government units. 
Article 24 
(1) Minority self-governments can be elected in self-government units where members of a national 
minority have at least 1.5% share in the total population, or where more than 200 members of a 
national minority are resident, or in the area of a regional self-government unit where more than 
500 members of a national minority are resident. 
(2) 10 representatives shall be elected to a minority self-government of a municipality, 15 to a 
minority self-government of a town, 25 to a minority self-government of a county. 
(3) In cases where at least one of the requirements for the election of a minority self-government 
under para. 1 of this article has not been met, and in an area with at least 100 residing members of a 
national minority, a minority representative shall be elected for the territory of such self-
government nit. 
(4) Candidates for minority self-governments or candidates for minority representatives can be 
nominated by minority organisations or at least 20 members of a national minority from the 
territory of a municipality, or 30 from the territory of a town or 50 from the territory of a county. 
(5) Members of minority self-governments and minority representatives shall be elected by direct 
secret ballot for a four-year term, with the election procedure to be conducted in compliance with 
the law regulating the election of representatives to representative bodies of local self-government 
units. 
(6) Relevant for the determination of the number of national minority members for the purpose of 
implementing the provisions of this article shall be the national census increased or reduced by the 
number of voters entered in or deleted from the electoral register drawn up to elect representatives 
to the representative bodies of local self-government units. 
Article 25 
(1) A minority self-government shall be considered a non-profit legal entity. Its legal status shall be 
acquired by registration with the ministry responsible for general administrative affairs. 
(2) For its obligations the minority self-government shall be liable with its entire assets. 
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(3) The name of a minority self-government shall be in both the Croatian language and Latin script 
and in the language and script of the national minority which has formed the minority self-
government. 
(4) The name of a minority self-government shall contain a reference to the national minority in 
question and the territory it has been established for. 
(5) The minister responsible for public administration affairs shall define the tenor of the register of 
the minority self-government and the manner in which it is to be kept, as well as the application 
form for entry in the register of national minorities 
Article 26 
The members of the minority self-government shall elect their chairperson by secret ballot. The 
minority self-government shall also elect a person to act on behalf of the chairperson in case of his 
or her absence or inability to perform his or her duties. 
Article 27 
(1) Minority self-government shall pass its programme of work, financial plan and annual balance 
sheet, as well as its statute regulating matters relevant for work of the minority selfgovernment. 
(2) The chairman of the minority self-government shall represent and act on behalf of the minority 
self-government, convene council sessions, and have powers and duties as defined in the statute of 
the minority self-government. 
(3) The minority self-government statute, programme, financial plan and annual balance sheet shall 
be passed by a majority vote of the council members. 
(4) The minority self-government statute, financial plan and annual balance sheet shall be published 
in the official gazette of the self-government unit where the minority self-government has been 
established. 
Article 28 
(1) Self-government units shall ensure funds for operation of minority self-government bodies, 
including funds required for their administrative services, and may also ensure funds for specific 
activities as defined in the respective minority self-government programmes. 
(2) Funds required for certain minority self-government programmes can also be provided from the 
national budget. 
Article 29 
(1) The funds obtained by a minority self-government from its property, from donations, grants, 
inheritance or other sources may only be used for the activities and purposes relevant for the 
respective national minority as defined in its programme. 
(2) The funds obtained by a minority self-government from the national budget or a selfgovernment 
unit's budget can be used solely for the purposes envisaged in the budget or the law or a decision 
regulating budget expenditures, or, when it comes to national budget funds, for purposes designated 
by the Council for National Minorities. 
(3) When purchasing goods or services or performing works financed from funds referred to in 
para. 2 of this article, the minority self-government may use them solely under the conditions and in 
the way stipulated by the Procurement Act. 
Article 30 
(1) Members of a minority self-government and its bodies shall, as a rule, perform their duties on a 
voluntary basis and with due care of a good husband. 
(2) Members of a minority self-government and its bodies may only be reimbursed for costs 
incurred while carrying out their duties for the minority self-government and remunerated on a 
monthly or other basis, only if so approved and up to a limit thus approved by the minister in charge 
of general administration. 
Article 31 
(1) Minority self-governments in a self-government unit shall be entitled to: 
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• propose to self-government units measures to improve the position of the respective national 
minority nation-wide or in a specific area, including proposals of by-laws to regulate issues relevant 
for that national minority; 
• propose candidates for duties in government administration bodies and bodies of self-government 
units; 
• be informed of any issue to be discussed by the committees of the self-government unit's 
representative bodies, of relevance to that national minority; 
• give their views and make proposals to self-government unit's bodies concerning local and 
regional radio and TV broadcasts intended for national minorities or addressing minority issues. 
(2) In their bylaws the bodies of self-government units shall define the manner, time schedule and 
procedure applicable in exercising the rights stipulated in paragraph 1 of this article. 
Article 32 
(1) In drafting its by-laws the self-government unit's administration shall seek opinions and 
proposals of the minority self-government formed in its area regarding the provisions regulating 
minority rights and freedoms. 
(2) Should a minority self-government deem a self-government unit‘s by-law or any of its 
provisions to be in contravention of the Constitution, this Constitutional Law or special laws 
governing the minority rights and freedoms, it shall immediately notify thereof the ministry in 
charge of general administration, the self-government unit‘s administration and the Council for 
National Minorities. 
(3) If the ministry responsible for general administration or the Council for National Minorities 
assess the by-law from para. 2 of this article or any of its provisions to be in contravention of the 
Constitution, this Constitutional Law or the special laws governing the minority rights and 
freedoms, the ministry shall suspend its implementation within eight days. 
(4) A decision suspending implementation of a by-law shall be forwarded without delay to the 
mayor or county prefect as well as the chairman of the representative body which has passed the by-
law, and the notification of the decision shall be forwarded to the Council for National 
Minorities and the minority self-government on the basis of whose notification the decision has 
been made. 
(5) The Ministry in charge of general administration shall forward to the Croatian Government the 
decision suspending the implementation of the by-law along with a proposal to initiate proceedings 
to assess its conformity with the Constitution and the law before the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia and notify the respective self-government unit accordingly. 
(6) The suspension of a by-law shall cease to apply if the Croatian Government fails to initiate the 
proceedings from para. 5 of this article within 30 days of the date of receipt of a decision to this 
effect. 
Article 33 
(1) Two or more minority self-governments of a local or regional self-government unit may for the 
purpose of harmonisation and promotion of joint interests set up a steering committee of minority 
self-governments. 
(2) Through the steering committee the minority self-governments shall harmonise their views on 
matters within the scope of their responsibilities. 
(3) Minority self-governments may authorise the steering committee to take on their behalf 
measures from article 31 of this Constitutional Law. 
(4) The minority self-governments of regional self-government units shall be deemed to have set up 
a steering committee for the territory of the Republic of Croatia once the agreement to set up such a 
steering committee has been acceded by more than half of the minority self-governments of 
regional self-government. 
Appendixes – 2. The Croatian constitutional law on the rights of national minorities   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
362 
 
(5) The minority self-government steering committee set up by minority self-governments of 
regional self-government units for the territory of the Republic of Croatia can make decisions on  
the national minority insignia and symbols and on minority holidays, in concordance with the 
Council for National Minorities. 
Article 34 
(1) A minority representative shall perform his/ her duties under the title both in the Croatian 
language and Latin script and in the language and script of the national minority which has elected 
him/ her, containing also a reference to the region for which he/ she has been elected. 
(2) The minority representative shall open an account for funds utilised to implement minority 
rights in the area of the self-government unit for which he/ she has been elected, present the 
financial plan for utilising such funds and prepare the balance sheet. The financial plan and the 
balance sheet for funds utilised in the implementation of minority rights shall be published in the 
official gazette of the local self-government unit for the area of which the minority representative 
has been elected. 
(3) To the minority representative, his/ her powers and obligations the provisions of articles 28, 29, 
30, 31, 32 and 33 hereof shall apply as appropriate. 
IV COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES 
Article 35 
(1) A Council for National Minorities shall be set up to consider and propose ways of regulating 
and addressing issues related to the exercise and safeguarding of minority rights and freedoms. To 
this end the Council shall co-operate with competent government and self-government bodies, 
minority self-governments, national minority organisations and legal entities engaged in activities 
related to the exercise of minority rights and freedoms. 
 (2) The Council for National Minorities shall be entitled to: 
• propose to legislative and executive authorities debates on particular issues relevant for a national 
minority, especially the implementation of this Constitutional Law and the special laws governing 
minority rights and freedoms; 
• propose to legislative and executive authorities measures to improve the position of a national 
minority nation-wide or in a specific area; 
• give views and make proposals concerning public radio and TV broadcasts intended for national 
minorities, or the treatment of minority issues in public radio and TV broadcasts or other media; 
• propose taking economic, social or other measures in areas traditionally or significantly populated 
by national minorities with a view to preserving their existence in those areas. 
• seek and receive from the central government and local and regional government bodies 
information and reports required for considering matters within their scope; 
• invite and request the presence of representatives of a central government or local and regional 
government body responsible for matters within the scope of the Council as defined in this 
Constitutional Law and the Statute of the Council. 
(3) The Council for National Minorities shall co-operate in matters of interest to national minorities 
in the Republic of Croatia with competent international organisations and institutions engaged in 
minority issues and with the competent authorities of the countries of origin of the national 
minorities in the Republic of Croatia. 
(4) The Council for National Minorities shall disburse the state budget funds earmarked for the 
needs of national minorities. The beneficiaries of these funds shall file annual reports on the use of 
funds being remitted to them from the state budget, which in turn shall be reported by the Council 
to the Croatian Government and Parliament. 
(5) In case of failure of the Council for National Minorities to decide upon the disbursement of the 
funds referred to in paragraph 4 of this article within 90 days of the passage of the state budget, the 
matter shall be decided upon by the Croatian Government. 
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Article 36 
(1) Members of the Council for National Minorities shall be appointed by the Croatian Government 
for a four-year term, viz.: 
• seven minority members from among the persons proposed by minority self-governments 
• five minority members from among prominent cultural, scientific, professional or religious figures 
proposed by minority organisations, religious communities, legal entities or individual members of 
national minorities. 
(2) Members of the Council for National Minorities shall also be national minority MPs. 
(3) The Council for National Minorities shall have its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, appointed by 
the Croatian Government from among the Council members. 
(4) In appointing the members of the Council for National Minorities the Croatian Government 
shall take into account the share of particular national minorities in the total population of the 
Republic of Croatia, as well as the need for the Council's composition to reflect the identity and 
distinctive features of those national minorities, their historic values, their ethnic, cultural and every 
other peculiarity. 
(5) Chairman of the Council for National Minorities shall carry out his/ her duties professionally 
and head the Council's administrative and technical services. 
(6) The Croatian Government shall form the Council's administrative service to perform technical 
and administrative duties for the Council for National Minorities, and establish the approximate 
number of its staff. 
(7) The Council for National Minorities shall have its statute being passed with the approval of the 
Croatian Government. The statute shall define in more detail the Council‘s scope of work and 
organisation. 
(8) The Council for National Minorities shall pass its agenda, financial plan, balance sheet and 
decisions on the disbursement of state budget funds assigned for the needs of national minorities. 
(9) The Council for National Minorities shall pass the organisation rules, proposed by the 
chairperson of the Council, applicable to its professional services. 
(10) The decisions by the Council for National Minorities shall be passed by the majority of votes 
of all its members. 
(11) The agenda, financial plan and balance sheet of the Council for National Minorities, as well as 
the bylaws by virtue of which the Council is disbursing the funds provided from the state budget for 
the needs of national minorities, shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
V SUPERVISION 
Article 37 
(1) The implementation of the minority rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, this 
Constitutional Law and the special laws shall be supervised by relevant government bodies within 
the scope of their responsibilities. 
(2) The Croatian Government shall co-ordinate the work of government bodies in the application of 
this Constitutional Law and the special laws regulating issues of relevance to national minorities. 
(3) At least once a year the Croatian Government shall report to the Croatian Parliament on the 
progress of implementing this Constitutional Law and the utilisation of funds provided from the 
state budget for the needs of national minorities, whereas the Council for National Minorities shall 
file semi-annual reports to the Croatian Parliament or its committee in charge of minority rights on 
matters within the responsibility of the Council plus quarterly reports on the utilisation of funds 
provided from the state budget for the needs of national minorities. 
 
Article 38 
(1) A minority self-government or a minority representative in a self-government unit may request 
from the competent government body to review the application of this Constitutional Law and the 
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special laws governing minority rights and freedoms by the self-government units where they were 
established, and to take actions to ensure the legality of procedure, and to notify thereof the Council 
for National Minorities, which in turn shall inform the minority self-government or a minority 
representative about its position on the matter. 
(2) The Council for National Minorities may request from the Croatian Government to review the 
application of this Constitutional Law and the special laws governing minority rights and freedoms 
by the government bodies and to take actions to ensure the legality of procedure. 
 (3) Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia, the minority self-governments or a minority representative and the Council for National 
Minorities may lodge a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court if in their opinion or 
if acting upon an initiative by national minority members they consider the minority rights and 
freedoms safeguarded by this Constitutional Law and the special laws to have been violated. 
VI TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 39 
(1) The provision of article 19 of this Constitutional Law shall apply as of the date of entry into 
force of a law regulating in line with this provision the election of MPs. 
(2) The representative bodies of local and regional self-government units whose mandate is running, 
but where the right to representation by minority representatives has not been exercised in line with 
the provisions of article 20 hereof, shall be replenished by a corresponding number of minority 
representatives in the manner and within the time limits prescribed by the law regulating the 
election of representatives to the local and regional self-government representative bodies. 
Article 40 
Nothing in this Law shall be construed as including any right to engage in any activity or perform 
any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law, and in particular the sovereignty, 
unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Croatia. 
Article 41 
The rights of national minorities arising from international treaties to which the Republic of Croatia 
is a party shall not be altered or abolished by this Constitutional Law. 
Article 42 
(1) The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall appoint the members of the Council for 
National Minorities as well as its Chairman and Vice-Chairman as provided in article 34, para. 1 
hereof within 90 days of the date of entry into force of this Constitutional Law. 
(2) If by the expiry of the deadline from para. 1 of this article minority self-governments are not 
established, or if they fail to nominate before the Croatian Government their candidates to the 
Council for National Minorities, the Council shall be composed of the members appointed under the 
provisions of article 36, para. 1, indent 2 and the members appointed according to the article 36, 
para 2 hereof. 
(3) Pending the formation of the administrative service of the Council for National Minorities, the 
required technical and administrative services for the Council shall be provided by the Government 
Office for National Minorities. 
Article 43 
(1) As of the date of entry into force of this Constitutional Law the provision of article 4, para.1, 
clause 1 of the Law on the Use of Minority Languages and Script (Official Gazette No. 51/2000) 
shall cease to apply. 
(2) As of the date of entry into force of this Constitutional Law the provision of article 9 of the Law 
on the Election of Representatives to Representative Bodies of Local and Regional Self-government 
Units (Official Gazette No. 33/2001) shall cease to apply in its part stipulating the election of 
representatives to the representative bodies of local and regional self-government units from among 
the members of national minorities, as well as the provision of article 61 thereof. 
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Article 44 
As of the date of entry into force of this Constitutional Law the Constitutional Law on Human 
Rights and Freedoms and of the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the 
Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette Nos. 65/91, 27/92, 34/92 - revised text, 51/2000 and 
105/2000- revised text) shall cease to apply. 
Article 45 
This Constitutional Law shall enter into force as of the date of its publication in the Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Croatia. 
 
December 13, 2002 
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Number of Serbs and Yugoslavs in the former SR of Croatia in the post-war period 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of the Serbs in the former SR of Croatia after World War II 
Territory 1948        1953 1971 1981 1991 Index 
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % 1991/ 
1948 
1948
= 
100 
Northwest 
Dalmatia 
83,503 15.4 87,095 14.8 93,255 14.9 83,171 15.6 92,213 15.9 110.4 
Lika and 
Gorski 
Kotar 
81,420 15.0 81,600 13.9 70,168 11.2 54,435 10.3 55,114 9.5 67.7 
Bania and 
Kordun 
134,731 24.8 142,664 24.2 131,076 20.9 110,184 20.7 117,058 20.1 86.9 
Slavonia, 
Baranja 
and 
Western 
Srem 
199,929 36.7 212,098 36.0 227,803 36.3 180,339 33.9 197,209 33.9 98.6 
Other part 
of the 
former SR 
Croatia 
44,212 8.1 65,299 11.1 104,487 16.7 103,373 19.5 120,069 20.6 271.6 
Total 543,759 100 588,756 100 626,789 100 531,502 100 581,663 100 107.0 
 
 
 
Year Total 
number of 
inhabitants 
Serbs Yugoslavs   
  Count Percent Count Percent 
1948 3,779,858 543,795 14.4     
1953 3,936,022 588,756 15.0 16,964 0.4 
1961 4,159,696 624,991 15.0 15,560 0.4 
1971 4,426,221 626,789 14.2 84,118 1.9 
1981 4,601,469 531,502 11.6 379,057 8.2 
1991 4,784,265 581,653 12.2 106,041 2.2 
1991/1948 
index 
126.6 107.0 - - - 
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 Number of Serbs in Yugoslavia by Population Censuses from 1948-1991 
Republics & 
Regions 
1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
1,136,116 1,264,372 1,406,057 1,393,148 1,320,644 1,369,258 
Montenegro 6,707 13,864 14,087 39,512 19,407 57,176 
Croatia 543,795 588,411 624,985 626,789 531,502 580,762 
Macedonia 29,721 35,112 42,728 46,465 44,182 44,159 
Slovenia 7,048 11,225 13,609 20,521 42,182 47,097 
Serbia-total 4,823,730 5,152,939 5,704,686 6,016,811 6,182,159 6,428,420 
Central Serbia 3,810,573 4,088,724 4,459,953 4,699,415 4,865,283 5,081,766 
Vojvodina 841,246 874,346 1,017,717 1,089,132 1,107,378 1,151,353 
Kosovo and 
Metohia 
171,911 189,869 227,016 228,264 209,498 195,301 
SFR of 
Yugoslavia 
6,547,117 7,065,923 7,806,152 8,143,246 8,140,507 8,526,872 
 
 Persons Declaring Themselves as Yugoslavs by Population Censuses from 1961 to 
1991 
 
 
Republics & 
Regions 
1961 1971 1981 1991 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
275,883 43,796 326,316 239,845 
Montenegro 1,559 10,943 31,243 25,854 
Croatia 15,559 84,118 379,057 104,728 
Macedonia 1,260 3,652 14,225 - 
Slovenia 2,784 6,744 26,263 12,237 
Serbia - total 20,079 123,824 441,941 317,739 
Central Serbia 11,699 75,976 272,050 145,810 
Vojvodina 3,174 46,928 167,215 168,859 
Kosovo & Metohia 5,206 920 2,676 3,070 
SFR of Yugoslavia 317,124 273,077 1,219,045 - 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Serbian Questions in The Balkans, University of Belgrade, publisher - Faculty of 
Geography, Belgrade 1995. Available online at http://www.rastko.rs/istorija/srbi-balkan/index.html 
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"The Serbs are descended from the unbaptized Serbs, also called 'white', who live beyond Turkey in 
a place called by them Boiki, where their neighbour is Francia, as is also Great Croatia, the 
unbaptized, also called 'white': in this place, then, these Serbs also originally dwelt. But when two 
brothers succeeded their father in the rule of Serbia, one of them, taking a moiety of the folk, 
claimed the protection of Heraclius, the emperor of the Romans, and the same emperor Heraclius 
received him and gave him a place in the province of Thessalonica to settle in, namely Serbia, 
which from that time has acquired this denomination."... 
..."Now, after some time these same Serbs decided to depart to their own homes, and the emperor 
sent them off. But when they had crossed the river Danube, they changed their minds and sent a 
request to the emperor Heraclius, through the military governor then governing Belgrade, that he 
would grant them other land to settle in."... 
..."And since what is now Rascia (Serbia) and Pagania and the so-called country of the Zachlumi 
and Trebounia and the country of the Kanalites were under the dominion of the emperor of the 
Romans, and since these countries had been made desolate by the Avars (for they had expelled from 
those parts the Romans who now live in Dalmatia and Dyrrachium), therefore the emperor settled 
these same Serbs in these countries, and they were subject to the emperor of the Romans; and the 
emperor brought elders from Rome and baptized them and taught them fairly to perform the works 
of piety and expounded to them the faith of the Christians."... 
..."And since Bulgaria was beneath the dominion of the Romans * * * when, therefore, that same 
Serbian prince died who had claimed the emperor's protection, his son ruled in succession, and 
thereafter his grandson, and in like manner the succeeding princes from his family"... 
-De Administrando Imperio chapter 31, Constantine VII (10th century) 
 
 
Source: http://archive.org/details/DeAdministrandoImperioonTheGovernanceOfTheEmpire
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Ferdinand I Privilege awarded to the Serbian captains and dukes (1538) 
 
Ferdinand, by the grace of God always his highness king of  Rome and king of Germany, Hungary, 
Chechia, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia etc...  
 
              By this document We proclaim and announce to all concerned that Our beloved nobleman 
Nikola Jurišić,  baron of Kisek,  Our head officer in charge has informed Us that some Serbian or 
Rascian captains and dukes have decided to arrive together with their soldiers and others ruled by 
their honorable ducal names, to come into Our service and to always loyally and irretrievably stay 
and stand their ground in Our service. That is why We want, for these Serbian or Rascian captains 
and dukes, their soldiers and men under their command and their dependents, to be given and to be 
awarded an abundant and merciful gift of royal sympathy and kindness. 
 
             So that they can confirm their pledge strongly with their deed, We will, because of their 
faithful intentions and attitudes towards Us and the Christianity,  give, procure, allow, award  and 
pledge this later presented privilege of exemption from certain obligations, of assignation of certain 
rights and of awarding the freedom which should, in Our opinion, be promised, given and procured 
to consist of these things: 
 
            When these Serbian or Rascian captains and dukes, soldiers and aforementioned men under 
their command pledge an oath to Our loyal service, each family that will have lived in one 
household, under one roof and on one estate*, must, can and is allowed to live freely on Our lands 
in place of residence that Our aforementioned head officer in charge designates, and for twenty 
years without interruption shall without any tax of fee farm the land or have it leased, gather all 
crops and income from that land, without any limitation or argument. Also, We will order for each 
captain or duke of these Serbians or Rascians who has under his leadership or command 200 
soldiers, an award each year  to be received  and be given,  to be paid and counted in money  of 50 
aranyforints*, for as long as he serves Us well and faithfully. Besides that, whatever they take away 
from the hands of nonbelievers  and sworn enemies of the Christian faith, the Ottomans, whatever 
they win into their governance and possession, all of that is to belong to these Rascians except 
towns, market places, fortresses, watchtowers, captains and dignitaries,  all of which We will keep 
to rule of Our own accord. 
 
With this a condition is also added: when in Our paid service, and when having captured something 
from the nonbelievers while in this paid service, they are obliged to as well as above mentioned 
limits, to turn to Our treasurer a third of any such gain or goods, for We shall not denounce the 
profit or income of this one third of gains. 
 
We are prepared to, when and if the need arises, issue a new privilege or modify it to the advantage 
of the very Serbs or Rascians, like paying the ransom for captured men, if any of them fall prisoner 
or under the rule of Our enemy, or to reward and show special gratitude to those who prove 
themselves beyond others, by some extraordinary and praiseworthy deed,  performed in the name of 
Christian community against its sworn enemies, and when We witness that the aforementioned 
dukes, their soldiers and men in their service are working for Our own benefit and when they show 
that they deserve to be given not only this one privilege that is awarded, but a far greater gratitude 
and mercy on behalf of Us and on the behalf of the entire Christianity. 
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We pledge and promise that We shall honor this privilege, and We demand and request that all 
pledge to do the same. We confirm this with Our own signature. In Our city of Linz, on September 
the 5th 1538." 
 
Ferdinand. 
 
 
Source: http://www.rodoslovlje.com/en/documentation/ferdinand-i-privilege-awarded-serbian-
captains-and-dukes
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Ethnic groups in ex- Yugoslavia (1991) 
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Ethnic Groups in Yugoslavia," Making the History of 1989, 
Item #170, http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/170 
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Areas where Serbo-Croatian is spoken by a plurality of speakers (as of 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Serbo_croatian_language2005.png 
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Ethno-political variants of Serbo-Croatian as of 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Serbo_croatian_languages2006_02.png 
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Source: http://govori.tripod.com/hrvati_ijekavci.htm 
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The Serb migrations (1690) 
 
 
 
 
The Moving of the Serbs (Seoba Srbalja), painting by Paja Jovanović in 1896, portrays the Serbian 
Orthodox Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević, surrounded by soldiers, flocks of sheep and women with 
babies, leading some 36,000 families from his seat in Peć, Kosovo and Southern Serbia to what is 
now Vojvodina and further to Hungary in 1690, after Serbian revolts failed. 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Serbmigra.jpg 
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Serbian Krajšnici (Frontiersmen), 16th century–1882 
 
Source: http://carskepovlastice.blogspot.com/2008_05_01_archive.html 
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Source: http://grenzer.blogspot.com/2010/05/austrian-grenzers-krajisnici.html 
 
 
 
 
 
Serbian national costumes in Croatia (Western Slavonia, first half of XX century) 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.kolo.rs/kolo_plugins/autogallery/autogallery.php?show=Costumes 
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Traditional Serbian costumes from Lika 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/507/lican2006bh5.jpg/ 
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Source: http://www.pirn.hr/hr/posudionica-i-radionica-narodnih-nosnji-home/posudionica-i-
radionica-narodnih-nosnji-galerija/posudionica-i-radionica-narodnih-nosnji-galerija-nacionalne-
manjine-u-hrvatskoj.html 
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Traditional cap from Lika 
 
 
Source: http://www.korenicani.com/slike/kapa.jpg  Source: http://www.nasa-lika.com 
     
 
The traditional cap from Lika cap appeared in the rocky area of the region of Lika. It symbolizes the 
suffering of the Serbian people during the Ottoman Empire and the Battle of Kosovo. The cap is a 
symbol of the Old Jug Bogdan, and its nine fringes symbolize the death of nine Jugović brothers. 
The red color symbolizes the bloodshed in the Serbian struggle for the freedom of all the Serbian 
people. The black rim symbolizes the mourning Serbian mothers, sisters, daughters and other 
women's for the death of the Serbian knights. The rim of the cap is made of strong embroidered 
thread as a symbol of the connection among the Serbs. The inside is set with black lining. There are 
no markings on it. The Lika cap is worn also in Dalmatia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, with some 
differences. The Lika cap is worn also in the Bosnian Krajina, because the Bosnian Krajina was 
opulated with people from Krajina, Lika and Dalmatia.  
 
Source: http://www.licka-sarenica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47:lika-
kapa&catid=61:obiaji 
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Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Croatia 
 
  
 
 
(In the picture the former Croatian president Stipe Mesić and the actual Serbian president Boris 
Tadić in a visit to the Krka Monastery) 
 
Three and a half kilometers east of Kistanje, in the canyon of Krka River, stands a monastery 
named after the river that runs beside it. This ancient monastery Krka erected the Serbian princess 
Jelena, sister of Serbian Emperor Dušan, married to Croatian Prince Mladen Šubić II. It was the 
year 1350. Monastery Krka  is dedicated to St. Archangel Michael. The monastery was devastated 
and burned during the wars between Turks and Venetians. 
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   Krupa Monastery is located at the foot of the 
Velebit Mountains, near the sources of the eponymous river. It was built at the time of King Milutin 
in 1317
th
. Tradition has it that he set the foundations of monks from the monastery Krupa on the 
Vrbas. Just like the monasteries Krka and Dragović, the Krupa Monastery has always shared the 
fate of the Serbian Orthodox people from these regions, where it belonged. He often suffered in the 
various invasions. But after that is always restored. 
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Monastery Dragović is situated on a hill downstream the Cetina River not far from the place called 
Vrlika. The present monastery building is the third one placed on the third locality. The Serbs from 
Bosnia, who ran away from Turks to the territory of the Cetinska krajina, erected the first monastery 
building in 1395. It has been looted and devastated several time during the centuries. In autumn 
2004, basic conditions have been achieved for the return of monks. 
 
Source: http://www.eparhija-dalmatinska.hr/Frames-e.htm 
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Lepavina monastery was built around the 1550th year, soon after the formation of the first Serbian 
settlements in this area. The history of the monastery Lepavina is inextricably linked with the 
history of the Serbs in Varaţdin Generalship. From the time of its restoration, heavy fighting was 
led against the attempts of religious assimilations and the attempts of feudalizing the Serb 
Frontiersmen. In defense of their religion and national privilege (Statute Valahorum) the monks 
from Lepavina fought with the people and often suffered them. It has been ruined several times, but 
the worst episode was the bombing during World War II. 
 
Source:  
http://www.mitropolija-
zagrebacka.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37%3A2009-12-23-08-25-
22&catid=2%3A2009-12-23-08-21-46&Itemid=5&lang=sr 
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Notable Serbs of Croatia 
 
 
 Ruđer Josip Bošković (Dubrovnik, Croatia, 18 
May 1711 –  Milano, Italy, 13 February 1787) was a physicist, astronomer, mathematician, 
philosopher, diplomat, poet, theologian, Jesuit, and a polymath from the city of Dubrovnik in the 
Republic of Ragusa (today Croatia), who studied and lived in Italy and France where he also 
published many of his works. He is famous for his atomic theory and made many important 
contributions to astronomy, including the first geometric procedure for determining the equator of a 
rotating planet from three observations of a surface feature and for computing the orbit of a planet 
from three observations of its position. In 1753 he also discovered the absence of atmosphere on the 
Moon. His father, Nikola Bošković, was a Serb trader from present day Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and his mother, Paola Bettera was a member of a cultivated Italian merchant family established in 
Dubrovnik since the early seventeenth century. 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Joseph_Boscovich 
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 Josip Runjanian or Josif Runjanin (Vinkovci, 
Croatia, 8 December 1821– Novi Sad, Serbia, 2 February 1878) was a Serb composer from 
Habsburg Monarchy (born in the territory of present-day Croatia, died in the territory of present-day 
Serbia), most notably known for composing the melody of the Croatian national anthem ―Lijepa 
naša domovino‖(Our beautiful homeland) and of the Serbian patriotic song "Rado Srbin ide u 
vojnike" (Gladly will the Serb enlist in the Army). He was lieutenant-colonel in the Habsburg 
Army. 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josif_Runjanin 
 
 Svetozar Borojević von Bojna (Umetić near 
Kostajnic, Croatia, 13 December 1856 – Klagenfurt, 23 May 1920) was an Austro-Hungarian field 
marshal who was described as one of the finest defensive strategists of the First World War. He 
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came from Croatia but spent his entire life in the imperial military, becoming a nobleman as Baron 
von Bojna, and later rising to the rank of Field Marshal before the end of the First World War in 
1918, becoming the first and only holder of that rank in the Austro-Hungarian Empire who was not 
of German origin. The accounts of his ethnic and national origin differ because even though he was 
baptized in the local Orthodox Church and his family was described as a "Serbian Grenzer family‖, 
he did not express a Serb nationality, rather he consistently stated that he was a "Croat‖ and is 
sometimes described as such, while most foreign sources simply refer to him as "Croatian".  
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svetozar_Boroevi%C4%87#cite_note-Tucker135-0 
 
  Nikola Tesla (10 July 1856 – 7 January 1943), was an 
inventor, mechanical engineer, and electrical engineer. He was an important contributor to the birth 
of commercial electricity, and is best known for developing the modern alternating current (AC) 
electrical supply system. His many revolutionary developments in the field of electromagnetism in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries were based on the theories of electromagnetic technology 
discovered by Michael Faraday. Tesla's patents and theoretical work also formed the basis of 
wireless communication and the radio. He was born in the village of Smiljan in the region of Lika 
(in present day Croatia) to Serbian parents, being his father Milutin Tesla a priest in the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. During World War II the Croatian Ustaše burned the Orthodox Church near his 
house and murdered several of his fellow villagers as well as destroyed his monument, while during 
the Yugoslavian wars of the early 1990s his family house was burned by the Croatian army. On July 
10
th
 2006, a Memorial Center was open in his family home on the occasion of the 150
th
 anniversary 
of Tesla‘s birth, under the sponsorship of the Government of the Republic of Croatia.  
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikola_Tesla 
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 Milutin Milanković (Dalj, Croatia, 28 May 1879 – 
Beograd, Serbia, 12 December 1958) was a Serbian geophysicist and civil engineer, best known for 
his theory of ice ages, suggesting a relationship between Earth's long-term climate changes and 
periodic changes in its orbit, now known as Milankovitch cycles. Born to Serbian, Orthodox parents 
in the village of Dalj, Austria-Hungary, today Croatia.  
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milutin_Milankovi%C4%87 
 
 Patriarch Pavle (11 September 1914 – 15 November 
2009) was the 44th Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church. the spiritual leader of Eastern 
Orthodox Serbs, from 1990 to his death. His full title was His Holiness the Archbishop of Peć, 
Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovci, Serbian Patriarch Pavle. Before his death, he was the oldest 
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living leader of an Eastern Orthodox Church. Pavle was born Gojko Stojĉević in the village of 
Kućanci, near Donji Miholjac in what is today Croatia. 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Pavle_of_Serbia 
 
 
 Rade Šerbedžija (born 27 July 1946), is a 
Croatian actor, director and musician of Serb origin. He was one of the most popular Yugoslav 
actors in the 1970s and 1980s. He is now internationally known mainly for his supporting roles in 
Hollywood films during the 1990s and 2000s. His last known role is in the controversial film 
produced by Angelina Jolie, ―In the land of blood and honey‖ (2011). 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rade_%C5%A0erbed%C5%BEija 
 
 
 
 
